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Abstract
In the field of interactive coding, two or more parties wish to carry out a distributed
computation over a communication network that may be noisy. The ultimate goal is to develop
efficient coding schemes that can tolerate a high level of noise while increasing the communication
by only a constant factor (i.e., constant rate).
In this work we consider synchronous communication networks over an arbitrary topology,
in the powerful adversarial insertion-deletion noise model. Namely, the noisy channel may
adversarially alter the content of any transmitted symbol, as well as completely remove a
transmitted symbol or inject a new symbol into the channel.
We provide efficient, constant rate schemes that successfully conduct any computation with
high probability as long as the adversary corrupts at most εm fraction of the total communication,
where m is the number of links in the network and ε is a small constant. This scheme assumes
the parties share a random string to which the adversarial noise is oblivious. We can remove
this assumption at the price of being resilient to εm logm adversarial error.
While previous work considered the insertion-deletion noise model in the two-party setting, to
the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first multiparty scheme that is resilient to insertions
and deletions. Furthermore, our scheme is the first computationally efficient scheme in the
multiparty setting that is resilient to adversarial noise.
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1 Introduction
In his pioneering work, Schulman [Sch92, Sch96] introduced and studied the problem of how can
one perform an interactive two-party computation over a noisy communication channel. In [RS94],
Rajagopalan and Schulman extended the two-party case and considered a network of n parties
that wish to compute some function of their private inputs by communicating over an arbitrary1
noisy network. The work of [RS94] shows that if each channel is the binary symmetric channel2
(BSCε), then one can obtain a coding scheme that takes any protocol Π that assumes noiseless
communication, and converts it into a resilient protocol that computes the same task over the noisy
network.
The coding scheme in [RS94] defies noise by adding redundancy. The amount of added redundancy
is usually measured with respect to the noiseless setting—the rate of the coding is the communication
of the noiseless protocol divided by the communication of the noise-resilient one. The rate assumes
values between zero and one, and ideally the rate is bounded away from zero, commonly known as
constant or positive rate. The rate may vary according to the network in consideration, for instance,
the rate in [RS94] behaves as 1/O(log(d+ 1)) where d is the maximal degree in the network. Hence,
for networks where the maximal degree is non-constant, the rate approaches zero as the network
size increases.
The next major step for multiparty coding schemes was provided by Jain et al. [JKL15] and
by Hoza and Schulman [HS16]. In these works the noise is no longer assumed to be stochastic but
instead is adversarial. That is, they consider worst-case noise where the only limit is the amount of
bits flipped by the adversary. They showed that as long as the adversary flips at most ε/m-fraction
of the total communication, a coding scheme with a constant rate can be achieved, where ε is some
small constant, and m is the number of communication links in the network.3 Hoza and Schulman
further improved the noise resilience to O(1/n), where n is the number of parties, at the expense of
reducing the rate to 1/O(m log(n)/n), which is no longer constant.
In this work we further improve the state of the art and show coding schemes for arbitrary
networks that defy a stronger type of noise, namely, insertions and deletions. This type of noise may
completely remove a transmission (so that the receiver is not aware that a bit was sent to him), or
inject new transmissions (so that the receiver receives a bit while the sender didn’t send anything).
Insertion and deletion noise is more general, and considered to be more difficult, than bit-flips.
Indeed, a bit flip (a substitution noise) can be simulated by a deletion followed by an insertion.
Our first coding scheme (Algorithm A) achieves a constant rate, and is resilient to ε/m-fraction of
adversarial insertion, deletion, and substitution noise,4 assuming the parties share a common random
string, and assuming the adversarial noise is oblivious to this common randomness. In our second
coding scheme (Algorithm B), we remove the common randomness assumption and remove the
restriction of the obliviousness of the adversary, at the price of being resilient to ε/(m logm)-fraction
of insertion, deletion, and substitution errors. If we assume the parties pre-share a random string,
then we can further improve the resilience against a non-oblivious adversary to ε/m log logm-fraction
of insertion and deletion errors (Algorithm C).
1By “arbitrary” we mean that the topology of the network can be an arbitrary graph G = (V,E) where each node
is a party and each edge is a communication channel connecting the parties associated with these nodes.
2That is, a channel that flips every bit with some constant probability ε ∈ (0, 1/2).
3[JKL15] obtained this result for the specific star network, whereas [HS16] generalized this result to a network
with arbitrary topology.
4We assume that each insertion, deletion, or substitution counts as a single corruption.
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A main feature of our coding schemes is that they are all computationally efficient. So far,
all previous coding schemes that considered adversarial noise in the multiparty setting used a
combinatorial object known as a tree code for which no efficient construction is known. See Table 1
for a comparison of our new results (Algorithms A, B, and C) with the state of the art.
scheme topology noise level noise type rate efficient
RS94 arbitrary BSCε 1/O(log(d+ 1))
ABGEH16 clique BSCε Θ(1) Yes
HS16 arbitrary O(1/m) substitution Θ(1)
HS16 arbitrary O(1/n) substitution 1/O(m log(n)/n)
JKL15 star O(1/m) substitution Θ(1)
Algorithm A arbitrary O(1/m) oblivious insertionsand deletions Θ(1) Yes
Algorithm B arbitrary O(1/(m logm))
insertions and
deletions Θ(1) Yes
pre-shared
randomness:
Algorithm C arbitrary O(1/m log logm)
insertions and
deletions Θ(1) Yes
Table 1: Interactive coding schemes in the multiparty setting
The communication model. Some care should be taken when defining the communication
model in the presence of insertions and deletions (see, for instance, [BGMO17, SW17] for the
two-party case). Consider, for instance, a network where at each round every party sends a single
bit to all its neighbors; this setting is used by [RS94, HS16, ABE+16, BEGH17] and is sometimes
called fully utilized. In such a setting, insertions and deletions reduce to substitutions and erasures:
since exactly one bit is expected at every round, if no bit has arrived at a given round this must be
due to adversarial activity.
In this work we consider a more relaxed communication setting, where a party may or may
not speak at a given round; this setting is very common for distributed computations and was
previously considered for interactive coding by [JKL15, GK17]. Furthermore, we no longer assume
that the underlying error-free protocol is fully utilized. We relax that assumption and only require
the underlying protocol to have a fixed order of speaking, which is independent of the parties’ inputs.
Naturally, one can convert any protocol in our model to a fully-utilized protocol by forcing all parties
to speak at every round, and then apply an interactive coding scheme to the fully-utilized protocol.
However, the conversion to a fully-utilized protocol may cause the communication complexity to
increase by a factor of up to m, and thus prevent a constant rate coding.
As first noted by Hoza [Hoz15], when parties are allowed to keep silent at certain rounds, the
pattern of communication may carry information by itself. To see that, consider a party that speaks
once every two rounds—on an even round to communicate the bit ‘0’ and on odd round to denote ‘1’.
In fact, this kind of communication is completely resilient to noise that only flips bits since only the
timing of the transmission matters. Therefore, in this setting it seems crucial to allow insertion and
deletion errors, which we do.
We note that even though our noise-resilient protocol increases the communication complexity
by only a constant factor, it may blow up the number of rounds of communication by more than
a constant factor. As opposed to the fully utilized model, where the communication complexity
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determines the round complexity, this is no longer the case in our model. Specifically, in our model
an interactive protocol with communication complexity CC may consist of CC/m rounds (in the case
that the network if fully utilized) or may consist of CC rounds (in the case where the communication
is very sparse).
In a recent work, Efremenko et al. [EHK18] constructed an interactive coding scheme resilient
to insertions and deletions that blows up both the communication and the round complexity by at
most a constant factor. They considered only the two-party setting, and a communication model in
which in each round each party sends a message of an arbitrary length. We leave the problem of
extending their result to the multiparty setting for future work.
1.1 Our results
We give efficient interactive coding schemes with constant rate for arbitrary synchronous networks
(not necessarily fully-utilized) that suffer from a certain fraction of insertion, deletion and substitution
noise. Our result is two-fold. First, we assume that the parties share a common random string,
and that the adversary is oblivious, i.e., the noise is predetermined and is independent of this
randomness. In this case our result is as follows.
Theorem 1.1 (common randomness, oblivious noise, informal). Let G = (V,E) be an arbitrary
synchronous network with n = |V | nodes and m = |E| links. For any noiseless protocol Π over G
with a predetermined order of speaking, and for any sufficiently small constant ε, there exists an
efficient coding scheme that simulates Π over a noisy network G, assuming the parties share common
randomness. The simulated protocol is robust to adversarial insertion, deletion, and substitution
noise, assuming at most ε/m-fraction of the communication is corrupted. The simulated protocol
communicates O(CC(Π)) bits, and succeeds with probability at least 1− exp(−CC(Π)/m), assuming
the noise is oblivious.
Next, we remove the common randomness and the restriction to oblivious noise. Namely, we
consider adversaries that may adaptively decide which transmissions to corrupt according to the
observed transcript, as well as the parties inputs (however, the noise is unaware of any private
coin-tossing a party may perform later in the protocol). In this case we still obtain an efficient
coding scheme with a constant rate, albeit, with slightly smaller noise resilience.
Theorem 1.2 (no common randomness, non-oblivious noise, informal). Let G = (V,E) be an
arbitrary synchronous network with n = |V | nodes and m = |E| links. For any noiseless protocol Π
over G with a predetermined order of speaking, and for any sufficiently small constant ε, there exists
an efficient coding scheme that simulates Π over a noisy network G. The simulated protocol is robust
to adversarial insertion, deletion, and substituition noise, assuming at most (ε/m logm)-fraction of
the communication is corrupted. The simulated protocol communicates O(CC(Π)) bits, and succeeds
with probability at least 1− exp(−CC(Π)/m).
In Appendix B we consider the case where the adversarial channel is non-oblivious, however, the
parties pre-share randomness. In this case we show a coding scheme (Algorithm C) that is resilient
to a somewhat higher noise level of ε/m log logm-fraction of insertion and deletion noise, while still
incurring a constant blowup in the communication. See Appendix B for the complete details.
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1.2 Our techniques
The basic idea towards constructing a multiparty coding scheme, is to have each pair of parties
perform a two-party coding scheme [RS94, JKL15, HS16]. However, merely correcting errors in a
pairwise manner is insufficient, since if a pair of parties found an inconsistency and backtracked,
this may cause new inconsistencies (in particular, between these parties and their other neighbors).
In [JKL15], this problem was solved by assuming there is one party who is connected to all parties
(i.e., the star topology). This party has a global view on the progress of the simulation in the entire
network, and hence can function as the “conductor of the orchestra.”
In our setting, where the topology may be arbitrary, no such central party exists and consequently
no party knows the state of the simulation in the entire network. Instead, each party only sees
its local neighborhood, and needs to propagate its “status” to the entire network in a completely
decentralized manner.
We mention that Hoza and Schulman [HS16] also considered an arbitrary topology, but they
consider the fully-utilized model. Loosely speaking, correcting errors in the fully-utilized model
seems easier since the parties can afford to do a consistency check at every round, and therefore the
error is caught before too much wasted communication occurred. We elaborate on this point later.
In order to keep our simulation efficient, as opposed to previous works in the multiparty setting
which used the (inefficient) tree-code approach, we use the rewind-if-error approach [Sch92, BK12,
KR13, Hae14, GHK+18] (see also [Gel17]). Namely, each two neighboring parties send a hash of
their simulated pairwise transcripts, and if the hash values do not match, then an error is detected,
and the two parties initiate a “meeting-points” mechanism [Sch92, Hae14] in order to find a previous
point where their transcripts agree.
As mentioned above, once a party u decides to rewind due to an error on the link (u, v), this
has an effect on the simulation of u with its other neighbors, and those should be rewound to the
same point as well. We emphasize that merely running the meeting-points mechanism with all the
neighbors does not get the desired result, since the transcripts that u shares with its other neighbors
agree!
The next idea that comes to mind is to have party u artificially truncate its transcript with
all its neighbors and initiate a meeting-points sequence. However, this approach runs into several
difficulties. First, this causes the rewind to be made sequentially, and can result in different parties
simulating a different part of the original protocol at a given time (and thus cause the parties to be
“out of sync”).
To illustrate this point, consider the line topology, where for each i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}, party i is
connected to party i− 1 and i+ 1 (and party 1 is connected only to party 2 and party n is connected
only to party n− 1). Moreover, suppose that the underlying protocol proceeds in chunks, where in
each chunk the parties send messages in a straight-line manner from party 1 to party n− 1, and
then party n− 1 and party n send n messages back-and-forth to each other. Note that since we do
not want to increase the overall communication complexity by more than a constant factor, we can
only do consistency checks once every chunk.
Next suppose that an error occurred between parties 1 and 2 in a given chunk r. In particular,
this implies that the n bits communicated between party n − 1 and party n in this chunk are
useless. Assuming there were no additional errors or hash collisions, parties 1 and 2 will notice this
inconsistency in chunk r + 1, which will cause them to rewind their pairwise transcript. As a result,
parties 2 and 3 will notice this error in chunk r + 2, and so on. Note that parties n− 1 and n will
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only notice this error at chunk n− 1, and at that point, these two parties will send Θ(n2) wasted
communication.5
To overcome this blowup, we introduce a “flag-passing” phase in which each party informs the
network whether all seems correct and the simulation should continue, or it is in a error-correcting
state and the network should idle. To this end, each party generates its own continue/idle flag,
and these flags are communicated via a spanning tree over the network in a standard convergecast
manner: the leafs transfer their flag to their parents and so on until the flag reaches the root. Each
node passes a “continue” flag if and only if all the incoming flags from its children, as well as its own
flag, are “continue”. Once the flag reaches the root the process repeats in the other direction, so that
all nodes obtain the final flag (as long as there were no errors in the flag-passing communication).
Note that O(n) bits are sent during this flag-passing phase. To ensure that this does not blow
up the communication, the flag passing phase cannot be run too often. In particular, in order to
obtain a constant blowup, we are allowed to communicate O(1) bits of meta-data per 1 bit of the
protocol we simulate. To this end, our noise-resilient protocol will consist of phases, where each
phase will take care of one specific activity in the simulation and will have at most O(m) bits of
communication. We now briefly sketch the different phases in our protocol, and refer the reader to
Section 3.1 for an elaborated sketch of the protocol’s structure and a detailed description of the
various phases and their role.
In the simulation phase we simulate a (small) chunk of the original protocol consisting of Θ(m)
bits. Then we run a consistency-check phase, where the parties check if they are consistent with
their neighbors via the meeting points mechanism. This consistency-check phase (which we call the
meeting points phase) consists of at least m bits, since all the neighbors communicate. In order to
avoid a blowup in communication, we will also ensure it takes no more than Θ(m) bits, interleaving
its functionality over several iterations, if needed. Next we run the flag-passing phase, which as
discussed above, takes O(n) communication. If the flag-passing propagated an idle flag, then in the
next simulation phase each party simply sends a dummy message, and in the next consistency-check
phase the parties will try to make progress and correct the errors. If the propagated flag is a
continue flag then the parties continue to simulate the next chunk of the protocol.
It turns out, however, that the high-level protocol described above is insufficient. As argued
above, it may take n rounds of consistency checks for the entire network to do the necessary
rewinding caused by a single error. During this time the network is idle (to ensure that the parties
remain in sync), and yet Θ(m · n) bits are communicated. Thus, a single error can cause an increase
of Θ(m · n) in the communication complexity (during which no progress is made in the protocol). It
then follows that, using this approach, if we want to obtain only constant blowup in communication
we can only afford 1/mn-fraction of error. One of the conceptual novelties of this work is in the
way we get around this blowup. This is done by separating the rewindings that stem from channel
noise from ones that stem from the rewinding corresponding to other links, and not due to noise
on that specific link. The first type will be corrected using the meeting-points approach. For the
second type, we introduce a new rewind phase in which the parties can send “rewind” requests to
their neighbors. Such a rewind request (if accepted) causes the receiver to truncate a single chunk
of its transcript simulated on that link. This process essentially speeds up the rewinding process in
5We emphasize that this problem does not exist in the fully-utilized network, since in that setting a consistency
check can occur in each round. That is, party 1 and 2 will be able to detect the error after one round, rather than
after O(n) rounds as in the non fully-utilized example.
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the entire network. As usual, caution should be taken since these requests may arrive corrupted at
the other side (or be injected by the noisy channel, etc.).
Finally, we mention that there are several other delicate issues that need to be dealt with. To
give just a single example, one can observe it is important that the parties all agree on which phase
they are currently in: whether it is the consistency-check phase (where the meeting point mechanism
is run), the flag-passing phase, the simulation phase (which may be a dummy phase if the parties
should not simulate due to an idle flag), or the rewinding phase (described above).
To avoid any possible confusion we fix the number of rounds each phase takes. This leads
to several difficulties. For instance, the meeting-point mechanism may span over many rounds
(proportional to the number of corruptions observed). If the meeting point mechanism takes more
than the predetermined number of rounds allocated to the consistency-check phase, we will not
be able to complete it during that phase. Instead, we let it span over several iterations of the
consistency-check phase (separated by the other phases). We do this by ensuring that each of these
phases consist of an a priori fixed number of rounds.
Furthermore, for the simulation phase, we need to partition the underlying (errorless) protocol
into a predetermined number of rounds, while ensuring that each such chunk consists of Θ(m) bits.
Note that this is not trivial at all since, assuming a general protocol, a fixed number of rounds (say, R)
implies a communication between R and mR bits, and moreover, the amount of communication
may depend on the specific inputs and noise that the parties see. Due the above, we will assume
that in the underlying protocol, whether a message is sent between a pair of parties in a given
round is known and does not depend on the private inputs or the transcript so far (and only the
content of the message depends on the inputs and the transcript). We will define a chunk as a set
of consecutive rounds that consists of Θ(m) communication in our underlying protocol, and let the
predetermined number of rounds in the simulation phase be larger than the number of rounds in the
longest chunk (where the parties remain quiet after the chunk is done, until the simulation phase is
over).
A more detailed overview of the coding scheme can be found in Section 3.1.
Common random string In our interactive coding scheme described above, during the consis-
tency phase, parties send each other a hash of their simulated transcript. At first, we assume that
the seeds to these hash functions come in the form of shared randomness (also known as a common
random string), and we analyze the protocol assuming the adversary is oblivious to this shared
random string.
Next, we show how to remove the need for this shared common randomness. The basic idea is
adopted from previous work [GMS11, BK12, Hae14]: simply have each pair of parties sample this
string and send it across their shared link. However, this random string is very long, and sending it
will increase the communication complexity by a quadratic factor. Therefore, instead, the parties
communicate a short random string S which serves as a seed that generates a longer δ-biased string.
This is done via a well-known technique by Naor and Naor [NN93], or Alon et al. [AGHP92]. This
δ-biased randomness is used instead of the shared randomness above.
Intuitively, δ-biased randomness suffices, since hashing with a δ-biased seed behaves “close” to
hashing with a truly uniform seed. However, this holds only when the input to the hash function
is independent of the δ-biased seed. Unfortunately, in our setting, the input to the hash function
may depend on the δ-biased seed. More specifically, in our coding scheme, the parties hash their
partial transcripts in each meeting points phase, and these partial transcripts do depend on seed,
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since they are a function of the output of previous hashes, e.g., on whether or not hash-collisions
occurred in previous rounds.
We circumvent this issue by showing that a given pattern of hash-collisions determines the
(partial) transcripts throughout the protocol. Once the transcripts are fixed, the hashes output
behave similarly to the case of uniform randomness, up to a statistical difference of at most δ.
Therefore, if δ is small enough, we can prove robustness for all possible fixed patterns of hash-
collisions. Then, we can union bound over all the possible patterns of hash collisions, which bounds
the failure probability for the δ-biased case by the failure of the uniform case plus an error term
that depends on δ and the cardinality of the different hash patterns. One cannot take δ to be too
small, since generating the δ-biased string requires communicating ≈ O(m log(1/δ)) bits, hence the
smaller δ gets, the more communication we need. Luckily, we can set δ to be sufficiently small so
that the probability of failure is still exponentially small even after the union bound, while keeping
a constant rate in the communication.
We refer the reader to Section 5 for details.
Our analysis A main hurdle is analyzing the correctness of the scheme and its probability of
success. As in previous works, the analysis is done using a potential argument that measures the
progress of the simulation. The progress of each individual link is given by a potential function
similar to the one in [Hae14]. On top of this per-link potential, we need to measure the progress
from a “global” point of view. We next highlight the main technical difficulties in our analysis (that
do not come up in previous works).
The first difficulty arises from our communication model, which is not fully-utilized. As a result,
the communication complexity of the noise-resilient protocol is not a priori bounded, even if the
communication in the underlying error-free protocol is bounded. In particular, suppose that in the
underlying errorless protocol, in most of the rounds the communication is sparse (say, a single party
speaks in each round). The adversary can insert errors that will cause the parties get out of sync,
and as a result all speak simultaneously. Thus, by inserting errors, the communication increases,
which in turn gives the adversary additional budget to inject more error. This issue does not come
into play in the fully-utilized model, since in that setting, if the underlying protocol takes R rounds,
then in the noise-resilient protocol the parties simply abort after O(R) rounds, which ensures only
a constant blowup to the communication complexity. In our setting, we also instruct the parties
to abort after O(R) rounds, but in our case the communication can still increase from O(R) to
O(R ·m).
The second difficulty relates to hash collisions. Recall that our noise-resilient protocol consists of
phases, where in the consistency phase all parties check if they are consistent with their neighbors.
This is done using the meeting points mechanism, in which each party sends a hash of their (partial)
transcript. To ensure that the communication rate remains constant, the hash functions have
constant output length, and thus a pair of parties will not notice an error between them with constant
probability. This event is known as a hash collision.
We note that in the two party coding scheme of [Hae14] hash collisions also occur with constant
probability, which was the main technical hurdle in that work. However, in our work, the situation
is much worse, since the number of parties is large, and in particular larger than the inverse of the
collision probability. To exemplify the issue, consider (as above) the example of a line network: if an
error occurs between parties 1 and 2, then they will need to propagate this throughout the line, but
with very high probability there will be a hash collision and the propagation will fail! In addition,
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hash collisions may cause the parties to continue simulating the protocol in a wrong manner, hence,
may increase the communication even further (and as a result increasing the error budget).
Indeed, bounding the expected number of hash collisions is a subtle task, and is a main component
of our proof. This is done in three steps.
We begin by assuming the parties share a common random string (CRS), and assume that
the noise is independent of this CRS. As mentioned above, this random string is used as seeds to
the hash functions, making it so the probability of a hash-collision is exponentially small in the
output length, for any given input. We bound (with high probability) the number of hash-collision
and as a result, show that the total communication increased by only a constant factor (with high
probability). This part of the analysis is quite similar to the analysis done in previous works (in
particular, the work of [Hae14]).
We then remove the CRS, by replacing the CRS with a δ-biased string, and argue that the
number of hash-collision does not increase by much, assuming the adversary is oblivious to the
δ-biased string. As mentioned above, this part is quite subtle, and requires careful conditioning of
probabilistic events, and a careful setting of the parameters to ensure that the union bound does
not reduce the probability of success by too much.
Finally, we consider the case where the adversary is non-oblivious. We would like to follow the
approach of [Hae14] and simply union bound over all the possible oblivious attacks. Unfortunately,
as opposed to the two-party case of [Hae14], here there are too many options for attacks that lead
to too many possible hash collisions, and the proof fails spectacularly.
We briefly elaborate on how a non-oblivious adversary can use his options to attack our protocol.
Fix an edge (u, v) in the network, and suppose for simplicity that we use truly random functions
for our hashes. Since we use constant length hash outputs and the adversary knows the randomly
generated seeds ahead of time, with constant probability over the random seed, the adversary can
corrupt the simulation on the link (u, v) in such a way that a hash collision is ensured in the next
meeting points phase. In this case, the parties will not detect the error between them, and will
continue to simulate another chunk. But there is no guarantee that it will be caught in the following
phase either; if the adversary was fortunate, perhaps he was able to make an error that causes
hash collisions in two consecutive meeting points phases. Generalizing this reasoning, we can see
that with probability 1/m, the adversary can force hash collisions on the link (u, v) for Θ(log(m))
consecutive phases, which leads to Θ(m log(m)) wasted communication. But since there are m links
for the adversary to choose from when making his error, with high probability there exists a link
on which this is possible. Therefore, he can create Θ(m log(m)) wasted communication with just a
single error.
To overcome this issue, we must increase the length of the hash output, so it is no longer
constant but rather Θ(logm). Then the inherent hash-collision probability drops to 1/poly(m), and
the union bound yields the desired outcome. However, the length of each hash increased from a
constant to Θ(logm), and the rate of the coding scheme is no longer constant. To overcome this
issue, we simulate the protocol in larger chunks. That is, instead of sending a hash every Θ(m)
bits of communication of Π, parties exchange hashes of length Θ(logm) every Θ(m logm) bits of
simulation, thus increasing the overall communication by just a constant factor.
1.3 Related work
As mentioned above, interactive coding was initiated by Schulman [Sch92, Sch96]. Over the last
several years there has been tremendous amount of work on interactive coding schemes in the
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two-party setting (e.g., [GMS14, BR14, BE14, BKN14, GH14, GHK+18]), and in the multi-party
setting (detailed below). We refer the reader to [Gel17] for a survey on the field (and to references
therein).
In what follows we only mentions the schemes that are closely related to our setting, namely,
ones that are either in the multiparty setting, or ones that are in the two-party setting but are
resilient to insertions and deletions.
Coding schemes for insertions and deletions in the two-party setting were first constructed by
Braverman, Gelles, Mao, and Ostrovsky [BGMO17]. As was noted above, that in the model where
in each round each party sends a single bit (which is the model used by most previous works,
including [BGMO17]), insertions and deletions are only meaningful in the asynchronous model, as
otherwise, such an error model is equivalent to the erasure model. However, the asynchronous
model seems to be incompatible with insertions and deletions, since a single deletion can cause a
“deadlock”, where both parties wait to the next incoming message. Braverman et al. suggested a
model where any deletion is followed by an insertion, thus the protocol never “halts” due to noise.
However, the noise may delete a certain message and then inject a spoofed “reply” to the original
sender. Then, one party believes that the protocol has progressed by one step, while the other party
is completely oblivious to this. This type of noise was called synchronization attack as it brings the
parties out of synch.
Braverman et al. [BGMO17] constructed a coding scheme for insertions and deletions in this
model with constant communication rate, and resilience to constant fraction of noise. Later,
Sherstov and Wu [SW17] showed that a very similar scheme can actually resist an optimal noise
level. Both these schemes are computationally inefficient. Haeupler, Shahrasbi, and Vitercik [HSV17]
constructed an efficient scheme that is resilient to (a small) constant fraction of insertions and
deletions. Furthermore, they constructed a scheme where the communication rate approaches 1 as
the noise level approaches 0. Efremenko, Haramaty, and Kalai [EHK18] considered the synchronous
setting, where parties can send messages of arbitrary length in each round, and the adversary may
insert and delete bits in the content of each message. They construct an efficient coding scheme
with constant communication rate, and constant blowup in the round complexity, that are resilient
to a small constant fraction of noise.
In the multiparty setting, Rajagopalan and Schulman [RS94] constructed a coding scheme for
stochastic noise with rate 1/O(log(d + 1)) for networks with maximal degree d. This implies a
constant rate coding scheme for graphs with constant degree. Alon et al. [ABE+16] showed that if
the topology is a clique, or a dense d-regular graph, then constant rate coding is also possible. Yet,
Braverman, Efremenko, Gelles, and Haeupler [BEGH17] proved that a constant rate is impossible if
the topology is a star. All the above works assume a synchronous fully-utilized network. Gelles
and Kalai [GK17] showed that constant rate coding schemes are impossible also on graphs with
constant degree, such as a cycle, assuming a synchronous, yet not fully-utilized model.
The case of adversarial noise in the multiparty setting was first considered by Jain, Kalai, and
Lewko [JKL15], who constructed a constant-rate coding scheme over an asynchronous star network
that is resilient to O(1/n) fraction of noise. Hoza and Schulman [HS16] considered synchronous
networks with arbitrary topology and constructed a constant rate coding scheme that is resilient
to O(1/m) noise. Via routing and scheduling techniques, they show how to resist a fraction of
O(1/n)-noise, while reducing the rate to 1/O(m log(n)/n). Both these schemes use tree-codes, and
therefore are computationally inefficient.
Aggarwal, Dani, Hayes, and Saia [ADHS17] constructed an efficient synchronous coding scheme,
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assuming the parties have shared randomness that is unknown to the adversary. They consider a
somewhat different communication model than the above, where the length of the protocol is not
predetermined and may vary with the noise (similar to the two-party adaptive notion of [AGS16]).
Their coding scheme is resilient to an arbitrary (and a priori unknown) amount of bit-flips (as long
as the noise-pattern is predetermined and independent of parties shared randomness), and has a
rate of 1/O(log(nCC(Π))).
Censor-Hillel, Gelles, and Haeupler [CGH18] constructed asynchronous schemes, where the
parties do not know the topology of the network (an assumption that is very common in the
distributed computation community). Their scheme is resilient to O(1/n) noise and has a rate of
1/O(n log2 n).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations and setting
Notations and basic properties For n ∈ N we denote by [n] the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. The log(·)
function is taken to base 2. For a distribution D we use x ∼ D to denote that x is sampled according
to the distribution D. For a finite set Ω we let UΩ be the uniform distribution over Ω; we commonly
omit Ω and write x ∼ U when the domain is clear from context. The indicator function 1E is set to
1 if and only if the event E occurs. We usually use it to indicate an equality of values, e.g., 1x=y,
which equals 1 if and only if x = y.
Multiparty interactive communication model We assume an undirected network G = (V,E)
of n = |V | parties, p1, . . . , pn, and |E| = m edges, where pi is connected to pj if and only if
(pi, pj) ∈ E. We identify parties with nodes, and treat pi and node i as one. For v ∈ V , let N(v)
denote the neighborhood of v in G, i.e. {u : (u, v) ∈ E}. The network G is assumed to be a
connected simple graph (i.e., without self-loops or multi-edges).
The communication model works in synchronous rounds as follows. At each round, any subset of
parties may decide to speak. Each link is allowed to transmit at most one symbol per round in each
direction from a constant-sized alphabet Σ. We will assume throughout this paper that Σ = {0, 1}
(both in the noiseless and noisy settings), however, our results extend to a larger alphabet as well.
At each round, a party is allowed to send multiple (possibly different) symbols over multiple links.
A transmission over a certain link at a certain round is the event of a party sending a message on
this link at that round (if both parties send messages these are two separate transmissions).
We emphasize that, contrary to most previous work, our communication model is not fully-
utilized and does not demand all parties to speak at each round on every communication channel
connected to them; in fact we don’t demand a certain party to speak at all at any given round.
Multiparty protocol Each party is given an input xi, and its desire is to output fi(x1, . . . , xn)
for some predefined function fi at the end of the process. A protocol pi dictates to each party
what is the next symbol to send over which channel (if any), as a function of the party’s input,
the round number, and all the communication that the party has observed so far. After a fixed
and predetermined number of rounds, the protocol terminates and each party outputs a value as
a function of its input and observed transcript. The length of the protocol, also called its round
complexity RC(pi) is the maximal number of rounds pi takes to complete on any possible input.
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The communication complexity of the protocol (in bits), denoted by CC(pi), is the total number
of transmissions in the protocol times log |Σ|. Since we assume Σ = {0, 1}, the communication
complexity equals the number of transmissions.
Throughout this work we denote the underlying (i.e., noiseless) interactive protocol that the
parties are trying to compute by Π. We will usually use the notation |Π| to denote the length of
the (noiseless) protocol in chunks rather than in rounds; see Section 3.2 for details on partitioning
protocols into chunks. We assume that the noiseless protocol has the property that the speaking
order is independent of the inputs that the parties receive, and may depend only on the messages
the party received.6
Noise model We concern ourselves with simulating multiparty interactive protocols Π among n
parties over a noisy network. A single transmission over a noisy channel with alphabet Σ is defined
as the function
Ch : Σ ∪ {∗} → Σ ∪ {∗},
where ∗ is a special symbol ∗ /∈ Σ that means “no message”. Given a single utilization of the channel,
we say the transmission is corrupt (or noisy) if y = Ch(x) and y 6= x. Specifically, if x, y ∈ Σ, this
event is called a substitution noise, if x = ∗ (and y ∈ Σ) the event is an insertion and if x ∈ Σ and
y = ∗ the event is called a deletion.
We stress that the noise may have a crucial effect on the protocol executed by the parties. Not
only its correctness may be harmed, but also its length and communication may vary. Hence, in
the noisy setting we redefine RC(Π) and CC(Π) to be the length and communication complexity,
respectively, of a given instance of the protocol (which is determined by the inputs, the randomness,
and the noise pattern). Moreover, we emphasize that, opposed to some previous work where the
number of rounds fixes the communication complexity, in our model these two are only related by
the trivial bound CC(Π) ≤ 2|E| log |Σ| · RC(Π). We note that the gap between these two may be
substantial.
The fraction of noise observed in a given instance, is the fraction of corrupt transmissions out
of all the transmissions in that instance. For the binary case the noise fraction can be written as,
µ =
#(noisy transmissions)
CC(Π)
.
This is also known as relative noise fraction in adaptive (length-varying) settings, see for in-
stance [AGS16, BGMO17, SW17, EHK18].
An oblivious adversary is an adversary that pre-determines its noise attack, independently of
the inputs and randomness of the parties. In this work we focus on a specific oblivious adversary
known as additive adversary [BBT60] (see, e.g., [CDF+08, GS10, GIP+14] for applications resilient
against additive adversaries).
Assuming a binary alphabet, the oblivious additive adversary fixes a noise pattern e =
{0, 1, 2}2|E|·RC(Π) that defines the noise per each link in each round of the protocol. In partic-
ular, the entry ei,(u,v) ∈ {0, 1, 2} determines the noise added to the link u→ v in round i. Assuming
u transmits to v in iteration i the message t ∈ {0, 1, 2} (where 2 denotes the case of no message,
i.e., ∗), then v receives the transmission t+ ei,(u,v). The number of corruptions is the number of
6While we assume a fixed order of speaking for the noiseless protocol Π, we emphasize that this requirement will
not apply on the coding scheme that simulates Π over the noisy network.
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non-zero entries in e. The noise fraction, again, is the number of corruptions divided by the actual
communication given that error pattern (and specific inputs and randomness).
Remark 1. While there are other types of oblivious adversaries, we choose the additive one because
(a) it is easier to analyze, and (b) it is sufficient for our end-goal (Theorem 1.2). In particular, we
view the oblivious-adversary scheme as a stepping stone towards obtaining a coding scheme that is
resilient to non-oblivious adversary. As such, any (strong enough) oblivious adversary would do,
and we choose the additive one as it makes the extension to non-oblivious adversaries (in Section 6)
simpler.
If our final goal was the oblivious case (i.e., Theorem 1.1), then it would make sense to choose a
stronger type of an oblivious adversary; for instance, an adversary that fixes in advance the output
of the channel in any corrupted transmission, e.g., whether it is 0, 1, or silence. Note that while such
an adversary is more natural for the case of insertions and deletions, counting the actual number of
corruptions such an adversary makes in this case is more difficult (e.g., when the adversary sets the
output to be exactly what the parties communicate in that round anyways, this would not count as
a corruption).
We remark here that our result (Theorem 1.1) also holds for the above stronger oblivious
adversary. In fact, the oblivious-adversary analysis in Sections 4 and 5 go through as-is. However,
as mentioned, extending results for this oblivious adversary to the non-oblivious case would require
additional care. 
Coding scheme—a noise-resilient protocol A coding scheme is a scheme that converts any
protocol Π into a noise-resilient protocol Π˜ that simulates Π correctly with high probability on any
given input. We say that a protocol Π˜ simulates Π correctly on a given input if each party can
obtain its output corresponding to Π from the transcript it sees when executing Π˜. The protocol Π˜
is said to be resilient to µ-fraction of noise (with probability p), if it simulates Π correctly (with
probability at least p) when executed over a noisy network with adversarial noise that corrupts at
most µ-fraction of the transmissions in any instance of the protocol.
2.2 Codes
We use a standard binary error-correction code with constant rate and constant distance, which has
an efficient encoding and decoding procedures. Such codes can be constructed by concatenating
Reed-Solomon codes with binary linear random codes, or by employing the near-linear codes by
Guruswami and Indyk [GI05].
Theorem 2.1. For every 0 < ρ < 1 there exists δ > 0 and sufficiently large n such that the
following holds. There exists a binary linear code C : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n with rate k/n ≥ ρ and
relative distance at least δ. Furthermore, C can be encoded and decoded from up to δ/2 fraction of
bit-flips in polynomial time in n.
2.3 Hash functions, δ-biased strings
We use a standard inner-product based hash function. The hash function is seeded with a (usually
random) string S such that each bit of the output is an inner product between the input and a
certain part of S (using independent parts of S for different output bits). Formally,
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Definition 2.2 (Inner Product Hash Function). The inner product hash function h : {0, 1}∗ ×
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}τ is defined for any input x of length |x| = L and seed s of length |s| = τL, as the
concatenation of τ inner products between x and disjoint parts of s, namely,
h(x, s) = 〈x, s[1, L]〉 ◦ · · · ◦ 〈x, s[(τ − 1)L+ 1, τL]〉.
We use the shorthand hs(x)
def
= h(x, s).
We sometimes abuse notation and hash a ternary-string x (or a string over a larger alphabet).
In this case, assume we first convert x into a binary string in the natural manner (each symbol
separately, using dlog2 3e = 2 bits) and then hash the binary string. The seed length should increase
appropriately (by at most a constant).
The following is a trivial property of the inner product hash function, stating that, given a
uniform seed, the output is also uniformly distributed.
Lemma 2.3. For any x 6= 0, and r ∈ {0, 1}τ
Pr
s∼U
[hs(x) = r] = 2
−τ .
It is easy to see Lemma 2.3 also implies that the collision probability of the inner product hash
function with output length τ is exactly 2−τ , since given two strings x and y such that x 6= y, the
Lemma implies that the probability that Prs∼U [hs(x− y) = ~0] = 2−τ .
Usually, the hash function is seeded with a uniform string. In order to reduce the amount
of randomness needed, we use δ-biased random strings, which are close enough to uniform (for
our needs), yet can be constructed from much shorter (uniform) seeds, via a result by Naor and
Naor [NN93].
Definition 2.4 (δ-bias). Fix δ > 0. A distribution D over Fn2 is δ-biased if for any v ∈ Fn2 \ {0n},
we have that ∣∣∣∣∣ Prx∼D
[
n∑
i=1
vixi = 0
]
− 1/2
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ.
Lemma 2.5 ([NN93, AGHP92]). There is a constant c ∈ N and an efficiently computable function
G : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ such that the following holds. Fix ε > 0. For any size k and a uniformly
random string S ∈ {0, 1}c·(k+log(1/ε)), we have that G(S) ∈ {0, 1}2k is a 2ε-biased distribution over
bit strings of length of 2k.
Finally, we appeal to the following Lemma from [Hae14] (which is in turn based on [NN93]) that
connects the behaviour of hash function seeded with δ-biased string to hashes seeded with uniformly
random string as long as their input is fixed and independent of the seed.
Lemma 2.6 (Lemma 6.3 from [Hae14]). Fix positive integers k, τ , and L. Consider k pairs of
binary strings (x1, y1), . . . (xk, yk) where each string has length at most L. Let {hQ}Q∈{0,1}2τL be
an inner product hash family with input length ≤ L, output length τ , and seed length 2τL. Let
S = (s(1), . . . , s(k)) be a random seed of length k · 2τL.
1. If S is drawn from a uniform distribution over {0, 1}2τL·k, then for each i ∈ [k],
Pr
s(i)
[hs(i)(xi) = hs(i)(yi)] = 2
−τ
if xi 6= yi. Note that, trivially, Prs(i) [hs(i)(xi) = hs(i)(yi)] = 1 when xi = yi. Furthermore, for
each i ∈ [k] the events of hash collisions are independent.
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2. If S is drawn from a δ-biased distribution over {0, 1}2τL·k, then it holds that the distribution(
1h
s(1)
(x1)=hs(1) (y1)
, . . . , 1h
s(k)
(xk)=hs(k) (yk)
)
is δ-close to the case where S is uniformly random.
Recall that δ-closeness means that the statistical difference between two distributions is bounded
by δ.
Definition 2.7 (δ-closeness). We say that distributions P,Q over the probability space Ω are δ-close
if
sup
A⊆Ω
|P (A)−Q(A)| ≤ δ.
The above is equivalent to having 12
∑
ω∈Ω |P (ω)−Q(ω)| ≤ δ.
Note that as a corollary of Lemma 2.6, by setting k to 1, τ to a constant, and using δ-biased
randomness with δ = 2−τ , we can get the hash functions with seed length that is logarithmic in the
size of their input, by seeding the inner product hash function with δ-biased seeds. This corollary
was noted in previous work, e.g. in Naor and Naor [NN93].
Corollary 2.8. There is a hash function family {hQ}Q∈{0,1}s with input length ≤ L, output length τ ,
and seed length s = Θ(logL+ τ) such that, given any pair of inputs x and y such x 6= y, we have
that
Pr
Q
[hQ(x) = hQ(y)] ≤ 2 · 2−τ
3 Coding scheme for oblivious adversarial channels
3.1 Overview
The high-level description of the simulation is as follows. The basic mechanism is the rewind-if-error
approach from previous works [Sch92, BK12, Hae14] (see also [Gel17]). In particular, the parties
execute the noiseless protocol Π for some rounds and then exchange some information to verify if
there were any errors. If everything seems consistent, the simulation proceeds to the next part;
Otherwise, the parties rewind to a previous (hopefully consistent) point in Π and proceed from
there.
Note that since multiple parties are involved, it may be that some parties believe the simulation
so far is correct while others believe it is not. Yet, even if one party notices some inconsistency, the
entire network should rewind. Hence, we need a mechanism that allows propagating the local view
of each party to the entire network.
Our simulation algorithm consists of repeatedly executing the following four phases: (i) con-
sistency check, (ii) flag passing, (iii) simulation, and (iv) rewind. The simulation protocol cycles
through these four phases in a fixed manner, and each such cycle is referred to as an iteration. Each
phase consists of a fixed number of rounds (independent of the parties’ inputs and the content of
the messages exchanged). Therefore, there is never an ambiguity as to which phase (and which
iteration) is being executed. We next describe each phase (not in the order they are preformed in
the protocol).
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(i) Simulation: In this phase the parties simulate a single chunk of the protocol Π. Specifically,
we split Π into chunks—consecutive sets of rounds—where at each chunk 5K bits are being
communicated, for some K ≥ m that is fixed throughout the simulation and such that K is
divisible by m. Jumping ahead, we note that K is set to be Θ(m) in the first protocol we
construct, that is robust to oblivious adversaries, and is set to Θ(m logm) in the final protocol
that considers arbitrary (non-oblivious) adversaries. Note that since the speaking order in Π is
fixed and predetermined, the partition into chunks can be done in advance and is independent
of the inputs. We assume without loss of generality that each party speaks at least once
in each chunk (this is without loss of generality since one can preprocess Π to achieve this
property while increasing the communication complexity by only a constant factor).
In this phase, the parties “execute” the next chunk of Π, sending and receiving messages as
dictated by the protocol Π.
This phase always takes 5K rounds, which is the maximal number of rounds required to
simulate 5K transmissions of Π. It may be that the simulation of a specific chunk takes less
rounds; in this case, the phase still takes 5K rounds where all the parties remain silent after
the chunk’s simulation has completed until 5K rounds have passed.
We note that some parties may be aware that the simulation so far contains errors that were
not corrected yet (jumping ahead, this information can be obtained via local consistency
checks that failed or via the global flag-passing phase, described below). When we reach the
simulation phase, these parties will send a dummy message ⊥ to their neighbors and remain
silent for 5K rounds until the simulation phase completes.
(ii) Consistency check: The main purpose of this phase is to check whether each two neighboring
parties u, v ∈ V have consistent transcripts and can continue to simulate, or whether instead
they need to correct prior errors. This phase is based on the meeting points mechanism [Sch92,
Hae14], which allows the parties to efficiently find the highest chunk number up to which they
both agree.
Roughly speaking, every time the parties enter this phase, they exchange a hash of their
current transcripts with each other. If the hashes agree, the parties believe that everything
is consistent and effectively continue with simulating Π. If the hashes do not agree, the
parties try to figure out the longest point in their transcript where they do agree. To this
end, they send hashes of prefixes of their transcript until the hashes agree. In our setting,
each time the parties enter the “consistency check” phase they perform a single iteration
of the meeting-points mechanism [Hae14], which consists of sending two hash values. If the
hashes mismatch, they will send the next two hash values (of some prefixes of the transcript,
as instructed by the meeting-points mechanism) next time they enter the consistency check
phase.7
Note that the above is performed between each pair of adjacent parties, in parallel over the
entire network.
(iii) Flag passing: In the flag passing phase, the parties attempt to synchronize whether or not
they should continue the simulation of Π in the next simulation phase. As mentioned, it may
7In addition to exchanging two hash values corresponding to prefixes of the transcript, the parties also exchange a
hash indicating how long they have been running the meeting-points mechanism; see Section A for a full description.
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be that some parties believe that the simulation so far is flawless while other may notice that
there are some inconsistencies. In this phase the information about (2-party) inconsistencies
is propagated to all the parties.
Roughly, if any party believes it shouldn’t continue with the simulation, it notifies all its
neighbors, which propagate the message to the rest of the network, and no party will simulate
in the upcoming simulation phase. However, if all parties believe everything is consistent then
no such message will be sent, and all the parties will continue simulating the next chunk of Π.
Technically speaking, the parties accomplish this synchronization step by passing a “flag” (i.e.,
a stop/continue bit) along a spanning tree T of G. Namely, each party receives flags from
each of its children in T . A party u will receive a bit from each of its children in T . If one of
the flags is stop, or if the party sees inconsistency with one of its neighbors, it sends a stop
flag to its parent in the tree. Otherwise, it sends its parent the continue flag. After this phase
ends and the root of T receives all the flags, the root propagates the computed flag in the
opposite direction back to the leafs. If there is no channel noise in this phase, it is clear that
all parties are synchronized regarding whether the simulation should continue or not (recall
that a party sends a dummy message during the simulation phase if its flag is set to stop).
(iv) Rewind: In the rewind phase, each party tries to correct any obvious (i.e., length-wise)
inconsistencies with their neighbors. Recall that the meeting-points mechanism allows two
neighboring parties to truncate their mis-matching transcripts to a prefix on which both
parties agree. However, this may cause inconsistencies with all their other neighbors. Indeed,
if u and v rewind several chunks off their transcript with each-other, then u must inform any
other party z ∈ N(u) to rewind the same amount of chunks. This rewinding happens even
if the transcripts on the link (u, z) are consistent at both ends. Therefore, this discrepancy
is not necessarily revealed by the meeting-point mechanism between u and z, and must be
solved in a different manner.
Technically, if the transcript of u and v consists of k chunks, then u will send a “rewind”
message to any neighbor z for which the transcript of u and z contains more than k chunks.
However, there are a few caveats. Any party z that is currently trying to find agreement with u
via the meeting-points mechanism should not rewind the transcript with u. Intuitively, we can
see that any such rewind seems unnecessary, since z is already going to truncate its transcript
when it eventually finds agreement with u in the meeting-points subroutine. Furthermore,
an underlying assumption of the meeting-points protocol is that, until the parties decide to
truncate their transcripts in the protocol, their transcripts do not change.
Additionally, we restrict each party to rewinding at most one chunk in each of its pairwise
transcripts. This is primarily for ease of analysis: it means that no matter what kind of errors
the adversary induces, there is only so much harm that can be done during the rewind phase.
The upshot of this is that it is not necessarily true that after the rewind phase, u sees exactly
the same amount of simulated chunks with all z ∈ N(u).
Once a party u sends a rewind message to a neighbor z, party z will truncate one chunk of the
transcript that corresponds to the link (u, z), and might then want to send rewind messages
to its own neighbors. These rewinds could trigger more rewinds, leading to a wave of rewinds
going through the network. By providing n rounds in the rewind phase, we make sure that
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this wave has enough time to go through the entire network.8 This is critical to guaranteeing
that we fix errors quickly enough to simulate Π with constant overhead.
Randomness Exchange. Our coding scheme is randomized. The only usage of randomness in
our scheme is for the consistency check phase, where hash values are exchanged. Since both parties
must use the same hash function they must agree on the seed of the hash function, which can be
thought of as a random string. In the description of the protocol below, we will assume that any
pair of neighboring parties share a long random string of polynomial length in the communication of
the protocol, and this random string determines the seeds to the hash functions used in the protocol.
In Section 5 we show how to remove the need for a long shared random string. The basic
approach is from previous works [BK12, Hae14]: First make the common randomness short, by
having the randomness consist of a (short) seed for δ-biased randomness. Then, in the protocol,
use the δ-bias randomness, as opposed to the true randomness. Once the random string is short,
the parties can simply send it over the network using a standard error-correcting code9, without
blowing up the communication complexity by more than a constant factor.
Unfortunately, this approach doesn’t work in a straightforward manner. The reason is that
our assumption, that hashes seeded with a δ-biased string behave “close to” hashes seeded with a
uniform hash, no longer holds when the inputs to the hash depend on the seed itself. Indeed, in our
case the inputs depend on which hash collisions occurred in previous rounds, which is a function of
the δ-biased string. Showing that replacing a uniform seed with a δ-biased, despite the dependency
of the inputs on the seed, is a technicality that was overlooked in [Hae14], and is addressed in
Section 5.10
3.2 The coding scheme
We now formally describe the coding scheme assuming a common random string (CRS) and oblivious
noise. Let Π be a noiseless protocol over G = (V,E), with R rounds and C transmissions throughout.
Assume that the communication pattern and amount is predetermined, and independent of parties’
inputs and the transcript. Namely, let TΠ = (m1m2 · · ·mC) be the noiseless transcript of Π; the
content of the messages mi depend on the specific inputs, however their order, source and destination
are fixed for Π.
We partition TΠ into rounds according to Π, and group the rounds into chunks, where each chunk
is a set of contiguous rounds with total communication complexity exactly 5K. Specifically, we keep
adding rounds to a chunk until adding a round would cause the communication to exceed 5K. Note
that without the last round, the communication in the chunk is at least 5K − 2m+ 1 bits. We can
then add a virtual round that makes the communication in the chunk be exactly 5K bits. This
addition affects the communication complexity by a constant factor. From this point on, we assume
that Π adheres to our required structure.
8Alternatively, we could have fixed the rewind phase to consist of D rounds (rather than n rounds), where D is the
the diameter of the grahp G.
9The reason a standard error-correcting code suffices is that this “randomness sharing” step of the protocol fully
utilizes the network; hence, insertions are nonexistent, and deletions are equivalent to erasures.
10This technicality was not an issue in [BK12] since in their protocol, the seed to the hash function is not sent
ahead of time, but rather is send together with the hash value in each round. In our setting (as in [Hae14]) we cannot
afford to send the hash seed in each iteration, since we have the budget to send only constant many bits between two
parties in each iteration.
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We number the chunks in order, starting from 1. For any (possibly partial) transcript T , we let
|T | denote the number of chunks contained in the transcript T . In particular, |Π| is the maximal
number of chunks in Π. We assume without loss of generality that in each chunk, each party sends
at least one bit to each of its neighbors (again, this can easily be achieved by pre-processing Π while
increasing its communication by a constant factor). In addition, we assume that the protocol Π is
padded with enough dummy chunks where parties simply send zeros. This padding is standard in
the literature on interactive coding, and is added to deal with the case that the adversary behaves
honestly in all the rounds until the last few rounds, and fully corrupts the last few rounds.
The parties simulate Π one chunk at a time, by cycling through the following phases in the
following order: consistency check, flag passing, simulation, and rewind. Each phase takes a number
of rounds that is a priori fixed, and since our model is synchronous, the parties are always in
agreement regarding which phase is being executed.
Let Tu,v denote the pairwise transcript of the link (u, v) as seen by u, where v ∈ N(u); Similarly,
Tv,u is the transcript of the same link as seen by v (which may differ from Tu,v due to channel noise).
In more detail, Tu,v is the concatenation of the transcripts generated at each chunk, where the
transcript of chunk i consists of two parts: (1) the simulated communication of chunk i, and (2) the
chunk number i.11 The structure of the part (1) is as follows. Assume that in the i-th chunk in Π, j
bits are exchanged over the (u, v) link in rounds t1, . . . , tj . Then Tu,v holds a string of length j over
{0, 1, ∗} describing the communication at times t1, . . . , tj , as observed by u. The symbol ∗ denotes
the event of not receiving a bit at the specific round (i.e., due to a deletion). The transcript Tv,u is
defined analogously from v’s point of view. Note that restricted to the substrings that belongs to
chunk i, Tu,v = Tv,u if and only if there where no errors at rounds t1, . . . , tj in the simulation phase;
insertions and deletions at other rounds are ignored. We abuse notation and define |Tu,v| to be the
number of chunks that appear in Tu,v.
In Algorithm 1 we describe the noise-resilient protocol for a fixed party u. The parties start
by initializing their state with a call to InitializeState() (Algorithm 2). Much of this state is used
for keeping state across iterations of the meeting-points mechanism, described in Algorithm 7 (in
Appendix A).
Next, the parties perform a single iteration of the meeting-points mechanism (Algorithm 7).
Given a pair of adjacent parties u and v, the meeting-points mechanism outputs a variable statusu,v,
which indicates whether the parties want to simulate (in which case statusu,v = “simulate”) or
continue with the meeting-points mechanism (in which case statusu,v = “meeting points”).
Then, according to the output of the meeting-point mechanism and according to any apparent
inconsistencies in the simulated transcripts with its neighbors, each party sets its “flag” statusu to
denote whether it should continue with the simulation or not. This status is used as an input to the
flag-passing phase, described in Algorithm 3.
Each party ends the flag-passing phase with a flag denoted netCorrectu that is set to 1 if the
network as a whole seems to be correct. Then, the parties perform a simulation phase. If the
netCorrect flag is set to 1, they execute Π for one additional chunk, according to the place they
believe they are at. Otherwise, they send a special symbol ⊥ to indicate they are not participating
in the current simulation phase.
Finally, the rewind phase begins, where any party u that sees an obvious discrepancy in the
lengths of the transcripts in its neighborhood, sends a single rewind request to any neighbor v which
11It is important to add the chunk number since the inner-product hash function we use (Lemma 2.2) has the
property that for any string x, h(x) = h(x ◦ 0).
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is ahead of the rest, conditioned that u and v are not currently in the middle of a meeting-points
process.
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Algorithm 1 A noise-resilient simulation of Π (for party u)
1: InitializeState()
2: for i = 1 to 100|Π| do
3: for all v ∈ N(u) in parallel do . meeting points
4: statusu,v ←MeetingPoints(u, v, Si,u,v)
5: end for
6: minChunk ← minv∈N(u) |Tu,v|
7: if exists v such that statusu,v = “meeting points” then
8: statusu ← 0
9: else if exists v such that |Tu,v| > minChunk then
10: statusu ← 0
11: else
12: statusu ← 1
13: end if
14: netCorrectu ← FlagPassing(u, statusu) . flag passing
15: if netCorrectu = 1 then . simulation
16: Listen for one round.
17: Simulate chunk |Tu,v|+ 1 with each party v ∈ N(u) from whom we
have not received ⊥ at the first round. The simulation is based on the
partial transcript Tu,w for each w ∈ N(u), as well as the input to u.
18: If the above step took less than 5K rounds, wait until 5K rounds have passed
19: if we received no ⊥’s in Line 16 in this iteration then
20: minChunk ← minChunk + 1
21: end if
22: else
23: Send a single ⊥ to each neighbor, and wait 5K rounds.
24: end if
25: for round r = 1 to n do . rewind
26: for all v ∈ N(u) in parallel do
27: if statusu,v 6= “meeting points” AND alreadyRewoundu,v = 0 then
28: if |Tu,v| > minChunk then
29: Send a rewind message to v and truncate Tu,v by one chunk
30: alreadyRewoundu,v ← 1
31: end if
32: end if
33: if a rewind message is received from v then
34: if statusu,v 6= “meeting points” AND alreadyRewoundu,v = 0 then
35: Truncate Tu,v by one chunk
36: alreadyRewoundu,v ← 1
37: end if
38: end if
39: end for
40: end for
41: end for
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Algorithm 2 InitializeState()
1: K ← m
2: for all neighbors v ∈ N(u) do
3: Initialize Tu,v = ∅
4: Initialize ku,v, Eu,v,mpc1u,v,mpc2u,v ← 0
5: statusu,v ← “simulate”
6: alreadyRewoundu,v ← 0
7: Su,v := (Si,u,v)i∈[100|Π|]
unif← ({0, 1}Θ(|Π|K))100|Π| uniform bits of randomness.
8: end for
9: statusu ← 1.
10: netCorrectu ← 1
Algorithm 3 FlagPassing(u, status)
Let ρ ∈ V be a specific node known by all the parties. Let T be a spanning tree generated by
a breadth-first-search starting from ρ. Denote the depth of T as d(T ), where the depth of a
single vertex is 1. Finally, let the level of a vertex be defined as `(v) := `(u) + 1, where u is the
parent of v in T , and `(ρ) = 1.
1: netCorrect← status
2: if u is a leaf in T then
3: Send netCorrect to parent vertex in T .
4: Sleep for `(u)− 1 rounds.
5: else
6: Sleep for d(T )− `(u) rounds. Ignore any messages received in these rounds.
7: Receive b1, . . . , bk, one symbol from each child in T .
8: netCorrect←
k∧
i=1
bi ∧ status
9: if u 6= ρ then
10: Send netCorrect to parent.
11: Sleep for `(u)− 1 rounds. Ignore any messages received in these rounds.
12: end if
13: end if
14: if u = ρ then
15: Send netCorrect to children.
16: else
17: Sleep for `(u)− 1 rounds. Ignore any messages received in these rounds.
18: Receive b from parent.
19: netCorrect← b ∧ status
20: if u is not a leaf in T then
21: Send netCorrect to children.
22: Sleep for d(T )− `(u) rounds. Ignore any messages received in these rounds.
23: end if
24: end if
25: return netCorrect
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4 Coding scheme for oblivious channels: Analysis
In this section we analyze the coding scheme presented in Section 3 and prove the following Theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Assume a network G = (V,E) with n = |V | parties and m = |E| links. Suppose
Π is a multiparty protocol the network G with communication complexity CC(Π), binary alphabet
and fixed order of speaking. Let |Π| := CC(Π)5m and let ε > 0 be a sufficiently small constant. Then,
with probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(|Π|)), Algorithm 1 simulates Π correctly with communication
complexity Θ(CC(Π)), assuming an oblivious adversary with error rate ε/m.
In order to prove the above theorem we define a potential function that measures the progress
of the simulation at every iteration. In Section 4.1 we define the potential function and intuitively
explain most of its terms. In Section 4.3 we prove that in every iteration12 the potential increases
by at least K, while the communication increases by at most K × `, where ` measures the number
of channel noise and hash collisions that occurred in that specific iteration.
We split the analysis of the potential into two parts: the meeting points mechanism and the rest
of the coding scheme. The first part re-iterates the analysis of [Hae14] with minor adaptations. We
defer the full proofs to Appendix A. The rest of the potential analysis is novel and performed in
Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3. Specifically, in Section 4.3.2 we focus on the iterations with no errors/hash-
collisions, and in Section 4.3.3 we focus on iterations that suffer from errors/hash-collisions. Then,
in Section 4.4 we bound (with high probability) the number of hash-collisions that may happen
throughout the entire execution of the coding scheme. Finally, in Section 4.5 we complete the proof
of Theorem 4.1, by showing that the potential at the end of the coding scheme must be high enough
to imply a correct simulation of Π, given the bounded amount of errors and hash-collisions.
In the following, all our quantities measure progress in chunks, where each chunk contains exactly
5K = 5m bits. Recall that we denote by |Π| the number of chunks in the noiseless protocol Π, and
we denote by |Tu,v| is the number of chunks in the simulated (partial) transcript Tu,v.
4.1 The potential function
Our potential function φ will measure the progress of the network towards simulating the underlying
interactive protocol Π correctly. Naturally, φ changes as the simulation of Algorithm 1 progresses,
and so depends on the round number. In what follows, for ease of notation, we omit the current
round number in all the terms used to define φ.
For each adjacent pair of parties u and v, define
Gu,v (1)
to be the size (in chunks) of the longest common prefix of Tu,v and Tv,u. Namely, Gu,v is the length
of the largest prefix of communication between parties u and v in Π, that these parties agree on.
Define Bu,v to be
Bu,v
def
= max(|Tu,v|, |Tv,u|)−Gu,v. (2)
12Recall that a single iteration of Algorithm 1 consists of a consistency phase, flag-passing phase, simulation phase
and a rewind phase.
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Namely, Bu,v is the gap between how far one of the parties thinks they have simulated and how
far they have simulated correctly.13 Note that Bu,v is always nonnegative by design. Furthermore,
Bu,v = 0 if and only if the parties have no differences in their pairwise transcripts with each other.
Define
G∗ def= min
(u,v)∈E
Gu,v (3)
to be the largest chunk number through which the network as a whole has correctly simulated. Let
H∗ def= max
u
max
v∈N(u)
|Tu,v| (4)
denote the largest chunk number which any party in the network thinks it has simulated; note that,
by definition, H∗ ≥ G∗. Finally, we define
B∗ def= H∗ −G∗. (5)
In addition, our potential function also quantifies the progress of the meeting-points mechanism
between any two adjacent parties in the network (which we elaborate on in Section 4.2 below,
and in Appendix A). This is done via the term ϕu,v defined in Eq. (39), which is closely inspired
by the potential function stated in [Hae14]. Intuitively, ϕu,v is the number of iterations of the
meeting-points mechanism that parties u and v need to do to make Bu,v = 0; indeed, for all pairs
(u, v) ∈ E it holds that (Proposition A.2)
0 ≤ Bu,v ≤ ϕu,v,
and in particular, ϕu,v = 0 implies that Bu,v = 0 .
Finally, let EHC denote the number of errors and hash collisions that have occurred in the
protocol until the current round of Algorithm 1. Similarly to all the other terms in the potential,
we drop the dependence on the round r.
Our potential function is defined to be:
φ
def
=
∑
(u,v)∈E
(
K
m
Gu,v −K · ϕu,v
)
− C1KB∗ + C7K · EHC (6)
where C1 and C7 are constants such that C1 is sufficiently larger than 2, but smaller than all the
constants C2, . . . , C6 defined in Eq. (39), and C7 is a constant sufficiently larger than C2, . . . , C6.
Remark 2 (Remark on Notation). For any variable var that represents the state of some party in
Algorithm 1, including all the ones in Table 1, we let var(i) denote the value of the variable var at
the beginning of iteration i. For example, Tu,v(10) denotes the value of the partial transcript Tu,v
at the very start of the tenth iteration of Algorithm 1. 
13Note that we can have Bu,v = 0 even when there have been errors in the network, as long as those errors were
corrected.
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Parameter Definition
Tu,v Transcript of communication between u and v according to u
Gu,v Size of longest common prefix of Tu,v and Tv,u (in chunks)
Bu,v max(|Tu,v|, |Tv,u|)−Gu,v
G∗ min(u,v)∈E Gu,v
H∗ maxu maxv∈N(u) |Tu,v|
B∗ H∗ −G∗
ϕu,v Meeting points potential between u and v
EHC Number of errors and hash collisions that have occurred overall
φ Overall potential in network
Figure 1: Definition of terms related to the potential function φ.
4.2 The meeting-points mechanism and potential ϕu,v
In what follows, we briefly recall the meeting-points mechanism and why we use it. We defer the
formal definition of ϕu,v and all the proofs regarding it to Appendix A.
If two adjacent parties u and v have Tu,v 6= Tv,u (or equivalently, Bu,v > 0), then they should
not simulate further with each other without fixing the differences in their transcripts. If u and v
knew which of them needs to roll back and by how much, they could simply roll back the simulated
chunks until Tu,v = Tv,u, at which point they can continue the simulation. However, they do not
know this information. Furthermore, they cannot afford to communicate |Tu,v| or |Tv,u|, since these
numbers potentially require log |Π| bits to communicate.
This problem is solved via the “meeting-points” mechanism [Hae14] which is designed to roll
back Tu,v and Tv,u to a point where Tu,v = Tv,u, while only requiring O(Bu,v) exchanges of hashes
between parties u and v, and guaranteeing that (in the absence of error) neither u nor v truncate
their transcript too much. That is, u (resp. v) truncates Tu,v (resp. Tv,u) by at most 2Bu,v chunks.
While errors and hash collisions can mess up this guarantee, each error or hash collision causes only
a bounded amount of damage. Since the adversary’s allowed error rate is sufficiently small, the
simulation overcomes this damage with high probability.
As mentioned above, our analysis of the meeting-points mechanism essentially follows that of
Haeupler [Hae14] after adopting it to our construction, where the meeting-points mechanism is
interleaved over several iterations, rather than performed all at once. Specifically, for each link
(u, v) ∈ E we define a “meeting-points potential” term ϕu,v that approximately measures the number
of hash exchanges it will require for u and v to roll back Tu,v and Tv,u to a common point. We prove
how this potential behaves in each of the phases of our simulation protocol. While its behavior
in the meeting-points phase naturally repeats the analysis of [Hae14], ϕu,v can also change during
the other phases of the protocol, especially when noise is present. Our analysis bounds the change
in ϕu,v in all the phases as a function of the errors and hash collisions occurred throughout. This
allows bounding the change in the overall potential φ. We bound the changes in ϕu,v in the Flag
Passing, Rewind, and Simulation phases in Claim A.1. The changes in ϕu,v in the Meeting Points
phase are addressed in Lemmas A.6 (analogous to Lemma 7.4 in [Hae14]) and Proposition A.4, and
are combined to establish how the potential φ changes in the Meeting Points phase (Lemma A.11).
We defer the formal definition of the meeting-points mechanism and the proofs of the relevant
properties to Appendix A.
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4.3 Bounding the potential increase and communication per iteration
In this section we prove the following technical lemma that says that the potential φ (Eq. (6))
increases in each iteration by at least K. Furthermore, the amount of communication performed
during a single iteration can be bounded by roughly K times the amount of links (i.e., pairs of
parties) that suffer from channel-noise during this iteration, or links that experienced an event of
hash-collision during this iteration.
Lemma 4.2. Fix any iteration of Algorithms 1 and let ` be the number of links with errors or hash
collisions on them during this iteration. Then,
1. The potential φ increases by at least K in this iteration.
2. The amount of communication in the entire network during this iteration (CC) satisfies
CC ≤ α(1 + `)K,
where α is a sufficiently large constant.
The next sections are devoted to proving the above lemma. Let us begin by giving a high-level
overview of the proof.
4.3.1 Proof Overview
We proceed to prove the lemma in two conceptual steps.
1. First, in Section 4.3.2, we consider iterations that have no errors or hash collisions.
We first establish that the communication in this case is at most O(K). To this end, we
first argue that the communication in the meeting-points, flag-passing, and rewind phases is
always bounded by O(K) (Proposition 4.3), regardless of errors committed by the adversary.
Therefore, it suffices to bound the communication in the simulation phase. If every party is
simulating the same chunk, then the communication is easily bounded by O(K). However,
if the parties are simulating many different chunks, then the communication could be much
larger. This is where the flag-passing phase is useful: if there are no errors, then the flags will
prevent all parties from simulating when two parties are at different chunks.
We next establish that the potential increases by at least K, as follows. If the parties simulate,
then since there are no errors or hash collisions,
∑
Gu,v increase by K, and none of the other
terms change. If the parties do not simulate, then either some adjacent parties did not pass
their consistency check, in which case ϕu,v increases by Ω(1) (Lemma A.6) and none of the
other terms change, or some parties rewind, in which case B∗ decreases and none of the other
terms change.
2. Next, in Section 4.3.3, we consider iterations that have errors or hash collisions.
We first argue that errors and hash collisions increase φ by at least K. To this end, note that
errors may cause some terms of φ to decrease, but this is compensated for by the accompanying
increase in EHC, and since C7 is set to be large enough, even though some of the terms decrease,
overall the potential increases by at least K.
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We would then like to argue that the communication increases by at most O(K), though
unfortunately, this claim is false. The communication in an iteration can actually greatly
exceed O(K), though we show that in these cases, there were many errors or hash collisions
in the iteration. Specifically, we argue that each error or hash collision individually does not
cause too much extra communication. This is formalized in Lemma 4.8.
Before we formalize the intuition above, we mention some salient properties of the meeting-points
potential function ϕu,v that we use in the analysis.
4.3.2 Iterations with no errors or hash collisions
First, we prove a simple proposition, which says that the communication in the meeting-points,
flag-passing, and rewind phases is bounded. This reduces bounding the overall communication in
an iteration to bounding the communication in the corresponding simulation phase.
Proposition 4.3. The communication during the flag-passing and rewind phases is O(m) in total,
and the communication in the meeting-points phase is O(K), regardless of errors or hash collisions
in the iteration.
Proof. In the meeting-points phase, each adjacent pair of parties exchange hashes of their transcripts
(see Algorithm 7), where the output length of the hash functions is Θ(K/m). Hence, there is O(K)
communication in the meeting-points phase.
The communication pattern in the flag-passing phase is deterministic and consists of two messages
per link of a the spanning tree T , hence it is upper bounded by O(n) = O(m). Finally, each link
can have at most one valid “rewind” message in the rewind phase (note that messages that are
inserted do not count towards our communication bound).
Lemma 4.4. Suppose that there are no errors or hash collisions in a single iteration of Algorithm 1.
Then the overall communication in the network is O(K).
Proof. By Proposition 4.3, the communication in all the phases except of the simulation phase are
bounded by O(K), and we are left to bound the communication in the simulation phases
In the simulation phase, each party either sends ⊥ or simulates a specific chunk. Say that v
simulates chunk number nv with all its neighbors if it didn’t send ⊥ (however, its neighbors may
simulate a different chunk). Each chunk contains at most 5K bits of communication, hence, the total
amount of communication in the simulation phase is bounded by 5K times the number of distinct
chunk numbers being simulated in the network. In other words, it is bounded by 5K · |{nv | v ∈ V }|,
up to additional 2m ⊥ “messages” (which in our case are merely 2m bits).
Therefore, to finish the proof it remains to argue that if there are no errors or hash collisions
then |{nv | v ∈ V }| = 1 and the potential function increases by at least K in the iteration. We
consider several different cases according to the state of the network at the beginning of the iteration,
specifically, whether the parties have set netCorrect = 1 or not.
Case 1: At the end of the flag-passing phase, netCorrectu = 1 for every party u. Since
there were no errors or hash collisions, the fact that netCorrectu = 1 means that each party u had
statusu = 1 before the flag-passing phase. This follows since by the definition of the flag-passing
phase, for every party v ∈ V , netCorrectv =
∧
u∈V statusu. Note that, since we assume that none
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of the parties have netCorrectu = 0, and we assume no errors, the are no ⊥ symbols sent in the
simulation phase.
The fact that each party u has statusu = 1 implies that for all v, w ∈ N(u), it holds that
|Tu,v| = |Tu,w|. Further, for any v ∈ N(u), Tu,v = Tv,u, or otherwise the hashes would indicate a
mismatch and the parties would have set status = 0. Putting these two facts together, we get that
G∗ = H∗ and hence B∗ = 0, which implies that indeed |{nv | v ∈ V }| = 1, as desired.
Case 2: At the end of the flag-passing phase, some party u has netCorrectu = 0. Since
netCorrectu = 0 for some party u, there must be some party v such that statusv = 0, and hence
we have that netCorrectu = 0 for all u ∈ V . Since netCorrectu = 0 for all parties u, we know that
none of the parties will simulate (they will only send ⊥s) and hence the overall communication in
the iteration will be 2m = O(K).
We next show that the potential increases by at least K in any such iteration.
Lemma 4.5. Suppose that there are no errors or hash collisions in a single iteration of Algorithm 1.
Then the potential φ increases by at least K during this iteration.
Proof. We consider the status of the network at the iteration according to the next three cases.
Case 1: At the end of the flag-passing phase, netCorrectu = 1 for every party u. Recall
that since there were no errors or hash collisions, the fact that netCorrectu = 1 means that each
party u had statusu = 1 before the flag-passing phase. This in turn implies that for all v, w ∈ N(u),
it holds that |Tu,v| = |Tu,w|. Further, for any v ∈ N(u), Tu,v = Tv,u, or otherwise the hashes would
indicate a mismatch and the parties would have set status = 0. Consequently, we have G∗ = H∗
and B∗ = 0. The fact that netCorrectu = 1 for every party u, together with the fact that B∗ = 0,
implies that all parties simulate the same chunk, and the absence of errors in the communication
implies that this simulation is simulation done correctly. Hence, each Tu,v is extended correctly
according to Π. This in turn implies that Gu,v increases for each (u, v) ∈ E, which causes φ to
increase by K.
Next, we argue that none of the other terms of φ decrease. We first argue that B∗ remains zero
at the end of the iteration. To this end, note that since all parties choose to simulate one more
chunk in each of their pairwise transcripts, we still have the property that |Tu1,v1 | = |Tu2,v2 | for all
(u1, v1) ∈ E and (u2, v2) ∈ E after the simulation phase. Since there were no errors, we also have
that Tu,v = Tv,u for all (u, v) ∈ E. As noted before, this gives us that B∗ = 0 after the simulation
phase, and since there are no errors it remains zero after the rewind phase as well.
It remains to argue that ϕu,v does not increase for any (u, v) ∈ E. By Proposition A.4 we know
that ϕu,v does not increase in the meeting-points phase. Furthermore, it does not increase in the
flag-passing, simulation or rewind phases either, by Claim A.1.
Putting this all together, we have that each Gu,v increases by one, B
∗ does not change and ϕu,v
does not increase, which implies that the potential φ increases by at least K overall, as desired.
Case 2: Some party u has a neighbor v ∈ N(u) s.t. statusu,v = “meeting points” after the
meeting-points phase. Since statusu,v = “meeting points”, u has statusu = 0 after the meeting-
points phase, and therefore, given the lack of errors, each party x ∈ V , will set netCorrectx = 0
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after the flag-passing phase. Note that since none of the parties are simulating the next chunk
during the simulation phase, it follows that φ does not change in the simulation phase. Next note
that the potential increases by at least 5K during the meeting-points phase (Lemma A.11). Since
the potential does not change during the flag-passing phase, it remains to argue that the potential
function does not decrease by much during the rewind phase.
In the rewind phase, we may have parties that send rewinds. Even though these rewinds seem
to take us in the right direction, they may cause a small decrease in some terms of the potential.
However, we argue that in the rewind phase the potential decreases by at most K, and thus in total,
φ increases by at least 5K −K = 4K, as desired.
To this end, first note that since we limit the number of truncations per link to at most one,
it follows that (K/m)
∑
(x,y)∈E Gx,y can decrease by at most K. It remains to argue that B
∗ and
{ϕx,y}(x,y)∈E do not increase in the rewind phase.
The fact that ϕx,y does not increase follows from Claim A.1. To argue that B
∗ does not increase,
note that since no party simulates in this iteration, H∗ does not increase. We claim a party x will
never truncate a transcript Tx,y such that |Tx,y| = G∗. Clearly x will not send a rewind message
to y, since there is no y∗ such that |Tx,y∗ | < |Tx,y| by the definition of G∗. We also claim that y will
not send a rewind message to x. If |Ty,x| = |Tx,y| = G∗, then this follows because there is no x∗
such that |Ty,x∗ | < |Ty,x|. Otherwise if |Ty,x| 6= |Tx,y|, then since there were no hash collisions or
errors in the meeting-points phase we conclude that statusy,x = “meeting points”. Therefore y will
not send a rewind message to x.
Case 3: At end of the meeting-points phase, statusu,v = “simulate” for all (u, v) ∈ E,
yet at the end of the flag-passing phase, some party u has netCorrectu = 0. Again, since
netCorrectu = 0 for some party u, there must be some party v such that statusv = 0, and hence
we have that netCorrectu = 0 for all u ∈ V . No party simulates on the next simulation phase
(they will only send ⊥s), hence, the potential does not change during the simulation phase. In
addition, the potential does not decrease in the meeting-points phase (Lemma A.11). Furthermore,
the potential remains unchanged during the flag-passing phase. Therefore, all that remains to show
is that φ increases in the rewind phase by at least K.
Recall that by Claim A.1, ϕu,v will not increase during the rewind phase for any (u, v). Fur-
thermore,
∑
Gu,v can decrease by at most m in the rewind phase, which means (K/m)
∑
Gu,v
decreases by at most K. Therefore, it suffices to show that B∗ decreases by 1, and therefore that φ
increases by C1K −K ≥ K, since C1 ≥ 2.
To this end, we first show that G∗ does not decrease, and then show that H∗ decreases by 1.
For the former, note that a party u will never issue a rewind to a party v for which |Tu,v| = G∗,
since this would mean that there is some party w ∈ N(u) such that |Tu,w| < G∗, which contradicts
the definition of G∗. Therefore, G∗ does not decrease.
To argue that H∗ decreases by 1, fix a party u and a neighbor v such that |Tu,v| = H∗. We
argue that during the rewind phase party u will rewind this transcript by one chunk. The proof
goes by induction on the distance between u and a party whose minChunk 6= H∗. To this end, let
S∗ = {v : ∃w ∈ N(v) : |Tv,w| < H∗} be the set of parties that have some transcript below chunk H∗.
Claim 4.6. S∗ is non-empty.
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Proof. Indeed, given that all parties have netCorrectv = 0 after the flag-passing phase, despite
all pairs having statusu,v = “simulate”, it must hold that some party sees an inconsistency in the
lengths of the simulated transcript with two of its neighbors (Line 9). Namely, for some party p,
there are neighbours w,w′ such that |Tp,w| 6= |Tp,w′ |. It follows that |Tv,w| = H∗ cannot hold for all
(v, w) ∈ E.
Let d(u, S∗) denote the shortest distance in the graph G between a party u and some party
in S∗, where d(u, S∗) = 0 if and only if u ∈ S∗.
Claim 4.7. Party u truncates Tu,v after at most d(u, S
∗) + 1 rounds of the rewind phase.
Proof. Note that if d(u, S∗) = 0, i.e., u ∈ S∗, then in the next round of the rewind phase for every
neighbor w ∈ N(u) we have |Tu,w| < H∗. This is the case since u has minChunku < H∗ by the
definition of S∗. Then, u sends a rewind message to any w with |Tu,w| = H∗, and truncates that
transcript (Line 28).
Next we claim that if d(u, S∗) = j for some j > 0 at the beginning of some round r in the rewind
phase, then in the beginning of round r+1 it holds that d(u, S∗) = j−1. Let u, a1, a2, . . . , aj ∈ S∗ be
the vertices in a shortest path from u to S∗. Note that for any two consecutive parties along this path,
|Tai,ai−1 | = |Tai−1,ai | = H∗, and the same holds for u and a1. This is true since u, a1, . . . , aj−1 /∈ S∗,
and since and statusaj ,aj−1 = statusaj−1,aj = “simulate”, which means any two parties are consistent
with their transcripts.
Since aj ∈ S∗ we have that minChunkaj < H∗ and it follows that in round r, party aj sends a
rewind message to aj−1 (Line 28). We stress that no rewind message has yet been sent on the link
(aj , aj−1). Indeed, if this were not the case, then we would have gotten |Taj ,aj−1 | < H∗ already in a
prior round where the rewind message took place. But this contradicts aj−1 /∈ S∗ in the beginning
of round r. Hence, by the end of round r we have that |Taj ,aj−1 | = |Taj−1,aj | = H∗ − 1 and thus
aj−1 ∈ S∗. This means that d(u, S∗) = j − 1 at the beginning of round r + 1.
By employing the same argument inductively we get that, if at the beginning of the rewind
phase d(u, S∗) = j, then after j rounds we have that u ∈ S∗, and after the (j + 1)− th round, party
u has truncated Tu,v by at least one chunk, as needed.
Showing that H∗ has decreased by 1 is now straightforward. For any party u we note that
d(u, S∗) can never exceed n− 1, which is an upper bound of the diameter of G. Since the rewind
phase consists of n rounds, after its (n− 1)-th round, all parties are in S∗, and by the end of the
n-round of the rewind phase, all pairwise transcripts are of length at most H∗ − 1. This completes
the proof.
4.3.3 Iterations with errors and hash collisions
Lemma 4.8. Let ` be the number of links that experienced either errors or hash collisions during a
given iteration, and assume ` ≥ 1. Then the increase in the potential φ in this iteration is at least
Ω(C7`K), and the amount of communication in this iteration is at most O(`K).
Proof. Let `1 denote the number of links with errors and hash collisions in the meeting-points phase,
let `2 denote the number of links with errors in the flag-passing phase, let `3 denote the number of
links with errors in the simulation phase, and let `4 denote the number of links with errors in the
rewind phase. Then ` ≤ `1 + `2 + `3 + `4.
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Let us begin with bounding the communication in this iteration. By Proposition 4.3, the
communication in all the phases except for the simulation phase are bounded by O(K), and we are
left to bound the communication in the simulation phase. As explained in the proof of Lemma 4.4,
the amount of communication in the simulation phase is bounded by 5K times the number of
distinct chunk numbers being simulated in the network (plus 2m for ⊥s). We show that this number
is proportional to the number links that experienced errors or hash collisions during that same
iteration.
Let T be the spanning tree used for the flag passing in Algorithm 3. Consider the subgraphH of T
induced by only keeping an edge (u, v) ∈ T if netCorrectu = netCorrectv = 1 and |Tu,v| = |Tv,u|.
Recall that netCorrectu = 1 implies that statusu = 1, and thus for any u with netCorrectu = 1 we
know that |Tu,v| = |Tu,w| for all w ∈ N(u) and in particular for all w such that (u,w) ∈ H. By a
straightforward induction, one can argue that for any pair of parties u and x that are in the same
connected component of H, it holds that |Tu,v| = |Tx,y| for any v, y s.t. (u, v) ∈ H and (x, y) ∈ H.
Hence, in any single connected component of H, at most one chunk of Π is being simulated. Note
that there are components in H with no chunk being simulated. Each such connected component
consists of a single isolated variable u such that netCorrectu = 0.
Claim 4.9. Let S denote the set of connected components in H such that netCorrectu = 1, and
let s = |S| be the number of components in S. Then,
s− 1 ≤ `1 + `2.
Proof. We claim that there are at least s− 1 edges (u, v) in T \ H such that v is in a component in
S and `(u) < `(v), where recall that `(u) is defined to be the distance of u from ρ, which is the root
of T , plus 1. Towards seeing this, note that each connected component in S is a subtree of T , and
since they are disjoint, at least s− 1 many of them do not have ρ as the root of the subtree. Let v
be such a root, and let u be its parent in T . This satisfies the desired conditions.
Fix such an edge (u, v). We argue that there was an error on the link (u, v) in either the
meeting-points or flag-passing phases, establishing the claim. Since (u, v) is an edge in T \ H, we
know that either netCorrectu = 0, netCorrectv = 0, or |Tu,v| 6= |Tv,u|; otherwise, (u, v) would have
been in H. However, we know that netCorrectv = 1, since v is in a connected component in S and
by the definition of S. Hence, it can either be that netCorrectu = 0 or that |Tu,v| 6= |Tv,u|.
If |Tu,v| 6= |Tv,u|, then there must have been an error or hash collision in the meeting-points
phase, otherwise we would have statusv = 0 implying netCorrectv = 0, which is a contradiction. If,
on the other hand, netCorrectu = 0 holds, then there must have been an error in the downward
part of the flag-passing phase, since netCorrectv = 1, so clearly v did not correctly receive the flag
that u sent.
As argued above, the communication during the simulation phase is bounded by s · 5K + 2m:
each connected component in S jointly simulates a single chunk, and components outside of S
(which consists of a single party u such that netCorrectu = 0) do not simulate; the 2m term
comes from potential ⊥ messages. The above claim implies that s ≤ `1 + `2 = O(`), leading to
communication of O(`K) in the simulation phase. Since all the other phases have communication
O(K), the communication in the entire iteration is a as claimed.
To finish the proof of the Lemma it remains to bound the increase in the potential φ. Consider
the various phases in the iteration, and the terms of φ given by Eq. (6).
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• Meeting Points: Lemma A.11 guarantees that the potential φ goes up by at least 5cK +
0.4C7`1K, where c is the number of pairs of parties (u, v) such that (u, v) ∈ E and statusu,v
or statusv,u is “meeting points” at the end of the Meeting Points phase.
• Flag Passing: No direct potential change happens in this phase, other than any increase in
potential caused by an error induced by the adversary. So the potential in this phase increases
by at least C7`2K.
• Simulation: The term ∑Gu,v cannot decrease in the simulation phase, since no transcript is
being truncated in this phase. Claim A.1 establishes that ϕu,v increases by C3 in the simulation
phase only if there was an error on the link (u, v) somewhere in this iteration. Otherwise,
it does not increase. Hence, the term −∑K · ϕu,v decreases by at most KC3`. The third
term,−C1KB∗, decreases by at most KC1. Indeed, B∗ = H∗−G∗ increases by at most 1 in the
simulation phase, since H∗ can increase by 1 but G∗ cannot decrease, since no party truncates
in this phase. The fourth term, C7K · EHC, increases by at least C7`3K. Thus in total, the
potential function increases during the simulation phase by at least −C3`K − C1K + C7`3K.
• Rewind: The term (K/m)∑Gu,v can decrease in the rewind phase by at most K, since
each party rewinds a transcript at most one chunk. The second term −∑K · ϕu,v decreases
by at most KC3`, again, by Claim A.1. The third term −C1KB∗ decreases by at most C1K
since B∗ increases by at most 1 in the rewind phase: G∗ can decrease by at most one (since
no party rewinds more than one chunk) and H∗ cannot increase. The fourth term C7KEHC
increases by C7`4K.
Putting it all together, we get that in the entire iteration φ increases by at least
5cK + 0.4C7`1K + C7`2K − C3`K − C1K + C7`3K −K − C3`K − C1K + C7`4K
≥ 5cK + 0.4C7(`1 + `2 + `3 + `4)K − 2C3`K − 2C1K −K
≥ 5cK + (0.4C7 − 2C3)`K − (2C1 + 1)K
where the final inequality follows from the fact that `1 + `2 + `3 + `4 ≥ `. Since ` ≥ 1 (by our
assumption), we can take C7 to be sufficiently large compared to C3 and C1, and get that the change
in φ is Ω(C7`K), as desired.
4.3.4 Putting it all together
We can finally complete the proof of Lemma 4.2.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. We first recall that Lemma 4.5 establishes that, in the absence of errors and
hash collisions, the potential increases by K and Lemma 4.4 bounds the total communication
by O(K). Now assume that there is at least one error or hash collision in the iteration, so ` ≥ 1.
Then Lemma 4.8 shows that the potential increases by Ω(C7`K), and that the communication in
the iteration is at most O(`K). By taking C7 to be sufficiently large, we can see that φ increases by
at least K while the communication is bounded by O((`+ 1)K), as required.
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4.4 Bounding hash collisions and communication
In this section we prove that the number of hash collisions throughout the entire simulation is
bounded by O(ε|Π|) with high probability, where |Π| is the number of chunks in the original,
noiseless protocol.
The main lemma we prove in this subsection is the following.
Lemma 4.10. Let ε > 0 be a sufficiently small constant. Suppose a hash function h in Algorithm 1
with hash collision p where p < 110C6 = 2
−Θ(K/m). Suppose there is an oblivious adversary, and let Err
denote the number of channel errors the adversary makes. Let CC denote the total communication in
the entire execution of Algorithm 1), and EHC denote the joint number of errors and hash collisions
during that execution. Let k be a real number such that 1/ε2 ≥ k ≥ 10C6. Then, with probability
1− pΩ(kε|Π|), we have that
CC ≤ 200α|Π|K and EHC ≤ (k + 1) · (200αε)|Π|,
or otherwise Err > εKCC, where α is the constant multiplying the communication complexity of an
iteration in Lemma 4.2.
4.4.1 Overview
We will use hash functions with constant collision probability p = 2−Θ(K/m), which is far higher
than the adversarial error rate of ε/K when K = m. Despite this, we can still bound the number of
hash collisions that occur in the protocol overall by O(ε|Π|). This will follow from the observation
that hash collisions are one-sided– they can only happen when the transcripts being hashed are
different. Since the meeting points protocol lets the parties correct their errors in relatively few
steps, there will be few opportunities for hash collisions. A similar approach is taken in [Hae14] in
the two-party setting.
Now we give more details. Fix two parties u and v. Note that ϕu,v roughly measures how many
hashes must be passed between the two parties to get back to a consistent transcript, with the
property that u and v have a consistent transcript when ϕu,v = 0 (Proposition A.2). The main
idea is that the potential function ϕu,v can only increase by at most a constant during any single
exchange of meeting points, even in the presence of errors or hash collisions. Furthermore, in the
absence of errors or hash collisions, it decreases by some constant. Finally, if ϕu,v = 0, then it can
only increase above 0 if an error is introduced between u and v, because hash collisions do not occur
when the transcripts match.
The main approach of this section is to argue that ϕu,v should not be nonzero too often. For
intuition, suppose the adversary starts by making some small number of errors, which makes ϕu,v
equal to some number N . Then the number of iterations in which ϕu,v is nonzero will be small
as long as hash collisions happen infrequently enough that the resulting increase in ϕu,v does not
outweigh the decrease of ϕu,v in a typical iteration, where a hash collision does not happen. This
will follow from the independence of hash collisions across iterations and links of the network.
The hash collisions are independent because the adversary is oblivious: they place their errors
before seeing the execution of the protocol. What will specifically be useful to us is that they place
their errors without knowing the randomness S used to seed the hash function. Since the random
seed for the hash h is independently generated for each pair of parties (u, v) ∈ E and each iteration
i ∈ [100|Π|], the events of hash collisions are independent. This lets us bound the number of hash
collision with high probability by using a Chernoff bound.
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The only property of an oblivious adversary we require here is that the error pattern is independent
of the seeds used throughout the protocol. Hence, the results in this section hold for any oblivious
adversary, regardless of whether the adversary is additive (the primary model of oblivious adversary
we consider in this paper; see Section 2) or fixing (see Remark 1). This is because, at the beginning
of any iteration i, every partial transcript Tu,v(i) is a deterministic function of the inputs to the
protocol, the errors that the adversary committed obliviously, and the hash seeds for all links (u, v)
and iterations j = 1, . . . , i− 1. However, in Algorithm 1, the seeds used in iteration i are sampled
independently of all of the above. Hence, all our results in this section hold regardless of which
model of oblivious adversary we use.
4.4.2 Proof of Lemma 4.10
In analogy with the terminology of dangerous rounds from [Hae14], we define the notion of dangerous
triples as follows.
Definition 4.11. Let i be an iteration of Algorithm 1, and let u and v be parties such that (u, v) ∈ E.
Call the triple (i, u, v) dangerous if Bu,v > 0 at the beginning of iteration i.
Now we state the lemma that we will prove in this section, which will be the main workhorse in
proving Lemma 4.10.
Lemma 4.12. Let ε > 0 be a sufficiently small constant. Suppose an oblivious adversary, and
suppose the hash collision probability of h is p such that p < 110C6 in Algorithm 7. Let Err denote the
number of errors the adversary makes, CC denote the total communication in Algorithm 1, and let D
denote the number of dangerous triples (i, u, v). Let k be a real number such that 1/ε2 ≥ k ≥ 10C6.
Then with probability 1− pΩ(kε|Π|), we have that
CC ≤ 200α|Π|K and D ≤ k · (200αε)|Π|,
or otherwise, Err > εKCC, where α is the constant multiplying the communication complexity of an
iteration in Lemma 4.2.
Note that a hash collision can only occur between u and v in an iteration i ∈ [100|Π|] when
(i, u, v) is a dangerous triple, by definition. Hence, the proof of Lemma 4.10 from Lemma 4.12
follows easily:
Proof of Lemma 4.10. Suppose Err ≤ εKCC, and recall that log(1/p) = Θ(K/m). By Lemma 4.12,
the communication of Algorithm 1 is upper bounded by 200α|Π|K with probability 1− pΩ(kε|Π|).
When this occurs and also Err ≤ εKCC, this implies that the number of errors is at most 200αε|Π|.
Furthermore, the number of hash collisions is at most the number of dangerous triples, which is
at most k · (200αε)|Π|, again by Lemma 4.12. This concludes the proof that EHC is bounded by
(k + 1)(200αε)|Π|.
The first part of Lemma 4.12 argues that the communication complexity CC is bounded with
high probability. First we will argue that if the communication complexity is too large, then the
number of dangerous triples must be very large with respect to the number of errors the adversary
can introduce. Then, we establish that the number of dangerous triples can only be so large if the
fraction of hash collisions in these triples is too large, which happens with low probability.
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Lemma 4.13. Consider a run of Algorithm 1. Denote the number of dangerous triples in this run
by D, and the number of errors by Err. Suppose that the communication complexity in this run
satisfies CC > 200α|Π|K, where α is the constant multiplying the communication in Lemma 4.2,
and suppose that Err ≤ εKCC.
If Err > 0, then D ≥ β · Err, where β def= CC3αKErr ≥ 13αε . If Err = 0, then D = 0 trivially.
Proof. The final statement follows easily - if there is never any error in the protocol, then there will
never be a point at which any pair of transcripts are mismatched.
Now we prove the statement when Err > 0. We start by summing Lemma 4.2 over all the 100|Π|
iterations i of Algorithm 1 in order to bound the communication complexity of the entire protocol.
Note that
∑
i∈[100|Π|] ` ≤ EHC; recall that EHC is the total number of errors and hash collisions
experienced throughout the entire protocol.
CC ≤
∑
i
α(1 + `)K
≤ αK(100|Π|+ EHC)
≤ αK
(
100|Π|+ CC · ε
K
+D
)
where the first inequality is Lemma 4.2, and in the last inequality we use the fact that
EHC ≤ ε
K
CC +D
since D upper bounds the number of hash collisions, and that the error rate is bounded by ε/K.
Rearranging, we get that
D ≥ (1− αε)CC− 100α|Π|K
αK
≥ CC
3αK
= βErr
where the second inequality follows from the fact that CC > 200α|Π|K and we take ε sufficiently
small so that αε < 1/3 , and the final equality comes from the definition of β.
Now we proceed with establishing that the probability that D is so large with respect to Err is
relatively small. Let ϕu,v(i) denote the value of ϕu,v at the beginning of iteration i. Towards proving
Lemma 4.12, define the random variable Xi,u,v for all (i, u, v) such that ϕu,v(i) > 0 as follows:
Xi,u,v =
{
1 if hash collision occurs between u and v in iteration i
0 otherwise
.
Define the process ψu,v as follows.
We remark that ψu,v updates in such a way that it is always a upper bound on ϕu,v. We
formalize this below.
Lemma 4.14. For all iterations i in Algorithm 1 and all (u, v) ∈ E, we have that ψu,v(i) ≥ ϕu,v(i),
where ϕu,v(i) denotes the value of the potential ϕu,v at the beginning of iteration i.
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i← 1, ψu,v(1)← 0
for all iterations i from 1 to 100|Π| do
if error occurs between u and v during iteration i, during any phase then
ψu,v(i+ 1) = ψu,v(i) + 6C6
else if ϕu,v(i) > 0 then
ψu,v(i+ 1) = ψu,v(i) + 5C6Xi,u,v − 5(1−Xi,u,v)
else
ψu,v(i+ 1) = ψu,v(i)
end if
end for
Proof. We prove the claim by induction. Clearly it is true for iteration i = 1. Assume now that it is
true for a certain i. We will show that it is also true for iteration i+ 1.
If ϕu,v(i+ 1) = 0, then the claim follows since in this case ψu,v(i+ 1) ≥ ψu,v(i), and ψu,v(i) ≥
ϕ(i)u,v ≥ 0 by induction and since ϕu,v(i) is non-negative (Proposition A.2).
Suppose there is an error between u and v in iteration i. We know that ϕu,v increases by at
most 6C6 regardless of the number of errors or hash collisions in the entire iteration. This follows
from Lemma A.6 and Claim A.1: Lemma A.6 shows that ϕu,v can increase by at most 5C6 in the
Meeting Points phase, and Claim A.1 shows that ϕu,v can increase by at most 2C3 in all the other
phases combined, so C6 ≥ 2C3 yields the desired result. So we conclude that ψu,v(i+1) ≥ ϕu,v(i+1).
Now suppose that ϕu,v(i+ 1) > 0 and there is no error between u and v in iteration i. Then
we must have that ϕu,v(i) > 0, since if ϕu,v(i) = 0, we would have Bu,v(i) = 0 and, therefore there
is no error or hash collision in iteration i between u and v and hence the ϕu,v cannot increase
(Proposition A.4, Lemma A.6 for the Meeting Points phase, and Claim A.1 for Flag Passing,
Simulation, and Rewind phases). Furthermore, there can only be a hash collision at iteration
i between u and v if ϕu,v(i) > 0, which follows from Proposition A.2 and the observation that
hash collisions can only happen if Bu,v(i) > 0 after iteration i. Hence, ψu,v(i+ 1) = ψu,v(i) + 5C6
whenever there is a hash collision between u and v, and ψu,v(i+ 1) = ψu,v(i)− 5 whenever there is
no hash collision between u and v. Since ϕu,v increases by at most 5C6 in the presence of a hash
collision and decreases by at least 5 in the absence of one (Lemma A.6), we conclude the proof.
Let D∗ denote the set of triples (i, u, v) such that ψu,v(i) > 0. Then we claim that D ≤ |D∗|. This
follows from the fact that ψu,v(i) ≥ Bu,v(i) for all i (Lemma 4.14 and Proposition A.2). Our goal
will be to prove that |D∗| is not much larger than Err, with high probability. Our strategy will be to
use the fact that ψu,v(i) is always nonnegative (again, an application of Lemma 4.14 and Proposition
A.2) and that the adversary cannot make too many errors, to argue that
∑
(i,u,v)∈D∗ Xi,u,v must be
bounded below by something relatively large. If there are many random variables Xi,u,v, then a
Chernoff bound will let us argue that
∑
(i,u,v)∈D∗ Xi,u,v should not be this large with high probability.
However, the communication in the protocol is not a priori bounded14: if there are many hash
collisions or errors, then the parties might communicate more, which creates more budget for errors.
So our first step is to bound the number of errors that the adversary can commit.
14Except trivially, by the number of rounds of Algorithm 1 times m, but this can be a factor m more than CC(Π).
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Lemma 4.15. Suppose that the adversary is oblivious, and commits Err errors. Denote the hash
collision probability in Algorithm 1 as p, and suppose that p < 1/30C6. Then,
Pr
[
Err ≤ 200αε|Π|
∨
Err >
ε
K
CC
]
≥ 1− pΩ(|Π|/ε))
where the probability above is over the random seeds used for hashing throughout the protocol.
Note that while the number of errors that an oblivious, additive adversary commits is fixed
ahead of time, the communication in Algorithm 1 (denoted CC) is dependent on the seeds, which
is why the event in Lemma 4.15 is not deterministic. Note that for an oblivious fixing adversary,
the number of errors they commit is also a random variable, as it depends on the communication
pattern of the protocol, since e.g. fixing a link to communicate a 1 in a certain round does not
constitute an error if indeed there is a 1 sent in that round. In both cases, the probability is over
the seeds sampled for the hashes.
Proof of Lemma 4.15. Suppose Err > 200αε|Π| and Err ≤ εKCC. This implies that CC > 200α|Π|K,
and so applying Lemma 4.13 we see that D > 1/(3αε)Err. As we noted previously, |D∗| ≥ D
(consequence of Lemma 4.14 and argument above), and so it suffices to bound the probability that
|D∗| exceeds 1/(3αε)Err. By taking ε small enough with respect to α and C6, we can safely assume
that 3αε < 1/(10C6), and therefore we can apply Lemma 4.16, which tells us that the probability
of this is at most exp(−Ω(Err log(1/p)/ε)).
Lemma 4.16. Suppose the adversary is oblivious, and let Err be the number of errors committed
during a given instance of the protocol. Let p be the hash collision probability of h, and assume that
p < 1/30C6. Let k be some real number such that k ≥ 10C6. Let D∗ denote the set of triples (i, u, v)
such that ψu,v(i) > 0. Then,
Pr[|D∗| > kErr] < pΩ(kErr)
where the Ω hides constants on the order of 1/C6.
Proof. Consider running the protocol after fixing the adversary’s errors with uniformly random
seeds for the hashes. Assume that |D∗| > kErr, and let D˜∗ ⊆ D∗ be the subset of triples where no
error occurs. Since the number of errors is Err, we get that |D˜∗| ≥ (k − 1)Err. Define
ψ
def
=
∑
(u,v)∈E
ψu,v.
We will argue that the fraction of hash collisions required to be in the |D˜∗| (possibly) dangerous
triples is far too large.
We know that ψ is always nonnegative by design, since each of the ψu,v’s are nonnegative.
Consider ψ(100|Π|+ 1), that is, the value of ψ immediately after the final 100|Π|-th iteration of
Algorithm 1. Then, recalling the definition of ψu,v, we can upper bound ψ(100|Π|+ 1) as follows.
0 ≤ ψ(100|Π|+ 1) ≤ 6C6 · Err +
∑
(i,u,v)∈D˜∗
(5C6Xi,u,v − 5(1−Xi,u,v)). (7)
Hence, we can conclude that∑
(i,u,v)∈D˜∗
5C6Xi,u,v − 5(1−Xi,u,v) ≥ −6C6 · Err. (8)
36
Now we claim that
∑
Xi,u,v ≥ 45C6+5 |D˜∗|.∑
(i,u,v)∈D˜∗
(5C6Xi,u,v − 5(1−Xi,u,v)) ≥ −6C6 · Err
(5C6 + 5)
 ∑
(i,u,v)∈D˜∗
Xi,u,v
− 5|D˜∗| ≥ −6C6 · Err
∑
(i,u,v)∈D˜∗
Xi,u,v ≥ 4
5C6 + 5
|D˜∗|,
where in the last line we use the fact that |D˜∗| ≥ (k − 1) · Err ≥ 6C6 · Err.
Technically, some of the Xi,u,v are deterministically 0, which occurs when ϕu,v(i) > 0 but
Bu,v = 0. The event of Xi,u,v being deterministically 0 is also influenced by previous hash collisions
in the network, as these play a role in making the transcripts differ. We will ignore this fact wlog,
since making all of the |S′| triples have some probability of have collision (rather than just some of
them) can only increase
∑
Xi,u,v, and we will still be able to show that
∑
Xi,u,v is small. So we
will assume that all the random variables Xi,u,v are i.i.d Ber(p).
Now we apply a Chernoff bound. By taking p < 1/(10C6), we note that
Pr
∑
D˜∗
Xi,u,v ≥ 4
5C6 + 5
|D˜∗|
 ≤ Pr[ 1
|D˜∗|
∑
Xi,u,v ≥ p+ 3
5C6 + 5
]
.
We bound this probability by pΩ(|D˜∗|) in Claim 4.17, where the Ω hides terms on the order of 1/C6.
We finish the proof by recalling that |D˜∗| ≥ (k − 1) · Err.
Claim 4.17. Fix a constant γ > 0. Suppose that {Xi,u,v}(i,u,v)∈D˜∗ are i.i.d Ber(p) random variables
such that p is sufficiently smaller than γ. Then
Pr
 1
|D˜∗|
∑
(i,u,v)∈D˜∗
Xi,u,v ≥ p+ γ
 ≤ pΩ(|D˜∗|)
where the Ω hides constants on the order of γ.
Proof of Claim. From a Chernoff bound, we get that
Pr
 1
|D˜∗|
∑
(i,u,v)∈D˜∗
Xi,u,v ≥ p+ γ
 ≤ exp(−D (p+ γ || p) · |D˜∗|)
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where D(x||y) = x ln
(
x
y
)
+(1−x) ln
(
1−x
1−y
)
is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between two Bernoulli
random variables. We claim that D(p+ γ||p) ≥ Ω(log(1/p)).
D(p+ γ||p) = (p+ γ) ln
(
γ
p
)
+ (1− p− γ) ln
(
1− p− γ
1− p
)
≥ γ ln
(
γ
p
)
+ (1− p− γ)
( −2γ
1− p
)
≥ γ ln
(
γ
p
)
− 2γ
≥ γ(ln
(
γ
p
)
− 2)
where in the second line we use the inequality that −x ≤ ln(1− x/2) for x ∈ (0, 1).
From the above lemmas, the proof of Lemma 4.12 follows easily.
Proof of Lemma 4.12. By Lemma 4.15, the probability of having more than 200αε|Π| errors in the
protocol while also having Err ≤ εKCC is at most pΩ(|Π|/ε). The probability that the number of errors
is smaller than 200αε|Π| and simultaneously the number of dangerous triples exceeds k · (200αε)|Π|
is at most pΩ(kε|Π|) , by Lemma 4.1615. Hence, the union of these two events has probability at most
pΩ(kε|Π|)
, which is the only place where we use that k ≤ 1/ε2.
Now that we have bounded the communication and number of hash collisions, we are ready to
prove Theorem 4.1.
4.5 Completing the proof of Theorem 4.1
Recall that we set K := m in InitializeState (Algorithm 2). Throughout this analysis, we assume
that the number of errors that the adversary commits is Err such that Err ≤ (ε/m)CC, as this is
what is implied by the adversary having rate ε/m.
Lemma 4.2 shows that in every iteration of Algorithm 1, φ increases by at least K = m. Hence,
after at the end of the simulation after 100|Π| iterations, we know that φ ≥ 100|Π|m.
Lemma 4.10 shows that the total communication during the protocol is bounded by CC ≤
200α|Π|m with probability at least 1−pΩ(|Π|/ε), by invoking it with k = 1/ε2. Since we take p and α
to be constants, this just says that CC = O(|Π|K) = O(CC(Π)) with probability 1− exp(−Ω(|Π|/ε)).
Hence, we will assume that the CC = O(|Π|K) for the remainder of the proof.
We conclude the argument by establishing that, when the protocol ends and φ ≥ 100|Π|m,
the parties are done simulating the initial protocol correctly with high probability. We do this by
appealing to the following claim, written for general K, and apply it with K = m to finish the proof.
Claim 4.18. Suppose that φ ≥ 100|Π|K. Then with probability 1− exp(−Ω(ε|Π|)), the parties are
done simulating the underlying protocol Π correctly.
15Note that the k in the statement of Lemma 4.12 and the k with which we invoke Lemma 4.16 here are different -
technically, we invoke Lemma 4.16 with its k set to k(200αε|Π|)/Err. We settle for this abuse of notation because k
plays the same role conceptually in Lemmas 4.12 and 4.16.
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Proof. Recall our definition of the potential φ:
φ =
∑
(u,v)∈E
((K/m)Gu,v −K · ϕu,v)− C1KB∗ + C7K · EHC.
Fix ε∗ to be a constant such that ε∗ ≤ 1/(4200C6C7α), and take ε to be sufficiently smaller than
ε∗. Since ε∗ ≥ ε, know that EHC ≤ 4200C6αε∗|Π| with probability at most 1−exp(−Ω(ε∗|Π|)). This
follows from Lemma 4.10, taking k + 1 := (4200C6αε
∗/ε) · (|Π|m/CC), and noting that |Π|m/CC is
a constant, so taking ε sufficiently small makes k be large enough for the lemma to apply.
Since ε∗ is sufficiently small, we get that
C7K · EHC ≤ C7K · 4200C6αε∗|Π| ≤ |Π|K.
Furthermore, the term
∑−K · ϕu,v is nonpositive, due to the fact that ϕu,v is non-negative
(Proposition A.2). Therefore, we get that∑
(u,v)∈E
K
m
Gu,v − C1KB∗ ≥ 99|Π|K (9)
Recall that B∗ = H∗−G∗ ≥ max(u,v)∈E(Gu,v)−min(u,v)∈E(Gu,v). By plugging this into Eq. (9),
and recalling that C1 ≥ 2, we get
99|Π|K ≤
∑
(u,v)∈E
K
m
Gu,v − C1KB∗
≤ K max
(u,v)∈E
(Gu,v)− C1K
(
max
(u,v)∈E
(Gu,v)− min
(u,v)∈E
(Gu,v)
)
≤ K max
(u,v)∈E
(Gu,v)−K
(
max
(u,v)∈E
(Gu,v)− min
(u,v)∈E
(Gu,v)
)
= K min
(u,v)∈E
(Gu,v)
Hence, we conclude that min(u,v)∈E(Gu,v) ≥ 99|Π|. Therefore, each pair of parties have simulated Π
correctly for at least |Π| chunks, which suffices to compute Π correctly.
Finally, we recall that this all happens with probability 1− exp(−Ω(ε∗|Π|)). Since ε∗ is a fixed
constant in terms of α,C6, and C7, we can absorb it into the Ω, and conclude that the above
happens with probability 1− exp(−Ω(|Π|)).
5 Removing the CRS assumption for oblivious channels
5.1 Overview
In this section we modify our protocol from Section 3 to not require a common random string
(CRS) between the parties. This will involve the parties generating randomness privately and
sharing this randomness with their neighbors. We will still assume that the adversary is oblivious,
which in particular means that the adversary cannot plan his errors after seeing the random strings
communicated in the network.
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Note that the pairwise transcripts Tu,v are extremely large, potentially O(|Π|K). If we use the
inner product hash function with a uniformly random seed, the seed will be far too large for the
parties to send to each other. Specifically, if they all sent each other |Π| uniformly random seeds
each of length Ω(|Π|K), this would cost Ω(|Π|mCC(Π)) in communication throughout the network.
Our way around this, much like the solution employed by previous work [GMS11, BK12, Hae14],
employs δ-biased seeds for the inner product hash. Specifically, recall that the lemma of Naor and
Naor [NN93] (Lemma 2.5) states that we can efficiently generate δ-biased distributions over strings
of length ` using just Θ(log(1/δ) + log(`)) bits of uniform randomness. Hence, the parties can
share small amounts of uniform randomness that they will expand to a common δ-biased random
seed, which they can then use throughout the simulation. This randomness exchange occurs in
Algorithm 5, which is the main addition to the protocol in this section. It remains to show that,
even when the parties use this δ-biased randomness, the number of hash collisions is still bounded
with high probability, which we do in Lemma 5.2.
Our proof strategy uses nice properties of the inner product hash function (specifically, Lemma 2.6)
to reduce the case where the parties share δ-biased randomness to the case where the parties share
uniform randomness, at the expense of a small loss in our error bounds (which can be bounded by a
multiplicative loss of e when we take δ to be small enough). The challenge comes from the fact that
the transcripts passed at any given iteration are correlated with the random seeds used previously.
Therefore, in the case where the randomness used across iterations is not entirely uniform, this
means the transcripts are correlated with the random seeds used to hash them, preventing us
from directly applying Lemma 2.6. We circumvent this issue by showing that any pattern of hash
misses/matches throughout the simulation (which we call agreement patterns) fixes the transcripts
throughout the protocol. This furthermore implies that the probability of seeing a fixed agreement
pattern in the protocol is equal to the probability of seeing this same pattern of hash agreements
when we fix the inputs to the hash functions (Proposition 5.7).
Unfortunately, this alone is not quite enough. Specifically, the adversary can try to sabotage the
randomness exchange protocol on a link, which would mess up the protocol on that link irreparably,
and sabotage the entire protocol. In [Hae14], this is not a problem, since the communication in
the protocol is bounded a priori by the number of rounds, so we can make the number of errors
needed to mess up the randomness exchange so large that the adversary cannot possibly do it.
However, this is potentially problematic for us, since in our model of multiparty protocols, the
amount of communication in the network cannot be meaningfully bounded by the number of rounds
in the simulation. Therefore, the adversary can hope that her corruptions to the shared randomness
will greatly increase the amount of communication, paying for her errors. We need to show that
this does not happen with high probability, and therefore that the adversary cannot sabotage the
randomness exchange protocol on even a single link.
Roughly speaking, by corrupting the randomness exchange on a single link, the adversary
can make all the hash exchanges on that link be collisions. However, there are only Θ(|Π|) hash
exchanges on that link, and we force the adversary has to commit Θ(|Π|K/m) errors for each link
she wants to mess up. By Lemma 4.2, we can conclude that the number of hash collisions she
can cause on that that link is not sufficient to increase the communication enough to pay for her
previous errors. We additionally need to show that these adversary-induced hash collisions cannot
create more hash collisions on any edge in the set E′ where the randomness was shared correctly.
To rule this out, we need to generalize the analysis in to this scenario, where only a subset of edges
E′ correctly share a uniform seed. We note that, due to this complication, we also state Lemma 5.2
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in terms of a subset of edges E′ that managed to share δ-biased randomness correctly.
Finally, we discuss different models of oblivious adversaries. Just like in the previous section,
the only fact we need about oblivious adversaries are that the error pattern is independent of the
seeds sampled by the parties. Indeed, both the additive and fixing adversaries (see Section 2 and
Remark 1) fix their error pattern independently of the randomness sampled in the protocol. The
only difference from Section 4.4 is that the seeds across iterations are no longer independent, but
come from a large δ-biased seed. However, the adversary is still oblivious, so the errors she commits
are still independent of the seeds. Slightly more formally, we reduce the case with δ-biased seeds to
the case with uniform random seeds, and then the argument for why either oblivious adversary is
okay reduces to the argument we gave at the end of the overview in Section 4.4.
5.2 Simulation without a pre-shared CRS: Protocol Definition
We now define the simulation that assumes no CRS, which we call Algorithm A. Algorithm A is
based on the simulation of Algorithm 1 with a few changes to its subroutines. Specifically, the
InitializeState() subroutine is replaced with Algorithm 4. This new subroutine initiates a randomness
exchange routine (Algorithm 5), where the parties exchange a small amount of uniform randomness
in order to generate a larger (shared) δ-biased seed. The extended δ-biased will be used in the
meeting-points protocol, which behaves exactly as before (Algorithm 7).
Algorithm 4 InitializeState() (for simulation without assuming a CRS)
1: K ← m
2: for all neighbors v ∈ N(u) in parallel do
3: Initialize Tu,v = ∅
4: Initialize ku,v, Eu,v,mpc1u,v,mpc2u,v ← 0
5: statusu,v ← “simulate”
6: alreadyRewoundu,v ← 0
7: δ := 2−Θ(|Π|K/m)
8: S := (Si,u,v)i∈[100|Π|] ← RandomnessExchange(u, v, δ, K)
9: end for
10: statusu ← 1.
11: netCorrectu ← 1
The randomness exchange procedure is depicted in Algorithm 5. On every link (u, v), one of
the parties u (according to some global total ordering of the parties) uniformly sample a seed L,
encodes it and send it to v. Then, both parties expand R to a larged δ-biased string Su,v. Note
that v decodes the communication from u and gets a seed L′ which may differ from L due to noise.
In this case the string Su,v generated by u will differ from Sv,u generated by v. In hindsight, the
adversary will not have enough noise budget to corrupt any Sv,u, with high probability.
We note that the randomness exchange uses a standard error correcting code in order to protect
the seeds from noise. This suffices since the seeds are exchanged in fixed rounds at the beginning of
Algorithm 1. The noise can only flip the communicated bits or delete them. Every flip is a standard
error, while any deletion is perceived by the receiver as an erasure, since it expects a transmission
at that round. Any code with constant distance and constant rate suffices for us. For concreteness,
we can consider a code from Theorem 2.1 with rate ρ = 1/3 and constant distance.
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Algorithm 5 RandomnessExchange(u, v, δ, K)
input: u calling party, v ∈ N(u). δ > 0 is a parameter that specifies the bias we desire from
our random string.
1: Fix an arbitrary total order on the vertices in V (common for all instantiations of this procedure).
2: `← Θ(|Π|K) · 100|Π|,
3: r ← Θ(log(1/δ) + log(`)), large enough to generate a string of length at least ` and bias at most
δ via Lemma 2.5.
4: C ← error correcting code with block length Θ(r), constant rate and constant distance (e.g.,
the code from Theorem 2.1)
5: if u < v in the ordering then
6: Sample a uniformly random string L ∈ {0, 1}r
7: Send C(L) to v
8: else
9: Receive W from v
10: L← C−1(W ), the decoding of W with respect to the code C.
11: end if
12: Su,v ←
({0, 1}Θ(|Π|K))100|Π| gets the δ-biased string of length ` generated from L by Lemma 2.5.
13: Output Su,v.
5.3 Algorithm A: Analysis
We now analyze Algorithm A and show that for any oblivious adversary that corrupts at most a
fraction O(ε/m) of the communication, the parties correctly simulate Π with high probability.
The main theorem of this section is as follows. Its proof will also be useful in Section 6.
Theorem 5.1. Assume a network G = (V,E) with n = |V | parties and m = |E| links. Suppose Π
is a multiparty protocol the network G with communication complexity CC(Π), binary alphabet and
fixed order of speaking. Let |Π| = CC(Π)5m and let ε > 0 be a sufficiently small constant. Consider an
instance of Algorithm A with an oblivious adversary and let CC denote the communication complexity
of the instance. Then, the probability that the total number of errors satisfies Err ≤ εm · CC and yet
Algorithm A either simulates Π incorrectly or has CC = ω(CC(Π)), is at most exp(−Ω(|Π|)).
5.3.1 Overview
The analysis follows the same track of Section 4 and in fact we use many of the lemmas proved in
that Section for analyzing Algorithm A as well. We note that the technical lemmas of Section 4.3,
(in particular, Lemma 4.2) do not depend on the seed used for the hash function and hold for
Algorithm A as well. Similarly, all the lemmas in Appendix A do not depend on the seed used for
the hash function. This is because all these statements care about establishing that the potential φ
increases in the event of a hash collision, regardless of the origin of the hash-collision.
The difference arises when we need to bound the number of hash-collisions during an instance of
the algorithm. Namely, the proofs in Section 4.4, and in particular Lemma 4.10 and Lemma 4.16.
These statements are affected by our use of a δ-biased seed, since we critically use the fact that
the seeds were uniform to imply that the events of hash collisions were independent. The main
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part of this section will be to show that δ-biased seeds do not significantly affect the bounds on
the number of hash-collision. In particular, Lemma 5.2 establishes that any bound on the number
of hash-collisions achieved assuming uniform seeds is valid also when the seeds are δ-biased, up to
some degradation of the probability. We formally state this part in Section 5.3.2 and the proof is
given in Section 5.3.4.
Additionally, we will need to establish that the adversary cannot meaningfully corrupt the
communication in the randomness exchange protocol. That is, the adversary cannot make parties
use mis-matching δ-biased strings. To this end we need to bound the communication of Algorithm A
assuming that some of the δ-biased strings are adversarially chosen. We show that despite the fact
that the adversary control some of these seeds, the communication does not increase too much, and
the increase is proportional to the number of seeds controlled by the adversary. This bound on the
communication effectively bounds the budget of the adversary. By choosing the right parameters,
we establish that a noise level of ε/m-fraction of the communication is insufficient to corrupt the
δ-biased string of even a single link. The communication-related bounds appear in Section 5.3.5.
Once the number of hash-collisions is bounded with high probability, and the communication is
bounded, the same proof of Section 4 directly implies the correctness of Algorithm A. The detailed
proof of Theorem 5.1 is given in Section 5.3.6.
5.3.2 Bounding hash collisions: Goal and Statement
We would like to bound the number of hash-collisions in an analogous manner to Lemma 4.10 (i.e.,
Lemma 4.12). Note that the only part of the proof of Lemma 4.12 that uses the fact that the seeds
are uniformly random is Lemma 4.16, where this assumption is used to invoke a Chernoff bound to
exponentially bound the probability that the number of hash collisions is too high. So it suffices for
us to prove an analogous statement to Lemma 4.16, which we do below in Lemma 5.2.
Lemma 5.2. Consider an instance of Algorithm A with |Π|K ≥ m log(m), and let p denote the
collision probability of the inner product hash function used by the protocol under uniformly random
seeds. Suppose the adversary is oblivious, and let E′ be the set of edges on which the parties
successfully share δ-biased randomness after InitializeState() is completed. Let Err be the number of
errors committed during the main part of Algorithm A (after InitializeState() is completed). Let k
be a real number, let D denote the number of triples (i, u, v) such that Bu,v(i) > 0 and (u, v) ∈ E′.
Then
Pr
S
[D > kErr] ≤ e · p−2Err · Pr
R
[D > kErr]
where S = (Si,u,v, Si,v,u)i∈[100|Π|],(u,v)∈E is the strings shared by each party after Algorithm 5, and
where R = (Ri,u,v, Ri,v,u)i∈[100|Π|],(u,v)∈E is sampled from a distribution such that for every (u, v) ∈ E′
the parties share a uniform string, and for any (u, v) 6∈ E′ the seeds are sampled identically to the
distribution of S on the corresponding links.
5.3.3 Bounding hash collisions: Notations and Definitions
Towards the proof of Lemma 5.2 let us re-iterate the main notations and definitions used in the
proof. We additionally set some new definitions and notations that will be useful for the proof.
Throughout the rest of this section as well as Section 6, denote the “main” part of the protocol
to be the part of Algorithm A after InitializeState() is completed. Say that the adversary has
“effective error rate” ε′/K in the “main” part of the protocol if the adversary inflicts at most ε
′
K ·CC′
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errors in the main part, where CC′ is the communication complexity of the main part of the protocol.
We show in Claim 5.3 below that the effective error rate in the main part of the protocol is always
within a constant factor of the overall error rate.
Claim 5.3. Let CC be the communication complexity of an execution of Algorithm A, let Err denote
the number of errors the adversary makes overall (including the randomness exchange), and let ε > 0
be a sufficiently small constant. Assume that |Π|K ≥ m log(m). If Err ≤ εK ·CC, then Err ≤ ε
′
K ·CC′,
where CC′ denotes the communication complexity of the main part of the protocol and ε′ = Θ(ε). In
particular, if we denote the number of errors in the main part of the protocol as Err′, this means
that the effective error rate on the main part Err′/CC′ is at most ε′/K.
Proof. The proof follows by establishing that the communication complexity of the main part of
the protocol can always be lower bounded by a constant times the communication complexity of
the randomness exchange. By Claim 5.13 (proved in Section 5.3.5), the communication in the
randomness exchange is Θ(|Π|K) as long as |Π|K ≥ m log(m). Furthermore, the communication in
the main part of the protocol is always at least Ω(|Π|K). This is because there are 100|Π| iterations,
and the communication in each meeting-points phase is at least Θ(K) regardless of errors or hash
collisions, since the parties pass hashes of size Θ(K/m) to each other and there are m links.
Note that the adversary has two types of errors it can place: it can use errors to tamper with
the randomness exchange phase, and it can use errors to corrupt the “main” part of Algorithm A.
Let E′ be the set of edges (u, v) on which the randomness exchange happens successfully, that is,
the string that u encodes and sends to v is correctly decoded by v. This set is determined after the
oblivious adversary places its errors: it simply consists of the edges in which it does not corrupt at
least Θ(|Π| · Km ) communication during the randomness exchange. In analog with Section 4.4, define
D to be the number of dangerous triples (i, u, v) on links with valid hash seeds,
D
def
= |{(i, u, v) | Bu,v(i) > 0 ∧ (u, v) ∈ E′}|.
Our goal is to argue that the number of hash collisions that the adversary can create on the links
in E′ is not very large, even when the pairs of parties in E′ use δ-biased strings. Note that in the
above lemma, and throughout the analysis in Section 5, dangerous triples (i, u, v) are defined as
such for which (u, v) ∈ E′. If (u, v) ∈ E \E′, then (i, u, v) is not dangerous even if Bu,v(i) > 0. The
reason we restrict ourselves to E′ is that the links in E \ E′ are effectively lost—the adversary can
make the parties disagree on the δ-biased strings and always have a “hash collision”.
Let
S
def
= (Si,u,v, Si,v,u)i∈[100|Π|],(u,v)∈E
denote the tuple of pairs of strings shared by each party after Algorithm 5. Denote by DS the
distribution on strings sampled from by Algorithm 5, accounting for the adversary’s oblivious
errors, then, S ∼ DS . Note that for edges (u, v) ∈ E′, we have that Si,u,v = Si,v,u for all i and
Su,v
def
= (Si,u,v)i∈[100|Π|] is a δ-biased string. However, for edges (u, v) 6∈ E′, the adversary has
tampered with the randomness exchange, and so we could have Si,u,v 6= Si,v,u. However, these
strings are independent of the “good” random strings Si,u,v for (u, v) ∈ E′, due to the obliviousness
of the adversary.
Let
R
def
= (Ri,u,v, Ri,v,u)i∈[100|Π|],(u,v)∈E
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denote the case where instead of δ-biased strings, the parties that successfully share a seed, share a
uniform seed. That is, R is sampled form the distribution DR where for every (u, v) ∈ E′ it holds
that Ri,u,v = Ri,v,u and Ru,v
def
= (Ri,u,v)i∈[100|Π|] is uniformly distributed. For any (u, v) 6∈ E′ it
holds that (Ri,u,v, Ri,v,u) is sampled from the distribution from which the tampered random strings
(Si,u,v, Si,v,u) are sampled.
Definition 5.4 (Agreement patterns). An agreement pattern a ∈ {0, 1}100|Π|·(2|E|) consists of a pair
of elements (ai,u,v, ai,v,u) for each iteration i ∈ [100|Π|] and each edge (u, v) ∈ E, where ai,u,v = 1
if and only if party u believes that u and v have matching hashes in iteration i. The term ai,v,u is
defined analogously.
Note that ai,u,v = 1 does not imply that the hashes actually match. Indeed, in the presence of
channel noise the parties may believe that their hashes match (or mismatch) while the real hashes
do not.
To be precise, multiple hashes are passed by u and v in iteration i, and an agreement pattern
should account for misses/matches in all of them. To ease the readability of the analysis, we will
assume that the parties exchange only a single hash, and that they make all their decisions according
to whether this hash missed or matched. This will not affect the validity of the analysis, yet it will
somewhat simplify it. We elaborate on this simplifying assumption in Remark 3 in the proof of
Lemma 5.2.
Given an agreement pattern a, let au,v ∈ {0, 1}200|Π| denote the vector
au,v
def
= ((a1,u,v, a1,v,u), . . . (a100|Π|,u,v, a100|Π|,v,u)),
which is the pattern of hash misses and matches that both u and v see along a single link (u, v)
throughout the protocol. Similarly, let
ai
def
= (ai,u,v, ai,v,u)(u,v)∈E ∈ {0, 1}2|E|
denote the vector of hash misses and matches for every party and every link in an iteration i, and
let a≤i
def
= (a1, . . . , ai). Call ai, au,v, and a≤i sub-patterns of a.
Note that, since we fix the oblivious adversary’s errors ahead of time, the agreement pattern a
observed in a given instance of Algorithm A is a function of the random seed S that the algorithm
samples. Let A denote the random variable over agreement patterns a, where PrS [A = a] is the
probability, over the random string S, that the protocol gets agreement pattern a, where S is the
concatenation of the randomness used by each party for each link. Similar to previous notation, let
Ai denote the random variable A restricted to sub-patterns ai, and A≤i denote the restriction to
sub-patterns a≤i.
5.3.4 Bounding hash collisions: Detailed proof
In this section, we prove Lemma 5.2. First, we state a simple but vital claim.
Claim 5.5. Fix the inputs to the protocol and an oblivious adversary, let i be an iteration of
Algorithm A, and fix an agreement sub-pattern a≤i for the protocol. Then for all (u, v) ∈ E and all
j = 1, . . . , i+ 1, the partial transcripts Tu,v(j) and Tv,u(j) are fixed.
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Proof. We will prove this by induction on j. In fact, we prove something stronger - for every party
u and every variable var that u keeps in its state, var(j) is fixed.
For j = 1, it is clear the statement holds, as no communication has happened yet, so each party
has the same (empty) partial transcript and all other variables have the values given to them in
InitializeState().
Now assume that the claim holds for j < i+ 1. In iteration j, the parties exchange hashes of the
partial transcripts Tu,v(j) and Tv,u(j). Since j ≤ i, we have fixed aj , which means we have already
fixed whether or not u and/or v observe hash collisions for every pair of adjacent parties (u, v) ∈ E.
Noting that the only randomness in Algorithm A comes from hashing, we can conclude that this
fixes every action of each party in iteration j. To give more detail, it is clear that the actions that
any party u takes in the Meeting Points phase are fixed, since these are a function of whether it
observes a hash collision or not, which we fixed via the agreement pattern. In every other phase,
the action that any party u takes is a (deterministic) function of the states of all the parties at the
end of the previous phase and the errors that the adversary commits (which are fixed in advance,
independent of the execution of the protocol). By induction on the four phases, we conclude that all
the actions u takes throughout iteration j, including messages sent and updates of state variables,
are fixed, for every party u.
Therefore, the values of every state variable (including the partial transcripts Tu,v and Tv,u) at
the beginning of iteration j + 1 are fixed.
The following corollary follows by taking i = 100|Π|.
Corollary 5.6. Fix the inputs to the protocol and an oblivious adversary, and fix an agreement
pattern a. For all (u, v) ∈ E and all iterations i, Tu,v(i) and Tv,u(i) are fixed.
Remark 3 (Remark on Hash Agreements). The situation is actually somewhat more complex than
just whether or not the hashes of the transcript Tu,v(i) matches the (possibly corrupted) hash of
Tv,u(i) in iteration i. In the meeting-points protocol, the parties send each other two hashes of
transcripts, one for each of their current “meeting points.” Party u compares these two received
hashes to her own two hashes, and takes different outcomes depending on how these received hashes
match with her hashes. The parties also send each other hashes of their meeting-point iteration k,
and compare these. Hence, the actions of party u are actually a function of these 5 hash comparisons,
and the agreement pattern should be defined over 25-ary symbols rather than bits. For simplicity,
we pretend as if the action is a function of just one hash comparison for this proof. This only affects
the constant in the exponent of p in Lemma 5.2. 
Now we can prove Lemma 5.2.
Proof of Lemma 5.2. Fix the inputs to the parties and the adversary’s errors. By Corollary 5.6, fixing
the agreement pattern throughout the entire protocol fixes all the partial transcripts Tu,v(i), Tv,u(i)
for each link (u, v) ∈ E and iteration i. In other words, as long as the agreement pattern for two
runs of the Algorithm A are the same, the actions of the parties in each phase of the two instances
are identical as well, even if the random seeds sampled in the two runs are different. In other words,
every random seed that leads to agreement pattern a also leads to the exact same set of pairs of
transcripts {(Tu,v(i), Tv,u(i))}i,u,v for every iteration i and edge (u, v) ∈ E.
We briefly note that it is possible that an agreement pattern a never occurs in Algorithm A (i.e.,
Pr[A = a] = 0 for any distribution of randomness). As a simple example, consider the cases where
46
no noise occurs at all, and yet ai,u,v = 0 for some i and (u, v) ∈ E. This is obviously impossible
since the absence of noise implies that the transcripts at both sides are the same, and hence their
hashes must be the same. Since no noise is present, both parties receive the correct hash values and
the agreement must be ai,u,v = 1 in all iterations.
We call an agreement pattern a consistent w.r.t a distribution D if there is some random seed
S ∈ supp(D) that can be sampled from the distribution D that leads to the agreement pattern a. If
a is consistent with the uniform distribution, then we simply say a is consistent. Given a consistent
agreement pattern a, denote the unique set of pairs of transcripts that can coexist with it in the
protocol as {(T (a)u,v (i), T (a)v,u (i))}i,u,v. We have already argued that a can coexist with at most one set
of pairs of transcripts, since fixing a fixes the behavior of all the parties in the protocol.
Now we prove the key proposition for this proof, which roughly says that the probability that
we see a consistent agreement pattern a in Algorithm A is equal to the probability of the following
event:
hu(T
(a)
u,v ) = hv(T
(a)
v,u ) if and only if ai,u,v = 1 for all (i, u, v),
where hu denotes the hash function that u uses during i with seed Si,u,v, hv denotes the hash function
that v uses with seed Si,v,u, and {(T (a)u,v (i), T (a)v,u (i)} denotes the unique set of pairs of transcripts
that is consistent with a given the specific oblivious noise.
This alone is not quite accurate, since u’s actions are not determined by whether the hashes of
T
(a)
u,v and T
(a)
v,u actually match, but rather by whether u thinks they matched. These two events can
be different when the adversary corrupts the hash that v sends to u, which is why we defined ai,u,v
and ai,v,u separately. Hence, instead of comparing ai,u,v to the event that h(T
(a)
u,v (i)) = h(T
(a)
v,u (i)),
we actually compare ai,u,v to the event that the hash of u’s transcript h(T
(a)
u,v (i)) = h˜(T
(a)
v,u (i)), where
h˜(·) is the function that first applies the hash h to the input and then induces errors from the
adversary.
For notational convenience, let Z(S, i, u, v, a) denote the event that the hash agreement between
u and v in iteration i is consistent with a, when seeded by S. Namely, Z(S, i, u, v, a) is the following
event
Z(S, i, u, v, a)
def
={(
1
hS,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i))=h˜S,i,v,u(T
(a)
v,u(i))
= ai,u,v
)∧(
1
h˜S,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i))=hS,i,v,u(T
(a)
v,u(i))
= ai,v,u
)}
(10)
where hS,i,u,v denotes the hash function h used in Algorithm A when given the seed Si,u,v, and
h˜S,i,u,v(·) is defined by applying hS,i,u,v to its input, then modifying the output with the errors that
the adversary commits on the transmission from u to v in iteration i.
Proposition 5.7. Fix a distribution D and a consistent agreement pattern a (with respect to the
uniform distribution). Fix {(T (a)u,v (i), T (a)v,u (i))}i,u,v to the unique transcripts forced in the protocol by
fixing a. Let S = (Si,u,v, Si,v,u)i∈[100|Π|,(u,v)∈E] denote the tuple of random strings used by the main
part of the protocol.
Then,
Pr
S∼D
[A = a] = Pr
S∼D
∧
i,u,v
Z(S, i, u, v, a)
 , (11)
Furthermore, if a is not consistent with D, then Eq. (11) is equal to 0.
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Proof. We show that the set of randomly sampled strings S that gives rise to the agreement pattern
a in the protocol is the same set of strings that gives rise to 1
hS,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i))=h˜S,i,v,u(T
(a)
v,u(i))
= ai,u,v
and 1
h˜S,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i))=hS,i,v,u(T
(a)
v,u(i))
= ai,v,u for all (i, u, v). Therefore, the probability on both sides
of Equation 11 is simply the measure of S under the distribution D, and the result follows as a
corollary.
We proceed by induction on i, the iteration of the protocol. For i = 1, note that all the pairs
transcripts match at the beginning of the iteration, as no communication has occurred yet. Hence,
the transcripts at the beginning of the protocol between u and v are trivially exactly T
(a)
u,v (1) and
T
(a)
v,u (1). Hence, A≤1 = a≤1 if and only if the strings S1,u,v, S1,v,u used to hash the transcripts in the
first iteration satisfy that 1
hS,1,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (1))=h˜S,1,v,u(T
(a)
v,u(1))
= a1,u,v and 1h˜S,1,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (1))=hS,1,v,u(T
(a)
v,u(1))
=
a1,v,u for all (u, v) ∈ E. I.e.,
Pr
S∼D
[A≤1 = a≤1] = Pr
S∼D
 ∧
(u,v)∈E
Z(S, 1, u, v, a)
 .
Now suppose inductively that the set of random strings Si−1 that lead to A≤i−1 = a≤i−1 is the
same as the set of strings that lead to
1
hS,j,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (j))=h˜S,j,v,u(T
(a)
v,u(j))
= aj,u,v
and
1
h˜S,j,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (j))=hS,j,v,u(T
(a)
v,u(j))
= aj,v,u
for all (j, u, v) s.t. j ≤ i− 1. Note that, since all S ∈ Si−1 lead to the same agreement sub-pattern
a≤i−1, they also all lead the protocol to the pairs of transcripts (T
(a)
u,v (i), T
(a)
v,u (i)) at iteration i, since
fixing the a≤i−1 fixes the behavior of all the parties up until the ith iteration of the protocol. Hence,
the random strings that lead to A≤i = a≤i are precisely the strings in Si−1 that additionally lead to
1
hS,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i))=h˜S,i,v,u(T
(a)
v,u(i))
= ai,u,v and 1h˜S,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i))=hS,i,v,u(T
(a)
v,u(i))
= ai,v,u for all (u, v).
Applying the inductive hypothesis, Si−1 is exactly the set of strings that lead to
1
hS,j,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (j))=h˜S,j,v,u(T
(a)
v,u(j))
= aj,u,v and 1h˜S,j,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (j))=hS,j,v,u(T
(a)
v,u(j))
= aj,v,u for all (u, v) ∈ E and
all j ≤ i−1. Hence we conclude that the the set of strings that lead to A≤i = a≤i is the same as the set
of strings that lead to 1
hS,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i))=h˜S,i,v,u(T
(a)
v,u(i))
= ai,u,v and 1h˜S,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i))=hS,i,v,u(T
(a)
v,u(i))
= ai,v,u
for all (u, v) and j ≤ i.
Finally, the last claim of the Proposition follows trivially, since if a is not consistent with D,
then no S ∈ supp(D) leads to a, and we have PrS∼D[A = a] = 0 by definition.
Now we can bound the probability of getting too many dangerous triples with δ-biased randomness
from the randomness exchange (Algorithm 5) in terms of the probability of getting too many
dangerous triples with uniform randomness. Recall that, after fixing a consistent agreement
pattern a, there is exactly one possible setting to all pairs of transcripts (Tu,v(i), Tv,u(i)) for each link
and iteration that complies with this agreement pattern. Given such a setting of pairs of transcripts,
it is easy to read off the number of dangerous triples: a dangerous triple is, by definition, a triple
(i, u, v) where Tu,v(i) 6= Tv,u(i) and (u, v) ∈ E′. Recall that we are interested in the probability there
where more than kErr dangerous triples, where k is a real number given by the lemma’s statement.
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Definition 5.8. A consistent agreement pattern a is called bad if it leads to having more than kErr
dangerous triples in the considered instance.
We let Bad = {a is bad and consistent} be the set of all bad consistent agreement patterns
(given the fixed inputs and fixed error pattern). The, for any distribution D we can write
Pr
S∼D
[D > kErr] =
∑
a∈Bad
Pr
S∼D
[A = a]. (12)
Hence, to prove Lemma 5.2, it suffices to show that∑
a∈Bad
Pr
S∼DS
[A = a] ≤ e · p−2Err ·
∑
a∈Bad
Pr
R∼DR
[A = a] (13)
where we recall that DS is the distribution where the {Su,v} are drawn i.i.d from a δ-biased
distribution for (u, v) ∈ E′ while for (u, v) ∈ E \ E′ the string {Su,v, Sv,u} are adversarially chosen
by the fixed noise. The distribution DR is the same for (u, v) ∈ E \ E′ and uniform for (u, v) ∈ E′,
as described in the statement of the lemma.
Since PrR∼DR [A = a] = 0 for any agreement pattern a that is not consistent w.r.t DR, we can
sum the right-hand side Eq. (13) only over a’s that are bad and consistent w.r.t DR. Denote these
by the set
BadDR = {a | a ∈ Bad and is consistent w.r.t DR}.
Noting that the uniform distribution trivially contains the support of DR, which itself contains the
support of DS , we get from Eq. (13) that∑
a∈BadDR
Pr
S∼DS
[A = a] ≤ e · p−2Err ·
∑
a∈BadDR
Pr
R∼DR
[A = a] (14)
For ease of notation in the proof below, let Q(a) denote the probability of seeing the agreement
sub-pattern au,v for all (u, v) ∈ E \ E′. Formally:
Q(a)
def
= Pr
S∼DS
 ∧
i,(u,v)∈E\E′
Z(S, i, u, v, a)
 (15)
where the events Z(S, i, u, v, a) are as defined in Eq. (10).
Now we proceed to use Proposition 5.7 to relate the probability of seeing a bad, consistent
agreement pattern a to the probability of seeing the same agreement pattern when hashing a fixed
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input, which will let us apply Lemma 2.6. We upper bound the left-hand side of Eq. (14) as follows:∑
a∈BadDR
Pr
S∼DS
[A = a]
=
∑
a∈BadDR
Pr
S∼DS
 ∧
i,(u,v)∈E
Z(S, i, u, v, a)

=
∑
a∈BadDR
 ∏
(u,v)∈E′
Pr
S∼DS
[∧
i
Z(S, i, u, v, a)
] ·Q(a)
≤
∑
a∈BadDR
 ∏
(u,v)∈E′
Pr
S∼DS
 ∧
i:no err on (i, u, v)
Z(S, i, u, v, a)
 ·Q(a)
=
∑
a∈BadDR
 ∏
(u,v)∈E′
Pr
S∼DS
 ∧
i:no err on (i, u, v)
1
hS,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i))=hS,i,u,v(T
(a)
v,u(i))
= ai,u,v
 ·Q(a) (16)
The first equality is Proposition 5.7. The second equality is due to the fact that, given a specific a
and fixing the adversary’s errors, the event
∧
i Z(S, i, u, v, a) for (u, v) ∈ E′ is independent from∧
i Z(S, i, u
′, v′, a) for all (u′, v′) ∈ E such that (u′, v′) 6= (u, v). This is due to the fact that, once a
is fixed, all the transcripts {T (a)u,v (i)} are fixed as well (Claim 5.5), and since the channel’s noise is
fixed we get that, for any (i′, u′, v′), the event Z(S, i′, u′, v′, a) depends only on the seed Su′,v′ . Now,
since the seed Su,v is independently sampled from other strings Su′,v′ it follow that Z(S, i, u, v, a) is
independent of all other Z(S, i′, u′, v′, a).
The inequality in the third line follows from the fact that the event
∧
i:no err on (i, u, v) Z(S, i, u, v, a)
contains the event
∧
i Z(S, i, u, v, a), since we perform AND over fewer random variables. Note that,
by i : no err on (i, u, v), we mean that there is no adversarial error between u and v in the entire
iteration i.
The last inequality follows from the following facts: (1) the parties successfully share a seed on
the edges in E′, so Si,u,v = Si,v,u for all (u, v) ∈ E′, (2) hS,i,u,v = h˜S,i,u,v and there is no adversarial
error between u and v in iteration i, and (3) ai,u,v = ai,v,u when a is consistent and there is no error
on (i, u, v), because the hashes are transmitted properly, and so either u and v will both have a
hash match or both have a hash miss, and so if ai,u,v 6= ai,v,u then a would not be consistent.
Now we can apply Lemma 2.6 to the right-hand side of Eq. (16). Note that∧
i:no err on (i, u, v)
1
hS,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i))=hS,i,u,v(T
(a)
v,u(i))
= ai,u,v (17)
is an event about a sequence of hash misses and matches on a fixed input when using a seed that is
chopped up from a string Su,v sampled from a δ-biased source. By Lemma 2.6, the probability of
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this event cannot differ by much from the same event given the seed is uniform,∣∣∣∣∣∣ PrS∼DS
 ∧
i:no err on (i, u, v)
1
hS,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i))=hS,i,u,v(T
(a)
v,u(i))
= ai,u,v

− Pr
R∼DR
 ∧
i:no err on (i, u, v)
1
hR,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i))=hR,i,u,v(T
(a)
v,u(i))
= ai,u,v
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ (18)
Therefore, we bound the right-hand side of Eq. (16) by
≤
∑
a∈BadDR
 ∏
(u,v)∈E′
 Pr
R∼DR
 ∧
i:no err on (i, u, v)
1
hR,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i))=hR,i,u,v(T
(a)
v,u(i))
= ai,u,v
+ δ
 ·Q(a)
=
∑
a∈BadDR
 ∏
(u,v)∈E′
 Pr
R∼U
 ∧
i:no err on (i, u, v)
Z(R, i, u, v, a)
+ δ
 ·Q(a) (19)
where we use the definition of Z(R, i, u, v, a) to avoid cumbersome notation. Note that in the last
transition we replaced the distribution DR with a uniform distribution U . This follows since, by the
definition of DR, each of the seeds Ri,u,v with (u, v) ∈ E′ is uniform and independent. Note that
this probability is the same as taking Ru,v ∼ U .
We now wish to bound δ as a fraction of the probability of the event (Eq. (17)).
Claim 5.9.
δ ≤ 2−|Π|K/m min
au,v :(u,v)∈E′
Pr
Ru,v∼U
 ∧
i:no err on (i, u, v)
Z(R, i, u, v, a)
 . (20)
Proof. Recall that, given a uniform seed, the hash collision probability is exactly p = 2−Θ(K/m)
(Lemma 2.3). Note that in the event of Eq. (17) we are AND-ing over at most Θ(|Π|) iterations i.
Then we can write,
min
a,(u,v)∈E′
Pr
Ru,v∼U
 ∧
i:no err on (i, u, v)
Z(R, i, u, v, a)
 ≥ min
a,(u,v)∈E′
∏
i:no err on (i, u, v)
Pr
Ru,v∼U
[Z(R, i, u, v, a)]
≥ p|Π|
= 2−Θ(|Π|·K/m).
Eq. (20) holds by recalling that δ = 2−Θ(|Π|·K/m) and taking the constant in the exponent of δ to be
sufficiently large.
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Plugging Eq. (20) into Eq. (19), the latter can be bounded by
≤
∑
a∈BadDR
∏
(u,v)∈E′
(1 + 2−|Π|K/m) · Pr
Ru,v∼U
 ∧
i:no err in (u, v))
Z(R, i, u, v, a)
 ·Q(a)
≤
(
1 + 2−|Π|K/m
)m ∑
a∈BadDR
∏
(u,v)∈E′
 Pr
Ru,v∼U
 ∧
i: no err on (i, u, v)
Z(R, i, u, v, a)
 ·Q(a)
≤ e ·
∑
a∈BadDR
∏
(u,v)∈E′
 Pr
Ru,v∼U
 ∧
i: no err on (i, u, v)
Z(R, i, u, v, a)
 ·Q(a) (21)
where in the last transition, we use the fact that |Π|K ≥ m logm to conclude that (1+2−|Π|K/m)m ≤
(1 + 1m)
m ≈ e.
We are almost done: if Eq. (21) had an AND over all iterations i instead of just the iterations
with no error, we would be able to apply Proposition 5.7 on this term and bound it via which fits
the right-hand side of the claim we are proving (Eq. (16)). Note that∑
a∈BadDR
Pr
R
[A = a]
=
∑
a∈BadDR
Pr
R
 ∧
i,(u,v)∈E
Z(R, i, u, v, a)

=
∑
a∈BadDR
∏
(u,v)∈E′
Pr
Ru,v∼U
 ∧
i:no err on (i, u, v)
Z(R, i, u, v, a)
× Pr
Ru,v∼U
 ∧
i:err on (i, u, v)
Z(R, i, u, v, a)
 ·Q(a)
where we use Proposition 5.7 in the first transition and the fact that the Ri,u,v are independently
sampled uniform strings when (u, v) ∈ E′ in the second.
The extra term can be lower bounded as follows.
Claim 5.10. For any a ∈ BadDR ,
∏
(u,v)∈E′
 Pr
Ru,v∼U
 ∧
i:err on (i, u, v)
Z(R, i, u, v, a)
 ≥ p2Err. (22)
Proof. First, we recall that edges in E′ have the property that the parties share their random string
correctly - hence, we have Ri,u,v = Ri,v,u for all (u, v) ∈ E′ and iterations i.
We split Z into two subevents Z1 and Z2 in the natural way, such that Z = Z1 ∧ Z2. Formally:
Z1(R, i, u, v, a)
def
=
{
1
hR,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i))=h˜R,i,u,v(T
(a)
v,u(i))
= ai,u,v
}
and (23)
Z2(R, i, u, v, a)
def
=
{
1
h˜R,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i))=hR,i,u,v(T
(a)
v,u(i))
= ai,v,u
}
(24)
where we also used the fact that Ri,u,v = Ri,v,u in the above definitions.
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Since a is consistent with respect to DR, i.e., Pr[A = a] > 0, then by Proposition 5.7 there
must exist R∗ such that
∧
i,u,v Z(R
∗, i, u, v, a) holds. In other words, for this specific R∗, we
have that for all (i, u, v) such that (u, v) ∈ E′ and iteration i, we have that Z1(R∗, i, u, v, a) =
Z2(R
∗, i, u, v, a) = 1. If o1 and o2 are the hash outputs on the link (u, v) in iteration i with
randomness R∗ (i.e. o1 = hR∗,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v ) and o2 = hR∗,i,u,v(T
(a)
v,u )), then if ai,u,v = 1, the noise exactly
makes h˜R,i,u,v(T
(a)
v,u (i)) = o1, and otherwise it does not. Similarly, if ai,v,u = 1 then the noise makes
h˜R,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i)) = o2, and otherwise it does not. We will say that o1 and o2 make the event Z
(resp. Z1, Z2) occur, when the iteration i, link (u, v), and agreement pattern a are understood from
context.
Fix an iteration i, link (u, v), and agreement pattern a. Assume T
(a)
u,v = T
(a)
v,u . Then, if there is
no noise in the message hR,i,u,v(T
(a)
v,u (i)) it must be that ai,u,v = 1, since we know that the hashes
will match even if the random string used were Ri,u,v = R
∗
i,u,v. In fact, any seed Ri,u,v makes the
hashes match, and so since ai,u,v = 1, we conclude that PrR[Z1(R, i, u, v, a)] = 1.
If there is noise in that message, then it must be that ai,u,v = 0 since for any seed Ri,u,v (including
R∗i,u,v), the hashes will not match, since they matched before the noise and the noise makes one of
the messages different. Once again, since this holds for all possible random strings Ri,u,v, we have
that PrR[Z1(R, i, u, v, a)] = 1 holds for this case as well.
Now assume that T
(a)
u,v 6= T (a)v,u . Furthermore, assume there is no noise in the message hR,i,u,v(T (a)v,u (i)).
If ai,u,v = 1, then, any seed R that causes a collision will make Z1(R, i, u, v, a) = 1. I.e.,
Pr
R
[Z1(R, i, u, v, a)] = Pr
R
[hR,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i)) = hR,i,v,u(T
(a)
v,u (i))] = p
where the last inequality uses the fact that p is exactly the collision probability of the inner product
hash function we use (Lemma 2.3). If, on the other hand, ai,u,v = 0, then by a similar argument,
Pr
R
[Z1(R, i, u, v, a)] = Pr
R
[hR,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i)) 6= hR,i,u,v(T (a)v,u (i))]
= 1− Pr
R
[hR,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i)) = hR,i,u,v(T
(a)
v,u (i))]
≥ 1− p
Next let us assume that there was noise in the message hR,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i)). We will first address
oblivious additive adversaries, and to be concrete we will denote the additive noise by x.
If ai,u,v = 1, then, since Z1(R
∗, i, u, v, a) = 1, we know that o1 = o˜2 = o2 + x, where we recall
that o1 and o2 are defined to be hR∗,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i)) and hR∗,i,u,v(T
(a)
v,u (i)) respectively. In fact, we can
conclude that for any random string Ri,u,v such that hR,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i)) = hR,i,u,v(T
(a)
v,u (i)) − x, will
make Z1(R, i, u, v, a) = 1.
Since the hash-function h is based on inner-product (Definiton 2.2), its output is uniform when
the seed is uniformly distributed and the input is nonzero (Lemma 2.3), and we get
Pr
R
[Z1(R, i, u, v, a)] ≥ Pr
R
[(hR,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i)) = hR,i,u,v(T
(a)
v,u (i))− x]
= p
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If, on the other hand, ai,u,v = 0, then
Pr
R
[Z1(R, i, u, v, a)] = Pr
R
[hR,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i)) 6= h˜R,i,u,v(T (a)v,u (i))]
= 1− Pr
R
[hR,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i)) = hR,i,u,v(T
(a)
v,u (i))− x]
≥ 1− p
where again this last transition follows due to the uniform output of the inner product hash function
(Lemma 2.3).
Hence, in all cases we have
Pr
R
[Z1(R, i, u, v, a)] ≥ p.
Similar arguments apply to Z2(R, i, u, v, a). Since both events are independent when the transcripts
are different (they use different seeds for the hashes, and the transcript is fixed by a and the noise
pattern), we get that for any appropriate (i, v, u),
Pr
R
[Z(R, i, u, v, a)] ≥ p2.
Recall that the seeds Ri,u,v are independent and uniform when (u, v) ∈ E′. Since there are Err
triples (i, u, v) such that an error occurs in (i, u, v), we conclude that
∏
(u,v)∈E′
Pr
Ru,v∼U
 ∧
i:err on (i, u, v)
Z(R, i, u, v, a)
 ≥ p2Err.
Finally, we address the case of oblivious fixing adversaries. Recall that when the outputs of the
hashes are o1 and o2 respectively, then the event Z1 will occur, since the outputs o1 and o2 are the
hash outputs resulting from the randomness string R∗ and we know that Z1(R∗, i, u, v, a) = 1 by
definition of R∗. Suppose that we have fixing noise on the message o2, so the message sent is o˜2.
The key point is that it does not matter any longer what the original hash output o2 was - since the
noise is fixing, the output after applying the noise is independent of the original hash output.
Hence, if ai,u,v = 1, then the probability that Z1(R, i, u, v, a) occurs is
Pr
R
[Z1(R, i, u, v, a)] ≥ Pr
R
[(hR,i,u,v(T
(a)
u,v (i)) = o˜2]
= p
Similarly, if ai,u,v = 0, then the probability that Z1(R, i, u, v, a) occurs is
Pr
R
[Z1(R, i, u, v, a)] ≥ 1− p
and the argument follows in the same manner.
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Claim 5.10 along with Eq. (16) lead to Eq. (14):∑
a∈BadDR
Pr
S∼DS
[A = a]
≤ e ·
∑
a∈BadDR
∏
(u,v)∈E′
 Pr
Ru,v∼U
 ∧
i:no err on (i, u, v)
Z(R, i, u, v, a)
 ·Q(a)
(1)
≤ e · p−2Err ·
∑
a∈BadDR
∏
(u,v)∈E′
(
Pr
Ru,v∼U
[∧
i
Z(R, i, u, v, a)
])
·Q(a)
(2)
≤ e · p−2Err ·
∑
a∈BadDR
∏
(u,v)∈E′
(
Pr
Ru,v∼U
[∧
i
Z(R, i, u, v, a)
])
· Pr
S∼DS
 ∧
i,(u,v)∈E\E′
Z(S, i, u, v, a)

(3)
≤ e · p−2Err ·
∑
a∈BadDR
∏
(u,v)∈E′
(
Pr
Ru,v∼U
[∧
i
Z(R, i, u, v, a)
])
· Pr
S∼DR
 ∧
i,(u,v)∈E\E′
Z(S, i, u, v, a)

(4)
= e · p−2Err ·
∑
a∈BadDR
Pr
R∼DR
[A = a].
Transition (1) is via Claim 5.10. (2) is by the definition of Q (Eq. (15)). (3) uses the fact that DR
and DS are identical for (u, v) ∈ E \ E′. (4) follows from Proposition 5.7.
Hence, we have proved the desired relation between
∑
a∈BadDR PrS∼DS [A = a] and between∑
a∈BadDR PrR∼DR [A = a] as stated in Eq. (14). We recall that this implies that PrS∼DS [D > k ·Err]
and PrR∼DR [D > k · Err] have the same relation, which concludes the the proof of Lemma 5.2.
We now show that even with arbitrary oblivious tampering of random strings on the edges
E \E′, the adversary cannot cause too many dangerous triples when the seeds Ru,v are uniform for
(u, v) ∈ E′. Recall the definition of ψu,v from Section 4.4. Analogous to the notation in Lemma 4.16,
we let D∗ denote the set of triples (i, u, v) such that ψu,v(i) > 0 and (u, v) ∈ E′. Note that the only
difference from the corresponding definition of D∗ in Lemma 4.16 is that we only count triples where
(u, v) ∈ E′.
Just like in Lemma 4.16, we have that |D∗| upper bounds D, which follows because ψu,v > Bu,v
for all iterations (Lemma 4.14 and Proposition A.2). Hence, any triple (i, u, v) that has Bu,v(i) > 0
also has ψu,v(i) > 0. Hence, to upper bound D with high probability, it suffices to upper bound
|D∗| with high probability. We now proceed to upper bound |D∗| with high probability.
Lemma 5.11. Suppose the adversary is oblivious, and let Err be the number of errors committed
during this part. Let p = 2−Θ(K/m) be the hash collision probability of h, and assume that p < 130C6 .
Let k be some real number such that k ≥ 10C6. Let D∗ denote the set of triples (i, u, v) such that
ψu,v(i) > 0 and (u, v) ∈ E′. Then
Pr
R
[|D∗| > kErr] < pΩ(kErr)
where R is defined as in Lemma 5.2, and the Ω hides constants on the order of 1/C6.
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The only difference between the above lemma and the analogous proof in Section 4.4 is that,
here we are only concerned with links in E′. Before beginning the proof, we reiterate the crucial
property of ϕu,v that allows us to prove this lemma, as well as every lemma in Section 4.4, which is
that ϕu,v increases only if there is an error or an hash collision on the link (u, v) (Claim A.1). This
allows us to define ψu,v that only depends on what happens on the link (u, v), such that ψu,v still
upper bounds ϕu,v (Lemma 4.14).
Proof of Lemma 5.11. Consider an instance of the protocol after fixing the adversary’s errors, and
assuming uniformly random seeds for the hashes. Assume |D∗| > kErr and let D˜∗ ⊆ D∗ denote the
set of triples (i, u, v) such that ψu,v(i) > 0 and (u, v) ∈ E′, and no error occurs between u and v in
iteration i. Since the number of errors is Err, we get that |D˜∗| ≥ (k − 1)Err. Define
ψ
def
=
∑
(u,v)∈E′
ψu,v.
We know that ψ is always nonnegative by design, since each of the ψu,v’s are nonnegative.
Consider ψ(100|Π|+ 1), that is, the value of ψ immediately after the final 100|Π|-th iteration of
Algorithm A. Recall from definition of ψu,v in Section 4.4 that ψu,v goes up by 6C6 whenever there
is an error between u and v, goes up by 5C6 whenever there is a hash collision between u and v, and
goes down by 5 whenever there is no hash collision between u and v and ψu,v was positive. This
yields
0 ≤ ψ(100|Π|+ 1) ≤ 6C6 · Err +
∑
(i,u,v)∈D˜∗
(5C6Xi,u,v − 5(1−Xi,u,v)),
where Xi,u,v = 1 if and only if there is a hash collision between u and v in iteration i.
The above bound is exactly the same as the one that appears in Eq. (7) in Lemma 4.16, but
with a different definition of D˜∗, that only counts triples (i, u, v) where (u, v) ∈ E′. Note that the
events of hash collisions on the links E′ are independent, due to the fact that the adversary fixes
their errors before the seeds are sampled. The remainder of the analysis is identical to the proof of
Lemma 4.16.
Corollary 5.12 (Corollary of Lemmas 5.11 and 5.2). Suppose |Π|K ≥ m log(m), and the adversary
is oblivious and makes Err errors. Let k be a constant that is sufficiently larger than C6 and the
constant term in the exponent of p, i.e. log(1/p)K/m . Suppose that run an instance of Algorithm A and
denote the random string sampled by the protocol as S. Let E′ ⊆ E and D be as in Lemma 5.2.
Then
Pr
S
[D ≥ k · Err] ≤ pΩ(kErr) = exp(−Ω(kErr · (K/m))
Proof. We apply Lemma 5.2 and use the fact that |Π|K ≥ m log(m), we have that
Pr
S
[D ≥ k · Err] ≤ e · p−2Err · Pr
R
[D ≥ k · Err]
where R is uniform for seeds on the edges in E′. Recall that the number of triples (i, u, v) with
ψu,v(i) > 0 upper bounds the number of triples (i, u, v) with Bu,v(i) > 0 (Lemma 4.14 and
Proposition A.2). Hence, applying Lemma 5.11 we get that (for a sufficiently large constant k),
Pr
S
[D ≥ k · Err] ≤ e · p−2Err · pΩ(kErr) = pΩ(kErr).
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5.3.5 Bounding the communication
We continue to bound the communication in Algorithm A. We start with an easy claim bounding
the communication that occurs during the randomness exchange.
Claim 5.13. Assume that |Π|K ≥ m log(m). Then the communication in the randomness exchange
(Algorithm 5) is Θ(K|Π|).
Proof. Since δ = 2−Θ(|Π|K/m) (Algorithm 4), every link needs to exchange during this part a seed
L ∈ {0, 1}r of length
r = Θ (log(1/δ) + log(`))
= Θ(|Π|K/m)) + Θ(log(|Π|2K))
= Θ
(
|Π|K
m
)
.
where in the last line we use the fact that log(K) = Θ(log(m)) for all settings of K that we use
(either m or m log(m)), and that |Π|K/m ≥ log(m).
Each such seed is encoded via an error correcting code with a constant rate, hence, each such
codeword takes Θ(|Π|K/m)) bits. Since there are m links in the network, the claim holds.
Now we prove the analogous lemma to Lemma 4.13 for the setting where some links have
arbitrary, potentially disagreeing, strings, and hence can have hash collisions all the time. While
this can make the communication very large, our goal is to show that it still cannot make it too
large without having many dangerous triples (where again, dangerous triples only count on edges
(u, v) ∈ E′).
Lemma 5.14. Fix γ ≥ 2. Denote the number of errors in the “main” part of the protocol
as Err, and the communication in this part as CC. Let D and E′ be the same as in Lemma 5.2.
Then CC ≥ 100γα|Π|K(1 + |E \ E′|) and Err ≤ εCCK only if Err > 0 and D > β · Err, where
β ≥ max
(
1
3αε ,
33γ|Π|(1+|E\E′|)
Err
)
, and α is the constant multiplying the communication in Lemma 4.2.
Proof. By Lemma 4.2, we can bound
CC ≤ αK(100|Π|+ EHC) (25)
A “hash collision” (the HC in EHC) occurs when two hashes that are passed on an edge match,
but the transcripts do not match. Note that on any edge (u, v) ∈ E \ E′, the seeds are have been
corrupted, and furthermore they may not even be the same! We bound the number of “hash collisions”
on edges like this trivially, by 100|Π|. Note that if u and v have different seeds, their hash outputs
may disagree even when their transcripts are the same. While this is problematic for simulating the
protocol correctly, these sorts of “fake” hash misses do not increase the communication, since this
stops parties from talking rather than making them talk too much (unlike hash collisions, which
can make parties talk excessively, as seen in Lemma 4.8).
By noting that Err ≤ εK · CC and that the number of hash collisions on links in E′ is upper
bounded by the number of dangerous triples D, we can rewrite Eq. (25) as
CC ≤ αK
(
100|Π|+ CC · ε
K
+D +HCE\E′
)
≤ αK
(
100|Π|+ CC · ε
K
+D + 100|Π| · |E \ E′|
)
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Rearranging and using the assumption that CC ≥ 100γα|Π|K(1 + |E \ E′|) and γ ≥ 2, we get that
D ≥ (1− αε)CC− 100|Π|αK(1 + |E \ E
′|)
αK
≥ CC
3αK
≥ βErr
Note that if Err = 0, then specifically there are no errors on the link in E′ in the main part
of the protocol. Since the parties agree on seeds in E′, this means there will be no dangerous
triples, and hence D cannot be larger than CC3αK . The bounds on β follow since CC ≥ Kε Err and
CC ≥ 100γα|Π|K(1 + |E \ E′|) respectively.
Now we can prove our main communication bound of the section.
Lemma 5.15. Assume that |Π|K ≥ m log(m). Denote the number of errors in the “main” part
of the protocol as Err, and denote the communication complexity in the main part as CC. Fix
ε > 0. Let D and E′ be the same as in Lemma 5.2. Suppose that the tuple of random strings S
used are as in the randomness exchange (Algorithm 5), and the adversary tampered with strings
on links E \E′. Fix γ ≥ 2. The probability that the communication complexity of Algorithm A is
CC ≥ 100γα|Π|K(1 + |E \ E′|) and Err ≤ εK · CC is at most
pΩ(γ|Π|·(1+|E\E
′|))
where α is the constant multiplying the communication in Lemma 4.2.
Proof. Suppose that CC ≥ 100γα|Π|K(1+ |E\E′|) and Err ≤ εK ·CC. Then by applying Lemma 5.14,
we have that D ≥ βErr, where β is as defined in Lemma 5.14. Since β ≥ 13αε > 20C6 by taking ε
sufficiently small, we apply Corollary 5.12 to get that the probability of this is at most
pΩ(βErr)
Since β ≥ 33γ|Π|(1+|E\E′|)
Err
, we conclude that the probability of this event is at most
pΩ(γ|Π|·(1+|E\E
′|))
5.3.6 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Recall that we have K = m in Algorithm A, and so we will set K = m throughout this proof. We
split the proof into three steps. First, we show that the probability that |E \E′| ≥ 1 and Err ≤ εmCC
is at most exp(−Ω(|Π|)). Then, we set E′ = E and show that the probability that Err ≤ εmCC and
CC > Θ(|Π|m) is also exponentially small. Finally, we show that the probability that Err ≤ εmCC,
CC ≤ Θ(|Π|m), and D ≥ ω(ε|Π|) is also exponentially small. This covers the space of bad events
for our protocol; after this, the proof of Theorem 4.1 can be used to conclude that the protocol is
simulated correctly. Denote the number of errors in the main part of the protocol as Err′, and the
communication in the main part as CC′.
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Claim 5.16.
Pr
[(
Err ≤ ε
m
CC
)
∧ (|E \ E′| ≥ 1)
]
< exp(−Ω(|Π|)).
Proof. Note that if |E \ E′| ≥ 1, then the adversary must have committed Θ(|E \ E′| · |Π|) errors
in the randomness exchange phase. This holds since we encode each random strings with an
error-correcting code with length r = Θ(|Π|) (Claim 5.13) and constant distance. This means that
in order to corrupt even a single codeword, the adversary must make at least Θ(|Π|) errors. But
since Err ≤ εmCC, such an attack is within the adversary’s budget only if CC ≥ mε |Π| · |E \ E′|.
Note that the communication in the randomness exchange phase is at most Θ(|Π|m), since there
are m links and strings of length Θ(|Π|) are sent on each. Hence, the amount of communication in
the main part of the protocol must be at least
CC′ ≥ Θ
(m
ε
|Π| · |E \ E′|
)
≥ 200α|Π|m(1 + |E \ E′|),
where we use the assumption that |E \ E′| ≥ 1.
By Claim 5.3, the error in the main part satisfies Err′ ≤ ε′mCC′ for ε′ = Θ(ε). So we can
apply Lemma 5.15 with γ = 2 and allowed noise rate (for the main part) of ε′/m, and get that the
probability that CC′ ≥ 200α|Π|m(1+ |E\E′|) is at most exp(−Ω(|Π| ·(1+ |E\E′|))) ≤ exp(−Ω(|Π|)),
as stated.
Given the above claim, we know that the adversary cannot corrupt even a single seed and keep
its attack within the allowed budget. Hence, we can assume from this point on that E′ = E, and
that all the seeds are δ-biased strings chosen by the parties. Under these conditions, Lemma 5.15
gives us that
Pr
[
(CC′ ≥ 200α|Π|m) ∧
(
Err′ ≤ ε
′
m
CC′
)]
< exp(−Ω(|Π|)).
Now further suppose that the communication in the main part satisfies CC′ ≤ 200α|Π|m and that
Err′ ≤ ε′mCC′. This implies that the number of errors the adversary commits is at most 200αε′|Π|.
Combining this with Corollary 5.12, we see that the probability that the adversary can cause the
number of dangerous triples exceed kε′|Π| in this case is at most exp(−Ω(kε′|Π|)), even when the
parties share δ-biased randomness, where the k ≥ 10C6. Hence,
Corollary 5.17. For a real number k such that k ≥ 10C6, we have that
Pr[EHC > (k + 1)(200αε′)|Π|] < exp(−Ω(kε′|Π|)).
To conclude, if we limit the adversary to corrupting at most Err ≤ εmCC transmissions, then
the probability that the adversary is able to tamper with any of the of the randomness exchanges,
cause more than Θ(|Π|m) communication throughout the protocol, or cause the number of errors
and hash collisions to exceed Θ(kε′|Π|), is at most exp(−Ω(kε′|Π|)), where we have freedom to set
k to be as large as we would like.
Regardless of the seed being used, Lemma 4.2 shows that Algorithm A concludes with φ ≥
100|Π|m. Then, as long as none of the above bad events happen, we can take ε (and therefore
also ε′) to be sufficiently small, which (by applying Corollary 5.17 with appropriately selected k)
makes EHC at most |Π|/C7 with probability at least 1− exp(|Π|). Finally, we appeal to Claim 4.18
to conclude that Algorithm A correctly simulates Π. For more details, see the proof of Theorem 4.1;
the proof follows identically in this case.
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6 Coding scheme for non-oblivious channels
6.1 Overview
In this section, we generalize the result of the previous section to hold for nonoblivious adversaries.
Nonoblivious adversaries have a lot of power: specifically, they can look at the random seeds that
will be used in the rest of the protocol and choose their errors as a function of these seeds. The
upshot is that we can no longer guarantee that the event of a hash collision is independent of
previous hash collisions, or even close to independent. We briefly recall (from the Introduction) the
issues that can occur with an adversary that knows the random seeds used ahead of time, even
when these seeds are initially sampled from a uniform distribution.
Suppose that the seeds to the hash functions are fixed, and that a randomly selected error
creates a hash collision in the next round with probability p. Then roughly a p fraction of the
possible errors would lead to a hash collision on this link in the next Simulation phase, and hence be
undiscovered. Among the errors that caused a collision, roughly a p fraction of them would lead to a
hash collision in the proceeding link, and so on. Hence, if the number of error patterns is sufficiently
large, the adversary can select a specific error pattern out of them that will not be detected within
a large sequence of iterations. In particular, since there are K = poly(m) bits communicated in a
single chunk, the adversary has a choice of poly(m) errors in any simulation phase, so that there
exists an error that is undetectable for Θ(log(m)) iterations with high probability.
To address this issue, we modify our hash function to have a collision probability of p = 1
mΘ(1)
,
by increasing the output size of our hash to Θ(log(m)) bits. This, however, affects the rate of the
coding scheme. In order to keep the rate constant, we set K to be m log(m), i.e., the size of each
chunk increases and we effectively send hashes (and other meta-data) less frequently. We then
appeal to the strategy of [Hae14], and show that there is no oblivious, additive adversary that fails
the simulation with high probability. In particular, for any given oblivious, additive adversary, there
are exponentially few “bad” randomness strings that do not guarantee a correct and constant rate
simulation. Taking a union bound over all possible oblivious, additive adversaries, we show that the
union of all the “bad” randomness strings is still exponentially small. This means that unless a bad
randomness is picked by the parties, no oblivious, additive adversary can invalidate the simulation.
But the actions of any non-oblivious adversary that makes Err errors can always be modeled by
some oblivious, additive adversary that makes Err errors - simply take the oblivious adversary
that miraculously manages to make the same corruptions. Hence, no non-oblivious adversary can
invalidate the simulation for the same randomness. For more details on this argument, see the
discussion at the beginning of the proof of Lemma 6.3.
6.2 Noise-resilient simulation for non-oblivious adversarial noise
Define Algorithm B to be Algorithm 1 combined with the InitializeState() procedure described in
Algorithm 6 below.
The only difference in InitializeState() from Section 5 is that K is set to m log(m).
6.3 Algorithm B: Analysis
the main result of this section is the following theorem, arguing that Algorithm B is resilient to
non-oblivious adversary that corrupts up to a fraction ε/m logm of the transmissions, with high
probability.
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Algorithm 6 InitializeState() for nonoblivious noise
1: K ← m log(m)
2: for all neighbors v ∈ N(u) in parallel do
3: Initialize Tu,v = ∅
4: Initialize ku,v, Eu,v,mpc1u,v,mpc2u,v ← 0
5: statusu,v ← “simulate”
6: alreadyRewoundu,v ← 0
7: δ := 2−Θ(|Π|K/m)
8: S := (Si,u,v)i∈[100|Π|] ← RandomnessExchange(u, v, δ, K)
9: end for
10: statusu ← 1.
11: netCorrectu ← 1
Theorem 6.1. Assume a network G = (V,E) with n = |V | parties and m = |E| links. Suppose Π
is a multiparty protocol over the network G with communication complexity CC(Π), binary alphabet
and fixed order of speaking. Let |Π| = CC(Π)5m log(m) and let ε > 0 be a sufficiently small constant.
Algorithm B correctly simulates Π with communication complexity O(CC(Π)) with probability at
least 1− exp(−Ω(|Π| log(m))) over the randomness of the parties, in the presence of a non-oblivious
adversary limited to a noise fraction at most ε/m log(m).
Recall that in Algorithm B we set K = m log(m). We will use K and m log(m) interchangably
throughout this section, often leaving expressions in terms of K and plugging in m log(m) at the
end.
As mentioned in the overview in Section 6.1, our general strategy is to union bound over all
oblivious additive adversaries to show that the fraction of random strings that lead to bad outcomes
is small. We start by showing a simple but useful claim, which provides a bound on the number of
different oblivious, additive adversaries that can commit a fixed number of errors.
Claim 6.2. Fix a nonnegative integer Err. Assuming a large enough m, the number of different
oblivious additive adversaries that commit exactly Err errors is at most(
Cm2 log(m)|Π|
Err
)
· 2Err
for some constant C > 0. Furthermore, if Err > Cεm|Π|, then Err > εm log(m)CC, where C is the
same constant and CC denotes the communication of the robust protocol.
Proof. In the randomness exchange part of the protocol, there are Θ(Km |Π|) = Θ(log(m)|Π|) rounds,
and in each of them there are at most m links which the adversary can corrupt. Therefore, there
are Θ(m log(m)|Π|) = O(m2 log(m)|Π|) places for the adversary to put errors in the randomness
exchange phase.
In the main part of the protocol, each iteration has at most O(m log(m)) rounds, there are
100|Π| iterations, and in each round, the adversary can choose which of 2m possible (directed) links
to put an error. Putting this together, we get that there are at most O(m2 log(m)|Π|) places for the
adversary to put an error in the main part of the protocol. The first part of the claim follows by
just letting C be the constant hidden in the big O.
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We now justify why there are at most O(m log(m)) rounds per iteration. Each meeting points
phase takes Θ(K/m) rounds in which 3 hash values, each of length Θ(K/m), are being exchanged
between each pair of parties (in parallel). Note that Θ(K/m) = Θ(logm) = O(m logm). The flag
passing phase has O(n) = O(m log(m)) rounds. The simulation phase takes 5m log(m) + 1 rounds
(where one round is for the ⊥ symbols), and the rewind phase takes n m logm rounds. Putting
them all together the round number is at most O(m logm).
In each place where an oblivious adversary commits an error, it can choose one of two possibilities
(either bit flip or deletion when there is communication; or inserting a 0 or 1 when there is no honest
transmission), which we formalized with an additive noise model. This yields the 2Err term.
The final claim follows since there are only ≤ Cm2 log(m)|Π| pairs of (round, directed link)
where there can possibly be communication during the protocol, and so we get a trivial upper bound
on the communication complexity as Cm2 log(m)|Π|.
Next, we consider the communication complexity of Algorithm B. Recall that while the round
complexity is fixed, the communication complexity depends on the inputs, noise, and randomness.
We now show that the probability that the adversary can make the communication of the robust
protocol larger than O(CC(Π)), if bounded to its allowed budget, is negligible.
Recall that Algorithm B has two parts: the randomness exchange part, which happens in
InitializeState(), and the “main” part, where the actual simulation occurs. Claim 5.13 bounds the
communication in the randomness exchange by Θ(|Π|K) = Θ(|Π|m log(m)). Therefore, we are only
left to show that communication in the main part of Algorithm B is bounded by Θ(|Π|K).
Lemma 6.3. Let |Π| = CC(Π)5m log(m) and let ε > 0 be a sufficiently small constant. The “main” part
of Algorithm B has at most 400α|Π|m log(m) = O(CC(Π)) communication with probability at least
1 − exp(−Ω(|Π| log(m))) over the randomness of the parties, in the presence of a non-oblivious
adversary with noise fraction at most ε/m log(m), and where α is the constant in Lemma 4.2.
This lemma immediately leads to a bound on the communication of the entire protocol as stated
by the following corollary.
Corollary 6.4. Assume the setting of Theorem 6.1. Algorithm B has at most O(|Π|m log(m)) =
O(CC(Π)) communication with probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(|Π| log(m))) over the randomness of
the parties, in the presence of a non-oblivious adversary with noise fraction at most ε/m log(m).
Proof. By Claim 5.13, the communication in the randomness exchange phase is O(|Π|K) =
O(|Π|m log(m)), regardless of the randomness of the parties. Lemma 6.3 additionally bounds
the communication in the main part of the protocol by O(|Π|m log(m)) with probability 1 −
exp(−Ω(|Π| log(m))) over the randomness of the parties.
Now we proceed to prove Lemma 6.3.
Proof of Lemma 6.3. For this proof, let CC′ denote the communication complexity in the main part
of Algorithm B.
Our proof strategy is to show that there is an exponentially small fraction of random strings r
that the parties can sample such that the adversary can cause the communication to be large when r
is sampled. We do so by relating our non-oblivious adversary to an oblivious one. Namely, we argue
that for any random string r for which the non-oblivious adversary can cause large communication,
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there exists some oblivious adversary that also can cause large communication for this random
string r.
Suppose the adversary makes makes errors at a rate of εm log(m) while making CC
′ > 400α|Π|m log(m)
for some random string r. Note that there is some oblivious adversary that makes the exact same
pattern of errors. Therefore, this specific oblivious adversary can cause the communication to be
large when the random string r is selected as well.
This leads us to the observation that the set of random strings r for which a non-oblivious
adversary can cause the communication to be large is contained in the set of random strings r for
which some oblivious adversary can cause the communication to be large. Hence, to prove the
result, it suffices to upper bound the measure of the latter set. In Lemma 5.15, we showed that we
can bound the measure of any such set for a fixed oblivious adversary by a quantity that is roughly
exponentially small with respect to the amount of communication divided by m. We will use this
observation and union bound over all oblivious adversaries to conclude the result.
Proposition 6.5. Fix an oblivious adversary, and denote the number of errors it commits as Err.
Let CC denote the communication complexity of the entire protocol, and CC′ denote the communication
complexity in the main part. Then
Pr
[
(CC′ > 400α|Π|K) ∧ (Err ≤ εKCC)
] ≤ {exp(−Ω(|Π| log(m))) if Err ≤ 400αε′|Π|
exp(−Ω(log(m)Err/ε)) otherwise , (26)
Proof. Recall from Section 5 that the adversary can tamper with the randomness exchanges on
some links. In line with the notation in Section 5, denote the set of edges that share randomness
successfully as E′ ⊆ E, and additionally define J def= |E \E′| to be the number of tampered edges,
for notational convenience. Note that, since the randomness in the randomness exchange phase is
encoded with a code with constant distance, and since log(1/δ) = Θ(K/m|Π|), we have that
J ≤ Θ
(
Err ·m
K|Π|
)
(27)
This is because it takes Θ(Km |Π|) errors to corrupt the randomness exchange on any single edge.
Furthermore, recall from Claim 5.3 that Err ≤ ε′KCC′ for ε′ = Θ(ε), and this implies that the
effective noise rate on the main part of the protocol is at most ε′/K. Hence, we write
Pr
[(
CC′ > 400α|Π|K) ∧ (Err ≤ ε
K
CC
)]
≤ Pr
[
(CC′ > 400α|Π|K) ∧ (Err ≤ ε
′
K
CC′)
]
≤ Pr
[
(CC′ > 400α|Π|K) ∧ (CC′ ≥ K
ε′
Err)
]
(28)
where in the second line we just rearranged the condition that Err ≤ ε′KCC′.
The fact that the effective noise rate is ε′ = Θ(ε) on the main part also lets us invoke Lemma 5.15,
which we now recall. This will be our main tool here.
Pr
[
(CC′ > 100γα|Π|K(1 + J)) ∧ (CC′ ≥ Kε′ Err)
] ≤ exp(−Ω(γ|Π| · (1 + J)Km )) (29)
where γ ≥ 2 is a parameter we can set at our convenience.
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We recall upper bound for J in terms of the number of errors, namely that J ≤ Θ(Err·mK|Π| ). We
can “plug in” this upper bound into Eq. (29) by absorbing a factor of 1+J1+Θ(Err·m/(K|Π|)) into γ, and
get that
Pr
[(
CC′ > 100γα|Π|K
(
1 + Θ
(
Err ·m
K|Π|
)))∧(
CC′ ≥ K
ε′
Err
)]
= Pr
[(
CC′ > γ(100α|Π|K + Θ(Err ·m)))∧(CC′ ≥ K
ε′
Err
)]
≤ exp
(
−Ω
(
γ|Π|K + Err · γ ·m
m
))
(30)
where the above formula still holds for γ ≥ 2, since we just made γ smaller by absorbing a factor
less than 1.
We will apply Eq. (30) to bound the probability on the left-hand side of Eq. (26) for the two
cases of the statement.
Case 1: Err ≤ 400αε′|Π|.
In this case, we note that Θ(Err ·m) ≤ 100α|Π|K due to the fact that ε′ can be taken to be
much smaller than α and the constant hidden by the Θ. Hence, we can select γ ≥ 2 such that
400α|Π|K ≥ γ(100α|Π|K + Θ(Err ·m)). Therefore, Eq. (26) becomes as follows:
Pr
[
(CC′ > 400α|Π|K) ∧ (CC′ ≥ Kε′ Err)
]
≤ Pr [(CC′ > γ(100α|Π|K + Θ(Err ·m))) ∧ (CC′ ≥ Kε′ Err)]
≤ exp(−Ω(|Π|Km ))
≤ exp(−Ω(|Π| log(m))) (31)
where γ ≥ 2 is selected appropriately. The second line follows from Eq. (30) with the appropriately
selected γ.
Case 2: Err > 400αε′|Π|.
In this case, we claim that CC′ ≥ Kε′ Err already implies that CC′ is large enough to apply
Eq. (30) to bound Pr[CC′ ≥ Kε′ Err]. To see this, note that CC
′
2 ≥ K2ε′Err  Θ(Err · m) and that
CC′
2 ≥ K2ε′Err ≥ 200α|Π|K, which implies that CC′ = γ(100α|Π|K + Θ(Err ·m)) for some γ ≥ 2.
Hence, we can apply Eq. (30) with appropriately selected γ ≥ 2 to get that
Pr[CC′ ≥ Kε′ Err] ≤ exp(−Ω( Kmε′Err))
≤ exp(−Ω(log(m)Err/ε)) (32)
Now that we have established Proposition 6.5, we are fully armed to prove our statement. We
will union bound over all possible oblivious additive adversaries to show that none of them can
make much communication. Recall from Claim 6.2 that the number of adversaries that commit
exactly Err errors is at most (
Cm2 log(m)|Π|
Err
)
· 2Err (33)
and that we can take Err ≤ O(εm|Π|) without loss of generality when considering adversaries that
do not exceed their error budget.
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Now suppose that Err ≤ 400αε′|Π|. Since ε′ is sufficiently small, Err is much smaller than
Cm2 log(m)|Π|, so we can apply the monotonicity of small binomial coefficients in their bottom
argument to upper bound Eq. (33) by
≤
(
Cm2 log(m)|Π|
400αε′|Π|
)
· 2400αε′|Π|.
≤
(
Cem2 log(m)|Π|
400αε′|Π|
)400αε′|Π|
· 2400αε′|Π|
≤ exp(O(ε|Π| log(m))) (34)
where the second transition is applying the inequality
(
n
k
) ≤ (nek )k. Now we can use Proposition 6.5
to show that the total fraction of random strings that can allow any oblivious adversary that makes
at most 400αε′|Π| errors to guarantee that Err ≤ εKCC and that CC > 400α|Π|m log(m) is at most:
400αε′|Π|∑
Err=0
(
Cm2 log(m)|Π|
Err
)
· 2Err · exp(−Ω(|Π| log(m)))
≤
400αε′|Π|∑
Err=0
exp(O(ε|Π| log(m))) · exp(−Ω(|Π| log(m)))
≤ exp(−Ω(|Π| log(m))), (35)
where we substitute Eq. (34) for the first transition.
Finally, we suppose that Err > 400αε′|Π|. Then we again use the inequality (nk) ≤ (nek )k and
Claim 6.2 to upper bound the number of oblivious adversaries that make exactly Err errors by(
Cm2 log(m)|Π|
Err
)
· 2Err ≤
(
Cm2 log(m)|Π|
Err
)Err
· 2Err
≤
(
Cm2 log(m)|Π|
400αε′|Π|
)Err
· 2Err
≤ exp(Θ(log(m)Err)). (36)
Again, we use Proposition 6.5 to show that the total fraction of random strings that can allow any
oblivious adversary that makes more than 400αε′|Π| errors to guarantee that Err ≤ εKCC and that
CC > 400α|Π|m log(m) is at most:
Cεm|Π|∑
Err=400αε′|Π|
(
Cm2 log(m)|Π|
Err
)
· 2Err · exp(−Ω(log(m)Err/ε))
≤
Cεm|Π|∑
Err=400αε′|Π|
exp(O(log(m)Err)) · exp(−Ω(log(m)Err/ε))
≤ exp(−Ω(log(m)Err/ε))
≤ exp(−Ω(log(m)|Π|)). (37)
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Finally, putting together Eqs. (35) and (37) yields the desired result: the fraction of random strings
that lead any additive oblivious adversary to have too much communication, is low. We conclude
that this upper bounds the probability over the randomness of the parties that any non-oblivious
party can make the communication too large.
Now we are ready to finish the proof of Theorem 6.1.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. We have already showed that with high probability over the randomness of the
parties, the communication will be only a constant blowup over CC(Π). Specifically, Corollary 6.4 tells
us that the communication CC is O(|Π|m log(m)) with probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(|Π| log(m))).
For the remainder of this proof, we work under the assumption that CC is bounded by this quantity
CCmax = O(|Π|m log(m)).
First, note that this means that the adversary cannot corrupt any randomness exchange while
having error rate εm log(m) . Indeed, this is because corrupting even a single randomness exchange
costs Θ(log(m)|Π|) errors, and the maximum number of errors that the adversary can commit while
staying under the error rate is O(ε|Π|). Hence, we can work under the assumption that all the
parties exchange randomness successfully, and hence J = |E \ E′| = 0.
Now, suppose that the communication complexity is CC = O(|Π|K) and Err ≤ εKCC ≤ O(ε|Π|).
We show that the probability of the number of errors being this small yet the number of dangerous
rounds D being too large, is exponentially small. Specifically, let k be a sufficiently large constant
with respect to C6 and to the constants in the hash collision probability p. Then for any oblivious
adversary that makes at most Err errors, we have that
Pr [(D > k · Err) ∧ (Err ≤ (ε/K)CC)] ≤ exp(−Ω(k · Err · log(m)))
by Corollary 5.12. Specifically, if we let Errmax =
ε
KCCmax, then this gives us that the probability
that, if the adversary commits Err errors,
Pr [(D > k · Errmax) ∧ (Err ≤ Errmax)] ≤ Pr
[
(D > k′ · Err) ∧ (Err ≤ Errmax)
]
≤ exp(−Ω(k · Errmax · log(m))), (38)
by applying Corollary 5.12 with Err and k′ such that k′ · Err = k · Errmax (and hence k′ ≥ k is
sufficiently large to apply the corollary).
Finally, we union bound Eq. (38) over all non-oblivious adversaries that make at most O(ε|Π|)
errors to show that, with high probability, no non-oblivious adversary can make D larger than
k · Errmax, with high probability. This probability is at most
Errmax∑
Err=0
(
Cm2 log(m)|Π|
Err
)
· 2Err · Pr [(D > k · Errmax) ∧ Err ≤ Errmax]
≤
Errmax∑
Err=0
(
Cm2 log(m)|Π|
Errmax
)
· 2Errmax · Pr [(D > k · Errmax) ∧ Err ≤ Errmax]
≤
Errmax∑
Err=0
exp(Θ(ε|Π| log(m))) · exp(−Ω(k · ε|Π| · log(m)))
≤ exp(−Ω(kε|Π| · log(m))).
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The second line follows from the monotonicity of binomial coefficients with the bottom part much
smaller than the top. The third line follows from applying the inequality
(
n
d
) ≤ (ned )d and bringing
factors of m and ε into the exponent, and by Eq. (38) and plugging in Errmax =
ε
KCCmax = O(ε|Π|).
The final line follows from taking the hash sizes (which affect the constants in Eq. (38)) and k to be
large enough.
We conclude that no non-oblivious adversary can make D = O(ε∗|Π|) while having Err ≤ O(ε|Π|)
with probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(ε∗|Π| · log(m))) over the randomness of the parties, where ε∗ is
a fixed constant that is sufficiently larger than 10C6ε and sufficiently smaller than 1/(4200C7C6α).
Combining this with Corollary 6.4 and using the fact that D upper bounds the number of hash
collisions, we conclude that the non-oblivious adversary cannot make EHC bigger than O(ε∗|Π|)
with probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(ε∗|Π| · log(m))). Since ε∗ is a constant that does not go to 0
with ε, we can absorb it into the Ω. Hence, we get that the non-oblivious adversary cannot make
EHC bigger than O(ε∗|Π|) with probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(|Π| · log(m))).
Finally, recall that Lemma 4.2 shows that the potential φ rises by at least K in every iteration.
This means that after 100|Π| iterations, the potential is at least 100|Π|K. Combining this with the
fact that EHC ≤ O(ε∗|Π|), Claim 4.18 gives us the desired result. For a fuller treatment of this part
of the proof, see the proof of Theorem 4.1.
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Appendix
A Meeting Points for Oblivious Adversaries
In this section we define and analyze the meeting points mechanism [Hae14] and its respective
potential ϕu,v. Certain parts of the analysis mostly repeat [Hae14] and are included here for
completeness. The main difference from [Hae14] is that the meeting points mechanism is interleaved
over several iteration of the simulation protocol. This brings two potential difficulties. First,
ϕu,v may change outside the meeting-point phase. Second, the transcript may change while the
meeting-points mechanism is still in progress. We eliminate the later by fixing a party’s transcript
until the meeting points mechanism reports the transcripts of both parties are consistent. The
former requires a more careful analysis of ϕu,v, and is handled in Claim A.1.
A.1 Meeting Points Protocol Between Two Parties
Below we describe the meeting points protocol that parties do pairwise. We write the algorithm as
it is performed by some party u with one of its neighbors v. In all variables below, we will drop the
subscript of (u, v) but it is implied. Specifically, k below denotes ku,v, and the same is true for E,
T , mpc1, mpc2, and status.
Roughly speaking, there are up to two types of actions performed in each round of meeting
points. The pair of parties first send each other hashes of their truncated transcripts, and increment
their respective E, T1, or T2 counters if applicable. In keeping with Haeupler’s paper we will call
this the verification phase of meeting points. Note that the verification phase always occurs during
a round of meeting point exchange.
After exchanging hashes, the parties judge whether or not to take further action based on the
values of E, T1, and T2. We will call this the transition phase of meeting points. For example, if
2Eu,v > ku,v, then party u will set all its variables in the meeting points computation to 0. We will
call these transitions reset transitions17. Otherwise, if mpc1u,v > 0.4ku,v, party u will transition to
meeting point 1, and similarly for meeting point 2. These will be called meeting point transitions.
We have the parties use separate seeds for each hash comparison, and so they take the large
shared seed between them and split it into many smaller seeds. The reason for this is somewhat
technical; it makes the events of hash collisions for the different comparisons independent (when the
seeds themselves are independent), which is useful in our analysis of removing the common random
string in Section 5 (see Claim 5.10; this is the only claim where this is used). It suffices to use a
single seed in Meeting Points for the usage in Section 4 (with a common random string). It is not
clear that using separate seeds is necessary to remove a common random string, but it happens to
help with our analysis.
A.2 Notation
We establish some notation that will be used in this section.
• Eu,v corresponds to the value of E that party u has for the communication link with party v.
Eu,v is defined similarly.
17This is called an error transition in [Hae14].
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Algorithm 7 MeetingPoints(u,v, Si,u,v, K)
1: Method called by u, with v ∈ N(u). Si,u,v ∈ {0, 1}Θ(|Π|K) is a large random seed to be split up
and used for hashing. Π← protocol to be simulated.
2: h ← inner product hash family (Definition 2.2) w/ input length16 Θ(|Π|K), p = 2−Θ(K/m)
sufficiently small, o = Θ(K/m), s = |Si,u,v|/10.
3: (S1, S2, . . . , S10)← Si,u,v. Si,u,v is split into ten seeds. Wlog we assume that S1, . . . , S5 are for
the hashes it sends, and S6, . . . , S10 are for the hashes it uses for comparisons (so v is using
S6, . . . S10 for the hashes it sends, and S1, . . . , S5 for comparisons, respectively).
4: k ← k + 1
5: k˜ ← 2blog kc. Let c be the largest integer such that ck˜ ≤ |Tu,v|.
6: T1 ← Tu,v[1 : ck˜], T2 ← Tu,v[1 : (c− 1)k˜]
7: Send (hS1(k), hS2(T1), hS3(T1), hS4(T2), hS5(T2)) to neighbor v.
8: (Hk, H
(1)
T1
, H
(1)
T2
, H
(2)
T1
, H
(2)
T2
)← (hS6(k), hS7(T1), hS8(T2), hS9(T1), hS10(T2))
9: Receive (H ′k, H
(1)′
T1
, H
(2)′
T1
, H
(1)′
T2
, H
(2)′
T2
) from our neighbor v.
10: if Hk 6= H ′k then
11: E ← E + 1
12: end if
13: if k = 1, E = 0, and H
(1)
T1
= H
(1)′
T1
then
14: k ← 0
15: status← “simulate” return status
16: end if
17: if H
(1)
T1
= H
(1)′
T1
or H
(2)
T1
= H
(1)′
T2
then
18: mpc1← mpc1 + 1
19: else if H
(1)
T2
= H
(2)′
T1
or H
(2)
T2
= H
(2)′
T2
then
20: mpc2← mpc2 + 1
21: end if
22: if 2E ≥ k then
23: k ← 0, E ← 0,mpc1← 0,mpc2← 0
24: status← “meeting points”
25: else if k = k˜ then
26: if mpc1 > 0.4k then
27: T ← T1
28: k ← 0, E ← 0
29: else if mpc2 > 0.4k then
30: T ← T2
31: k ← 0, E ← 0
32: end if
33: mpc1← 0,mpc2← 0
34: status← “meeting points”
35: else
36: status← “meeting points”
37: end if
38: return status
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• Eu,v, ku,v, mpc1u,v, and mpc2u,v are all defined as the value of the corresponding variable that
party u has for the communication link (u, v). We can also define these with v coming first in
the subscript (e.g. Ev,u); these will correspond to the value that party v has for the link (u, v).
• WMu,v corresponds to the number of wrong matches or mismatches that contribute to the
current values of mpc1u,v and mpc2u,v (the counters for party u) on link (u, v). That is, if
(T1)u,v ∈ {(T1)v,u, (T2)v,u} but party u does not increment mpc1 due to an error, then we
increment WMu,v by 1. Similarly, if (T1)u,v 6∈ {(T1)v,u, (T2)v,u} but party u increments mpc1
due to an error or hash collision, we increment WMu,v by 1. Define WMv,u similarly, but for
the increments and non-increments of party v.
• Let k{u,v} = ku,v + kv,u. Define E{u,v},mpc1{u,v},mpc2{u,v}, and WM{u,v} similarly.
• Given some number V that depends on the transcript T , define ∆(V ) to be the change in
V that results after one invocation to Meeting Points (Algorithm 7) for all pairs of adjacent
parties (i.e. in the Meeting Points phase of Algorithm 1).
• Similarly, given a number V that depends on the transcript T , define ∆u,v(V ) to be the change
in V that results in parties u and v running Meeting Points (Algorithm 7) with each other,
and no other pair of parties making changes.
• When it is understood that we are only talking about the interaction between a pair of parties
u and v, we will drop the superscript {u, v} off terms such as k{u,v}, E{u,v}, WM{u,v}, etc.
with the understanding that we are only talking about this pairwise interaction.
A.3 Potential Analysis
Following the paper of Haeupler [Hae14], we define ϕu,v as follows. Let 1 < C1 < C2 < C3 < C4 <
C5 < C6 < C7, where each Ci is selected to be sufficiently larger than Ci−1 (or 1 if i = 1).
ϕu,v =
{
C3 ·Bu,v − C2 · k{u,v} + C5 · E{u,v} + 2C6 ·WM{u,v} if ku,v = kv,u
C3 ·Bu,v + 0.9C4 · k{u,v} − C4 · E{u,v} + C6 ·WM{u,v} if ku,v 6= kv,u
(39)
Recall that we define our final potential function as follows:
φ =
∑
(u,v)∈E
(K/m)Gu,v −K · ϕu,v − C1KB∗ + C7K · EHC
We start with some simple claims about ϕu,v that we use directly in the main proof. The proof of
following claim (Claim A.1), unlike the other claims in this section, requires knowledge of the robust
protocol (Algorithm 1) beyond the definition of ϕu,v and the Meeting Points protocol (Algorithm 7).
Claim A.1. The potential ϕu,v does not change in the Flag Passing phase. In each of the Rewind
and Simulation phases, it changes by at most C3. In the absence of errors or hash collisions between
u and v in the iteration as a whole, ϕu,v does not increase in the rewind or simulation phases.
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Proof. The only term in ϕu,v that changes in these phases is Bu,v. Bu,v does not change in the Flag
Passing phase, can change by at most 1 in the Simulation phase, and can change by at most 1 in
the Rewind phase. This establishes the first part of the claim.
Now we establish the second part of the claim. First we consider the Simulation phase. At a
high level, Bu,v can increase in the Simulation phase if one of the following is true: 1) u and v are in
disagreement, but both decide to simulate anyway, 2) The adversary puts an error between u and v
in the Simulation phase, or 3) u decides not to simulate Πu,v, but v decides to simulate Πv,u. We
now formalize the three cases and prove that all of them require an error or hash collision between
u and v somewhere in the iteration.
In the first case, Πu,v 6= Πv,u but netCorrectu = netCorrectv = 1. Note that this implies that
statusu,v = statusv,u = “simulate”, since otherwise one of the parties would have netCorrect = 0.
This means there was an error or hash collision between u and v in the Meeting Points phase to
make them think that their transcripts matched. In the second case, there was an error between u
and v in the Simulation phase. In the third case, note that v simulates in Πv,u, so we know that
netCorrectv = 1 and v never received ⊥ from u in the Simulation phase. Furthermore, u does not
simulate. This can happen due to one of two reasons. The first case is that netCorrectu = 0, and
so u did not want to simulate after the Flag Passing phase. In this case, u would have sent ⊥ to
v. Since v did not receive it, the adversary must have deleted it. The second case is that u had
netCorrectu = 1, but received a ⊥ on the link (u, v). However, netCorrectv = 1, so v would not
have sent this ⊥. Hence, it was inserted by the adversary. Either way, there is an error on the link
(u, v) during the Simulation phase.
Now we consider the Rewind phase. If neither u nor v send or receive a rewind message on
(u, v), then it is clear that Bu,v is unchanged. We assume that any rewind sent on the link (u, v)
reaches the recipient. If this is not the case, then there was a deletion on the link (u, v) and we are
done. Similarly, we assume that any rewind received on the link (u, v) was sent by the other party
(otherwise it was an insertion). We break the remainder of the proof into cases depending on which
parties want to send rewinds on the link (u, v).
Suppose that statusu,v = statusv,u = “simulate”, alreadyRewoundu,v = alreadyRewoundv,u =
0. Then the following actions all happen together in the same round or not at all: u (resp. v)
sends “rewind” to v (resp. u), u truncates Πu,v, v truncates Πv,u, and alreadyRewoundu,v and
alreadyRewoundv,u are set to 1. If all these actions happen, then Bu,v does not increase. This
is because max{|Πu,v|, |Πv,u|} falls by one, and Gu,v falls by at most 1. Furthermore, after these
actions happen, alreadyRewoundu,v = alreadyRewoundv,u = 0, so u and v will not rewind on (u, v)
anymore.
If statusu,v = “meeting points” or alreadyRewoundu,v = 1, then u will not send a rewind
message to v nor take any action if it receives a rewind from v. Therefore, if v does not send
a rewind message to u, then Bu,v is unchanged in this Rewind phase. If v does send a rewind
message to u, then we know that just before the message was sent we had statusv,u = “simulate”
and alreadyRewoundv,u = 0. If statusu,v = “meeting points”, then there must have been a hash
collision or error between u and v in the Meeting Points phase, otherwise they would both have the
same status. Otherwise if alreadyRewoundu,v = 1, then u has already truncated Πu,v by one chunk.
So the net change to Bu,v from the truncation of Πu,v and Πv,u that have happened in this rewind
phase is nonpositive, as established in the previous paragraph. Furthermore, after this rewind is
sent, both parties have alreadyRewound = 1, and will not do anything further on this link in the
rewind phase.
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Proposition A.2. At the beginning of any iteration i of the robust protocol (Algorithm 1), the
following is true for all pairs (u, v) ∈ E:
0 ≤ Bu,v ≤ ϕu,v
As a corollary,
∑
(u,v)∈E ϕu,v ≥
∑
(u,v)∈E Bu,v.
Proof. If ku,v = kv,u, follows from fact that we can take C3 > 8C2 + 1. Thus, if ku,v is large enough
such that C2k
{u,v} > C3Bu,v, this means that we have ku,v = kv,u > 4Bu,v. But we know that
when both ku,v and kv,u are larger than 2Bu,v, both parties are including hashes of their pairwise
transcript truncated below the chunk Gu,v, which should match. So this means the fact that ku,v
and kv,u increased so much more without the parties doing a meeting point transition means that
there were many mismatches due to errors - specifically, WM{u,v} > 0.6(1/2)k{u,v}. Hence, in this
case, the sum of all the terms that do not include Bu,v is nonnegative.
If ku,v 6= kv,u, then this follows from the fact that k{u,v} ≥ 2E{u,v} so 0.9C4k{u,v} ≥ C4E{u,v}.
We would like to lower bound ∆(φ) with ∆u,v(φ). To this end, we define a lower bound on
∆u,v(φ) as follows:
∆˜u,v(φ) = (K/m)∆u,v(Gu,v)−K ·∆u,v(ϕu,v) + C1K ·∆u,v(G∗)
Claim A.3. ∆(φ) ≥∑(u,v)∈E (∆˜u,v(φ) + C7K∆u,v(EHC))
Proof.
∆(φ) = (K/m)∆(
∑
Gu,v)−K ·∆(
∑
ϕu,v)− C1K ·∆(B∗) + C7K ·
∑
∆u,v(EHC)
≥
∑
(K/m)∆(Gu,v)−K ·
∑
∆(ϕu,v) + C1K ·∆(G∗) + C7K ·
∑
∆u,v(EHC)
=
∑
(K/m)∆(Gu,v)−K ·
∑
∆(ϕu,v) + C1K · min
(u,v)∈E
(∆u,v(G
∗)) + C7K ·
∑
∆u,v(EHC)
≥
∑
(K/m)∆(Gu,v)−K ·
∑
∆(ϕu,v) + C1K ·
∑
∆u,v(G
∗) + C7K ·
∑
∆u,v(EHC)
=
∑
(u,v)∈E
(
∆˜u,v(φ) + C7K∆u,v(EHC)
)
The second line follows from the fact that parties do not simulate in the meeting points phase, so
∆(B∗) = ∆(H∗)−∆(G∗) ≤ −∆(G∗). The third line follows from the fact that the parties all do
meeting points in parallel and the definition of G∗: after doing the meeting points phase, there is
some pair of parties (u, v) such that the maximum chunk number that they have simulated correctly
is the new value of G∗. Then, by definition, we have that ∆u,v(G∗) = ∆(G∗). The fourth line follows
from the fact that parties do not simulate in meeting points, so ∆u,v(G
∗) ≤ 0.
The main claim that we establish in this section is that if statusu,v or statusv,u is “meeting
points” after the Meeting Points algorithm, then the function ∆˜u,v(φ) rises by Ω(K) in the meeting
points phase between parties u and v in the absence of errors and hash collisions. Furthermore,
if statusu,v = “simulate” after Meeting Points, then ϕu,v does not change. Note that this implies
that the potential φ rises by at least Ω(c ·K) where c is the number of pairs of adjacent parties
(u, v) such that statusu,v = “meeting points” and no errors or hash collisions occur between them,
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by Claim A.3. The proof of this is very similar to the main proof in [Hae14], where he effectively
shows that Gu,v − ϕu,v rises by Ω(1) in each iteration of Meeting Points and Simulation.
In the rest of the section, we will fix parties u and v and focus on how the potential between
them changes after they do Meeting Points (Algorithm 7) with each other. As noted earlier, we will
drop the superscript {u, v} off terms such as k{u,v}, E{u,v}, WM{u,v}, etc. with the understanding
that we are only talking about this pairwise interaction.
Proposition A.4. Fix parties u and v such that (u, v) ∈ E. If statusu,v = statusv,u = “simulate”
after Meeting Points, then ϕu,v is unchanged after Meeting Points, and ∆˜u,v(φ) = 0.
Proof. If we have statusu,v = statusv,u = “simulate” after Meeting Points, then all variables in ϕu,v
remain unchanged when the Meeting Points method returns. We note that no kind of truncation
occurs in this case, so neither Gu,v nor G
∗ change after the Meeting Points phase in this case, hence
∆˜u,v(φ) = 0
Lemma A.5. Fix parties u and v such that (u, v) ∈ E. Then the verification phase of Meeting Points
between u and v causes the potential ϕu,v to rise by at most 5C6, and we have that ∆˜u,v(φ) ≥ −5C6K
when only taking into account changes from the verification phase. Furthermore, in the absence of
errors or hash collisions, ϕu,v falls by at least five, and ∆˜u,v(φ) ≥ 5K when only taking into account
changes from the verification phase.
Proof. We start by noting that E and WM increment by at most 2 in any verification phase.
Furthermore, both ku,v and kv,u are incremented by one: this means that if they start equal, they
will stay equal. Conversely, if they start different, they will stay different. Furthermore, note that,
since this is a verification phase, no transition occurs, so Bi,i+1 remains the same. Thus ϕu,v rises
by at most 5C6, if we take C6 to be sufficiently large with respect to C5.
Case ku,v = kv,u:
WM increments only if there was an error or hash collision in the verification phase. Now
suppose there is no error or hash collision. In this case, E and WM do not increment, and k
increments by 2 (one increment for each party), so ϕu,v falls by at least five by taking C2 > 2.5.
Case ku,v 6= kv,u:
Note that WM , by definition, increments only in the presence of an error, and it will increase
by at most 2. This contributes 4C6 to ϕu,v. Suppose that E does not increment by 2. This means
that there was a hash collision or error - otherwise, both parties would have incremented E. Now
suppose that E does increment by 2. In this case, ϕu,v falls by at least (−0.9C4 +C4)2. By choosing
C4 to be a sufficiently large number, this is at least five.
The conclusions about ∆˜u,v(φ) follow from the fact that Gu,v and G
∗ remain unchanged in the
verification phase, so ∆˜u,v(φ) = −Kϕu,v.
Before proceeding with the proof, we define some notation we will use.
Notation for remainder of section:
• In proofs, we will often drop superscripts on quantities such as k{u,v},WM{u,v}, E{u,v}, with
the understanding that all quantities have {u, v} as an implied superscript.
• Quantities like ku,v,WMu,v, Eu,v will refer to the value of these variables just before the
transition phase (that is, after the verification phase). We note that there is one proposition
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for which we will use ku,v to denote the value of the variable before the previous verification
phase as well - we will be explicit about this abuse of notation in this case.
• Define k′u,v,WM ′u,v, E′u,v to be the value of the corresponding variables after the transition
phase. Define k′v,u,WM ′v,u, E′v,u similarly. Finally, define k′ = k′u,v + k′v,u, and define E′ and
WM ′ similarly.
• We abuse (our own) previous notation and define ∆(ku,v) to be k′u,v − ku,v - that is, the
difference in the variable after transitioning. Define ∆(Eu,v), ∆(WMu,v), ∆u,v(G
∗), and
∆(Bu,v) similarly as the change incurred in the relevant value by the transition phase between
u and v.
Lemma A.6. Fix parties u and v such that (u, v) ∈ E, and suppose that statusu,v = “meeting points”
after the Meeting-Points phase. Then Meeting-Points phase between u and v causes the potential
ϕu,v to increase by at most 5C6. In the absence of errors or hash collisions, ϕu,v decreases by at
least five. Furthermore, we have that ∆˜u,v(φ) ≥ −5C6 ·K, and in the absence of errors or hash
collisions, ∆˜u,v(φ) ≥ 5K.
Note that the above lemma includes the verifiation and transition phases. We have already
established that this is true for the verification phase alone in Lemma A.5. If we could also establish
that ϕu,v does not increase and ∆˜u,v(φ) does not decrease in the transition phase, we would be able
to conclude this lemma as a corollary. However, there is one case for which we cannot do this - in
this case, we need to lump together the transition phase previous verification phase to argue that
the potential rises enough there to pay for a possible decrease in our transition phase. This will
occur in Proposition A.7. We now split Lemma A.6 into cases and prove each case separately. We
assume that there is no error in the transition phase. Since the decisions of the parties here only
depend on their state, any error does not affect the transition and its corresponding affect on ϕu,v
or ∆˜u,v(φ).
Proposition A.7. Fix parties u and v such that (u, v) ∈ E. Suppose that ku,v 6= kv,u, and exactly
one party does a meeting point or reset transition. Then the current invocation of Meeting Points as
a whole causes ϕu,v to rise by at most 5C6 and ∆˜u,v(φ) ≥ −5C6 ·K . If no error or hash collision
occurs, then ϕu,v falls by at least five, and ∆˜u,v(φ) ≥ 5K.
Proof of Proposition A.7. Suppose wlog that the transitioning party is party u. Since party v did
not transition, we have that k′u,v 6= k′v,u after the transition as well. We now analyze the parameters
for party u, to analyze how party u’s contribution to the potential changes. We assume that WMu,v
was initially 0, otherwise the decrease in WMu,v to 0 will increase ϕu,v. Now, we know that party
u will set ku,v and Eu,v to 0. Setting ku,v to 0 will result in an increase in potential, and setting
Eu,v to 0 will result in a decrease in potential. The net change of ϕu,v from these two actions is
−0.9C4ku,v + C4Eu,v.
Note that for a meeting point transition, we have that Eu,v < 0.5ku,v, so the expression above is
−0.9C4ku,v + C4Eu,v ≥ −0.4C4ku,v. Note that a meeting points transition can affect Bu,v, G∗, and
Gu,v as well. However, that the change in each of these values is at most 2ku,v, and the constants
multiplying them in ∆˜u,v(φ) are C3, C1, and 1 respectively. Since we can take these to be much
smaller than C4, the affect on ∆(ϕu,v) (resp. ∆˜u,v(φ)) from changes in these variables are negligible
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compared to −0.4C4ku,v (resp. 0.4C4ku,v ·K). Hence, by taking C4 to be large enough, we get the
desired result, that ϕu,v falls by at least five and ∆˜u,v(φ) ≥ 5K.
Now we turn our attention to reset transitions. Note that for reset transitions, Gu,v and G
∗ are
unchanged, so ∆˜u,v(φ) = −K∆(ϕu,v). Recall that, when 2Eu,v ≥ ku,v, u will reset. So, we know
that before her most recent increment of ku,v in the last verification phase (and possibly Eu,v), we
either had that ku,v, Eu,v = 0 or 2Eu,v is strictly less than ku,v. This means that, after potentially
incrementing Eu,v and ku,v in the following iteration, we have that (currently) Eu,v ≤ 0.5ku,v+0.5.18.
Plugging into the expression for potential difference above, we see that
∆(ϕu,v) ≤ C4(−0.9ku,v + Eu,v) ≤ C4(−0.4ku,v + 0.5). (40)
Note that when ku,v > 1, this is at most −5 for sufficiently large C4, and hence ∆˜u,v(φ) ≥ 5K.
Combining this with the rise in potential during the verification phase (Lemma A.5), we conclude
the proof of Proposition A.7 in the case when ku,v > 1.
When ku,v = 1, we note that, before the previous verification phase, we must have had ku,v = 0.
So if we compare ku,v before the verification phase to k
′
u,v after the transition phase, we see that
they are both equal. The same is true of Eu,v before the verification phase and E
′
u,v. So party
u’s contribution to ϕu,v does not increase after one iteration of the meeting points protocol, and
all the other terms in ∆˜u,v(φ) are also unchanged. But what about party v? By assumption,
party v does not transition. Further, in the absence of errors and hash collisions we know that
statusv,u = “meeting points” after Meeting Points, since ku,v 6= kv,u. Therefore, v goes through
a verification phase. By Lemma A.5 and the fact that v does not transition, we get that the
contribution of party v to ϕu,v decreases by at least five in the absence of errors and hash collisions,
and increases by at most 5C6 in their presence. Hence, overall, ϕu,v falls by at least five in the
absence of errors, and rises by at most 5C6 in the presence of errors.
Note on notation:∆˜u,v(φ) changes meaning for the rest of the proof, to match with ∆(·).
Proposition A.7 was the only case where we needed to lump together verification and transition
phases to argue that the potentials behave like we want. For the remainder of the argument, it
suffices to show that ϕu,v falls in the transition phase, and that ∆˜u,v(φ) > 0 rises. Hence, we abuse
our previous notation to define ∆˜u,v(φ) := (K/m)∆u,v(Gu,v)−K ·∆(ϕu,v) +C1K ·∆u,v(G∗), where
we recall that ∆u,v(·) is now defined to be the change in a variable after the transition phase only.
Proposition A.8. Fix parties u and v such that (u, v) ∈ E. Suppose that ku,v 6= kv,u, and both
parties do some transition. Then ϕu,v falls by at least one in the transition phase. Furthermore,
∆˜u,v(φ) ≥ K.
Proof of A.8. Since both parties transition, we will have k′u,v = k′v,u = 0 after the transition.
Furthermore, we will have E′u,v = E′v,u = WM ′u,v = WM ′v,u = 0 due to the transitioning. Hence,
∆(ϕu,v) ≥ −0.9C4k + C4E − C6WM . Just like in the proof of Proposition A.7, we note that the
reset condition (Line 22) implies that we have Eu,v ≤ 0.5ku,v +0.5, and similarly Ev,u ≤ 0.5kv,u+0.5.
So E ≤ 0.5k + 1, and so we get that
∆(ϕu,v) ≤ C4(−0.4k + 1)
18Note that this inequality also holds if we started with ku,v, Eu,v equal to 0.
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Since we know that both ku,v and kv,u are greater than 1 after the verification phase and we also
know that ku,v 6= kv,u, we conclude that ku,v + kv,u ≥ 3. Therefore, the above expression is at most
−0.2C4. This establishes that ∆(ϕu,v) ≤ −1. To see that indeed ∆˜u,v(φ) ≥ K, we additionally note
that G∗ and Gu,v change by at most 2k, and so we get that ∆˜u,v(φ) ≥ K ·(−2k+0.4C4k−2C1k−C4) ≥
K · k(0.4C4− 2C1− 2)−C4. By taking C4 sufficiently large so that 0.05C4 ≥ 2C1 + 2 and using the
fact that k ≥ 3, we see that this in turn is ≥ 0.05C4K, which is greater than K since we needed
C4 > 20 earlier.
Proposition A.9. Fix parties u and v such that (u, v) ∈ E. Suppose that ku,v = kv,u, and
exactly one party transitions. Then ϕu,v falls by at least one in the transition phase. Furthermore,
∆˜u,v(φ) ≥ K.
Proof of Proposition A.9. Note that since only one party transitions, k′u,v 6= k′v,u. Wlog, suppose
that the transitioning party is u. We will directly show that ∆˜u,v(φ) ≥ K: since the other
quantities in the definition of ∆˜u,v(φ) do not increase in the Meeting Points phase, this implies that
∆u,v(ϕu,v) ≤ −1.
Let us suppose that the transition was a reset transition, so Eu,v ≥ 0.5ku,v. Then u’s contribution
to the potential will rise, since it sets E′u,v = k′u,v = 0 and we can take C5 > 2C2 + 1. But a
priori it seems possible that party v may have its contribution to ϕu,v fall. This is because the
contribution of kv,u to the potential was −C2kv,u, but after party u transitions the contribution is
0.9C4k
′
v,u, since after u’s transition we are using the potential function for unequal k’s. To address
this, we note that k′v,u = kv,u = ku,v ≤ 2Eu,v, where the first equality follows because party v did
not transition and the second equality holds by assumption. Hence, the change in ϕu,v is at least
−C5Eu,v + C2ku,v + C2kv,u + C4k′v,u ≥ (−0.5C5 + 2C2 + C4)ku,v. For sufficiently large choice of C5,
this quantity is at most −1. Since Gu,v and G∗ do not change for a reset trasition, this also implies
that ∆˜u,v(φ) ≥ K.
Now let us suppose that the transition was a meeting point transition. For simplicity, assume
that party u transitions to meeting point 1; identical reasoning will hold for transitioning to meeting
point 2.
Note that u only transitions when mpc1u,v ≥ 0.4ku,v. Since v is not transitioning, we know
that mpc1v,u < 0.4kv,u = 0.4ku,v and mpc2v,u < 0.4ku,v. Furthermore, we know that for the last
0.5ku,v iterations (if ku,v = 1, then for 1 iteration), both parties have exchanged hashes of the
same meeting points. Either there was truly a match among these meeting points or there was
not. If there was truly a match (wlog say it is with v’s first meeting point), then we know that
WM ≥WMv,u > 0.1kv,u = 0.05k, since v did not increment either mpc1 more than 0.4ku,v times.
Since k′u,v 6= k′v,u after the transition, the WM term in ϕu,v falls by 0.05C6 · k as a result. If there
was not truly a match, then we know that WMu,v ≥ 0.4ku,v, since u incremented its mpc1 counter
0.4ku,v times despite the lack of a true match. WMu,v resets to 0 after u transitions, so the of WM
term in ϕu,v falls by at least 0.2C6 · k after the transition.
Furthermore, the contribution of each of the other terms in ϕu,v is at most 2C5 · k due to this
transition. Hence, by taking C6 to be sufficiently large with respect to C5, we get that ϕu,v rises by
at least Ω(C6 · k), which is at least 1 for sufficiently large C6. Furthermore, Gu,v and G∗ also only
change by at most 2k, and so by taking C6 to be sufficiently large, we get that ∆˜u,v(φ) ≥ K.
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Proposition A.10. Fix parties u and v such that (u, v) ∈ E. Suppose that ku,v = kv,u, and both
parties transition. Then ϕu,v falls by at least one in the transition phase. Furthermore, ∆˜u,v(φ) ≥ K.
Proof of Proposition A.10. The main difference from Proposition A.9 is that we have k′u,v = k′v,u
after the transition. Note that |∆(Bu,v)|, |∆(Gu,v)|, and |∆u,v(G∗)| are all upper bounded by 2k.
Suppose that at least one party (wlog, u) does a reset transition. Note that this transition can only
decrease WM , which in turn only decreases ϕu,v, so we assume that WM = 0. Furthermore, recall
that Eu,v ≥ ku,v/2 = k/4. Then the difference in ∆˜u,v(φ) caused after both parties transition is at
least
∆˜u,v(φ) ≥ K(∆(Gu,v) + C5Eu,v + C2∆(k)− C3∆(Bu,v) + C1∆u,v(G∗))
≥ ((C5/4)k − 2C3k − C2k − 2C1k − 2k)K ≥ ((C5/4)− 7C3)k ·K
By taking C5 to be larger than 28C3 +1 and noting that k = ku,v+kv,u > 1, we see that ∆˜u,v(φ) > K.
Now suppose both parties do a meeting point transition. Suppose that ku,v > 4Bu,v. Note that
ku,v is a power of two by definition since a meeting point transition is occurring. So if Bu,v > 0,
then ku,v is divisible by 4. Then we must have had at least ku,v/4 iterations where u had some
value for ku,v that was at least ku,v/4 > Bu,v, and the same for v with kv,u. In this case, one of
party u’s two meeting points corresponds to Πu,v[1 : c(ku,v/4)], where c is defined to be the largest
integer such that c · ku,v/4 ≤ Gu,v. This uses the fact that ku,v > 0 after the Meeting Points phase
implies that statusu,v = “meeting points”, and that this prevents u from simulating or rewinding
Πu,v. The analogous fact is true of v as well, for identical reasons. Then, by the definition of Gu,v,
we have that
Πu,v[1 : c(ku,v/4)] = Πv,u[1 : c(ku,v/4)]
However, the parties did not transition at step ku,v/2 – this means that we must have WM ≥
0.4(ku,v/2) = 0.1k. Since C6 is sufficiently large, we get that ϕu,v falls by at least 1 and that
∆˜u,v(φ) ≥ K.
Note that if Bu,v = 0, then it is possible that we have ku,v ∈ {1, 2}, which we now address for
completeness. If ku,v = 1, then the parties exchanged a single meeting point and are now doing a
meeting point transition. But it cannot be that their hashes matched for the first meeting point - if
this were the case, they would have made their status “simulate” instead of going into the transition
phase. But since we know Bu,v = 0, their hashes should have matched on the first meeting point.
Hence, we get that WM ≥ ku,v = 1. If ku,v = 2, then note that the parties did not match their
Meeting Points when they had previously had ku,v = kv,u = 1. Since Bu,v = 0, they should have
matched, and so we get that WM ≥ 0.5ku,v. Hence, either way, WM is sufficiently large so that
ϕu,v falls by at least 1 and that ∆˜u,v(φ) ≥ K.
Now we assume that ku,v, kv,u ≤ 4Bu,v. Note that this implies that Bu,v > 0, since ku,v and kv,u
are both at least 1. First, we consider the case where B′u,v 6= 0. In this case, their communication
before now must have had at least 0.4ku,v hash collisions or corruptions to make them both increment
their meeting point counters enough to transition, and so WM is at least 0.4ku,v before the transition.
The decrease in WM from the transition means that ϕu,v falls by at least 1 and that ∆˜u,v(φ) ≥ K.
Now assume that B′u,v = 0. Then the potential change from this meeting point transition is at
least
K · (∆(Gu,v) + C1∆(G∗) + C2∆(k)− C3∆(Bu,v)) ≥ K · ((1 + C1 + C2)(−4k)− C3(−k/8))
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By taking C3 to be large enough, we get that ∆˜u,v(φ) ≥ K.
Since ∆˜u,v(φ) > K, ϕu,v falls by at least one, as ∆u,v(G
∗) and ∆(Gu,v) are both nonpositive.
Proof of Lemma A.6. First, note that an argument basically identical to the proof of Proposition
A.4 shows that any party v with statusv,u = “simulate” after Meeting Points does not contribute
any change to ϕu,v. Hence, we can ignore these parties when establishing Lemma A.6.
• Suppose neither party transitions. Then the only change to ϕu,v is in the verification phase,
and Lemma A.5 establishes the claim.
• Suppose one party transitions and ku,v 6= kv,u. Then Proposition A.7 establishes the claim.
• Suppose both parties transition and ku,v 6= kv,u. Then Lemma A.5 and Proposition A.8
establish the claim.
• Suppose one party transitions and ku,v = kv,u. Then Lemma A.5 and Proposition A.9 establish
the claim.
• Suppose both parties transition and ku,v = kv,u. Then Lemma A.5 and Proposition A.10
establish the claim.
Now we can prove the final lemma of this section, will be used directly in the proof that the
potential φ rises during the Meeting Points phase (Lemma 4.2).
Lemma A.11. Let c be the number of pairs (u, v) ∈ E such that statusu,v or statusv,u is “meeting
points” after the Meeting Points phase. Let `1 denote the number of errors and hash collisions that
occur in the network during the Meeting Points phase. Then after all adjacent parties do Meeting
Points, the overall potential rise ∆(φ) is at least 5c ·K + 0.4C7`1 ·K.
Now we can prove Lemma A.11
Proof of Lemma A.11. By Claim A.3, we recall that
∆(φ) ≥
∑
(u,v)∈E
(
∆˜u,v(φ) + C7K∆u,v(EHC)
)
For any pair (u, v) that have an error or hash collision between them during the Meeting Points
phase, ∆u,v(EHC) ≥ 1, so we get that ∆˜u,v(φ) + C7K∆u,v(EHC) ≥ C7 ·K − 5C6 ·K ≥ 0.5C7 ·K,
where this follows from Lemma A.6 in the case where either statusu,v or statusv,u was “meeting
points”. In the case where both parties have statusu,v = “simulate,”, Proposition A.4 gives us that
ϕu,v is unchanged after Meeting Points, and so are G
∗ and Gu,v. Hence, ∆˜u,v(φ) ≥ C7 ·K.
For any pair (u, v) such that statusu,v = “ meeting points” and there is no error between them,
Lemma A.6 gives us that ∆˜u,v(φ) ≥ 5K.
For any pair (u, v) such that statusu,v = statusv,u = “simulate” after Meeting Points and there
is no error between them, Proposition A.4 gives us that ∆˜u,v(φ) ≥ 0.
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Combining these facts, we get that
∆(φ) ≥
∑
(u,v)∈E
(
∆˜u,v(φ) + C7K∆u,v(EHC)
)
≥ 5c ·K + 0.4C7`1 ·K)
where we take C7 to be sufficiently large such that C7 − 5C6 ≥ 0.5C7 ≥ 0.4C7 + 5
B Improved coding scheme with noise rate 1/m log log(m) for non-
oblivious adversaries assuming CRS
B.1 Overview of Scheme
In this section we detail a coding scheme that tolerates fully general (non-oblivious) adversaries
with error rate 1/m log log(m). This improves the noise rate achieved in Section 6, in the setting
where the parties can share a common random string. The parties use a common hash function h1
which they agree on via their common random string, in the exact way that they do for the scheme
for oblivious adversaries in Section 3.
In order to make this scheme robust to non-oblivious adversaries that get to see the common
random string, they need to increase the output size of the shared hash to Θ(logm), just like in
Section 6. In addition, each party generates fresh randomness in each iteration for each of its links,
and shares these random strings with their neighbors. The parties use this randomness to further
hash the outputs of the common hash function h1 down to a constant size.
Since the randomness used for this second hash is generated fresh in each iteration, the adversary
cannot design their errors in previous iterations to cause hash collisions in this second hash, which
allows the output size of this hash to be Θ(1). This technique is also used in the two-party setting
by Haeupler [Hae14] to improve the rate of the coding scheme.
B.2 Protocol
Algorithm 8 RobustProtocolV2 (for party u) for non-oblivious adversaries
1: InitializeState()
2: Let K := m log log(m) (so chunk size is 5m log log(m)).
3: S = {Si,u,v}i,u,v ←
({0, 1}Θ(|Π|K))100|Π||E| uniform shared randomness.
4: for i = 1 to 100|Π| do
5: for all v ∈ N(u) in parallel do . meeting points
6: statusu,v ←MeetingPointsV 2(u, v, Si,u,v)
7: end for
8: Rest same as in Algorithm 1.
9: end for
Theorem B.1. Assume a network G = (V,E) with n = |V | parties and m = |E| links. Suppose Π
is a multiparty protocol over the network G with communication complexity CC(Π), binary alphabet
and fixed order of speaking. Let |Π| = CC(Π)5m log log(m) and let ε > 0 be a sufficiently small constant.
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Algorithm C correctly simulates Π with communication complexity O(CC(Π)) with probability at least
1− exp(−Ω(|Π|))) over the randomness of the parties, in the presence of a non-oblivious adversary
limited to a noise fraction at most ε/m log log(m), as long as the parties are allowed to share a CRS
(common random string).
B.3 Bounding Hash Collisions for Non-oblivious Adversaries w/ CRS
We denote the collision probabilities of the hash functions h1 and h2 by p1 and p2 respectively,
where we note that p1 =
1
mΘ(1)
and p2 is a sufficiently small constant. Just like we did in Section 4.4
for oblivious adversaries, we create a process ψu,v that upper bounds ϕu,v, but now we take into
account hash collisions from both hash functions. We will use the terminology that a hash function
h collides in (i, u, v) if there is a hash collision when u and v exchange hashes in iteration i.
Analogous to the previous section, define Xi,u,v for iterations when ϕu,v > 0 as
Xi,u,v =
{
1 if h1 collides in (i, u, v)
0 o/w
and define Yi,u,v for iterations when ϕu,v > 0 as
Yi,u,v =
{
1 if Xi,u,v = 0 and h2 collides in (i, u, v)
0 o/w
Then we define ψu,v as follows: Analogous to Lemma 4.14, we argue that ψu,v is an upper bound
on ϕu,v. Indeed, in the case of a hash collision in h1, note that ψu,v increases by (5C6 + 5)Xi,u,v +
5C6Yi,u,v − 5(1−Yi,u,v) = 5C6 + 5− 5(1) = 5C6, and in the case of a hash collision in h2, which only
occurs in the absence of a hash collision in h1, we get that (5C6 +5)Xi,u,v+5C6Yi,u,v−5(1−Yi,u,v) =
5C6. In the absence of a hash collision in either, we have that Xi,u,v = Yi,u,v = 0, and hence ψu,v
decreases by 5. The remainder of the argument is identical to the proof of Lemma 4.14.
We will let D denote the number of triples (i, u, v) such that ψu,v(i) > 0 at the beginning of the
iteration19. Let D′ ≤ D denote the number of such triples (i, u, v) where, addititionally, there is no
error between u and v in i. Let D2 ≤ D′ denote the number of triples (i, u, v) where, in addition to
this, there is no hash collision in h1 in (i, u, v). These are the triples where it is possible to have a
hash collision in h2, but there is no error. We start with the following proposition:
Proposition B.2. Let D′ be defined as above. The number of hash collisions in h2 in triples without
errors is at most 2p2D
′ with probability ≥ 1− exp(−Ω(p2D′)).
Proof. Note that hash collisions in h2 can only occur in triples in D2 or in triples (i, u, v) with an
error between u and v in iteration i. In each of the D2 triples (i, u, v), the event of a hash collision
in h2 is either iid Ber(p2) or Ber(0), where the latter can happen if Bu,v(i) = 0 but ψu,v(i) > 0.
Instead, consider the sum of a sequence of D′ Ber(p2) random variables. This stochastically
dominates the number of hash collisions in h2 in triples without errors, since D2 ≤ D′ by definition.
The statement follows from a standard Chernoff bound applied to the sum.
19Note that this is slightly different from in the previous section, where we defined D to be the number of triples
where Bu,v(i) > 0.
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Algorithm 9 MeetingPointsV2(u,v, Si,u,v) for non-oblivious adversaries with CRS
1: Method called by u, with v ∈ N(u), Si,u,v ∈ {0, 1}Θ(|Π|K)
2: h1 ← inner product hash function (Definition 2.2) w/ input length Θ(|Π|K), p1 = 1mΘ(1) for a
sufficiently small exponent, o1 = Θ(log(m)), s = |Si,u,v|.
3: h2 ← binary hash family from Corollary 2.8 w/ input length o1, p2 = Θ(1) sufficiently small,
o2 = Θ1, and s2 = Θ(log log(m)).
4: S1 ← Si,u,v
5: S2
unif← {0, 1}s2 are fresh privately generated bits.
6: hS ← h2,S2(h1,S1(·))
7: k ← k + 1
8: k˜ ← 2blog kc. Let c be the largest integer such that ck˜ ≤ |Tu,v|.
9: T1 ← Tu,v[1 : ck˜], T2 ← Tu,v[1 : (c− 1)k˜]
10: Send (S2, hS(k), hS(T1), hS(T2)) to neighbor v.
11: Receive (S′2, H ′k, H
′
T1
, H ′T2) from our neighbor v.
12: h′S ← h2,S′2(h1,S1(·))
13: (Hk, HT1 , HT2)← (h′S(k), h′S(T1), h′S(T2)).
14: if Hk 6= H ′k then
15: E ← E + 1
16: end if
17: if k = 1, E = 0, and HT1 = H
′
T1
then
18: k ← 0
19: status← “simulate” return status
20: end if
21: if HT1 = H
′
T1
or HT1H
′
T2
then
22: mpc1← mpc1 + 1
23: else if HT2 = H
′
T1
or HT2 = H
′
T2
then
24: mpc2← mpc2 + 1
25: end if
26: if 2E ≥ k then
27: k ← 0, E ← 0,mpc1← 0,mpc2← 0
28: status← “meeting points”
29: else if k = k˜ then
30: if mpc1 > 0.4k then
31: T ← T1
32: k ← 0, E ← 0
33: else if mpc2 > 0.4k then
34: T ← T2
35: k ← 0, E ← 0
36: end if
37: mpc1← 0,mpc2← 0
38: status← “meeting points”
39: else
40: status← “meeting points”
41: end if
42: return status
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i← 1, ψu,v(1)← 0
for all iterations i from 1 to 100|Π| do
if error occurs between u and v during iteration i, during any phase then
ψu,v(i+ 1) = ψu,v(i) + 6C6
else if ϕu,v(i) > 0 then
ψu,v(i+ 1) = ψu,v(i) + (5C6 + 5)Xi,u,v + 5C6(Yi,u,v)− 5(1− Yi,u,v)
else
ψu,v(i+ 1) = ψu,v(i)
end if
end for
Lemma B.3. Let Err denote the number of errors that the non-oblivious adversary commits in an
execution of RobustProtocolV2 (Algorithm 8), and let CC denote the communication complexity in the
execution. Then with probability 1− exp(−Ω(|Π|)), we have that either CC ≤ 200α|Π|m log log(m),
or that Err > εm log log(m)CC.
Proof. Recall that we set K = m log log(m). We will simply bound the upper probability that
CC > 200α|Π|K and simultaneously Err ≤ εKCC. We invoke Lemma 4.13, to establish that these two
events happen only if D > β · Err, where β = CC3αKErr ≥ 13αε . Note that this holds for any adversary,
oblivious or not.
Now our task is to establish that
Pr[D > βErr] ≤ exp(−Ω(|Π|)) (41)
for any adversary, which will bound the communication complexity of the protocol for any adversary.
First, we note that if D > βErr, then D′, the number of triples that additionally have no error,
is at least (β − 1)Err. Therefore, Proposition B.2 tells us that the number of collisions in the
hash h2 (in triples without errors) is at most 2p2D
′ with probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(p2D′) ≥
1− exp(−Ω(p2|Π|)), for any adversary, where we use the fact that D′ ≥ (β − 1) · Err = Ω(|Π|).
We can use this to condition on the event that the number of hash collisions in h2 is at most
2p2D
′, without losing too much in our bound. Formally, Proposotion B.2 gives us that
Pr[(D > βErr)] ≤ Pr[(D > βErr)|(# hash col in h2 ≤ 2p2D′)] + exp(−Ω(p2|Π|)) (42)
for any (non-oblivious) adversary. So it suffices to show that, conditioned on the number of
hash collisions in h2 being at most 2p2D
′, no adversary can make D > βErr except with negligible
probability, where the probability is taken over both the CRS and the privately sampled randomness.
This is done by showing this fact for any adversary that additive and oblivious to collisions in h1,
this occurs with probability at most exp(−Ω(β · Err · log(m)))(Lemma B.5). So now we know that,
for any adversary that is oblivious to collisions in h1, the probability that an oblivious, additive
can cause Err > 200αε|Π| errors while simultaneously having Err ≤ (ε/m log log(m))CC is at most
exp(−Ω(β · Err · log(m))).
To establish the result for arbitrary adversaries, we union bound the above probability over all
possible oblivious, additive adversaries that induce more than errors and show this is exp(−Ω(ε|Π| ·
log(m))). This is very similar to what we did in Section 6. The number of oblivious, additive
adversaries that induce exactly Err errors is at most(
Cm2 log log(m)|Π|
Err
)
· 2Err (43)
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for some constant C. For a proof of this fact, see the proof of Claim 6.2; the proof of this fact is
identical, with the log(m) replaced by log log(m) due to the fact that we take K := m log log(m) in
this section. Now, we separate the remainder of the proof into cases.
Case: Err ≤ 200αε|Π|. In this case, we use the montonicity of binomial coefficients where the
bottom is much smaller than the top to upper bound the RHS of Equation 43 by
(Cm2 log log(m)|Π|
200αε|Π|
)
.
Then, we apply the inequality that
(
n
k
) ≤ (nek )k to get that the number of such adversaries is at
most exp(O(ε|Π| · log(m))).
Hence, the probability that there exists an oblivious adversary that makes at most 200αε|Π|
errors and manages to make D > βErr (conditioned on the number of hash collisions in h2 being at
most 2p2D
′) is at most
200αε|Π|∑
Err=1
exp(O(ε|Π| · log(m))) · exp(−Ω(β · Err · log(m)))
Using the fact that β · Err = Ω(|Π|) by the definition of β, we can simplify the above to
exp(−Ω(|Π| log(m)))
as desired.
Case: Err > 200αε|Π|. In this case, we directly apply the inequality that (nk) ≤ (nek )k to get
that the number of such adversaries is at most exp(O(Err · log(m))).
Hence, the probability that there exists an oblivious adversary that makes at most 200αε|Π|
errors and manages to make D > βErr (conditioned on the number of hash collisions in h2 being at
most 2p2D
′) is at most
Cm2 log log(m)|Π|∑
Err=200αε|Π|+1
exp(O(Err · log(m))) · exp(−Ω(β · Err · log(m)))
Using the fact that β ≥ 1/(3αε), we can simplify this down to
exp(−Ω(−β · Err log(m))
and using the fact that β · Err = Ω(|Π|), we get
exp(−Ω(|Π| log(m)))
as desired.
Putting the two cases together with Equation 42, we establish Equation 41, completing the
proof.
Lemma B.4. Let Err denote the number of errors that the non-oblivious adversary commits in
an execution of RobustProtocolV2 (Algorithm 8), let D denote the number of triples (i, u, v) with
ψu,v(i) > 0, and let ε
∗ > 0 be a fixed constant larger than 4000αC6ε. Then with probability
1− exp(−Ω(|Π|)), we have that Err ≤ 200αε|Π| and D ≤ ε∗|Π|, or that Err > εm log log(m)CC.
We note that the probability in Lemma B.4 hides factors of ε∗ in the exponent. However, since
ε∗ is not going to 0 with ε, we do not include it in the exponent.
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Proof. First we can bound the probability that Err > 200αε|Π| and simultaneously
Err ≤ (ε/m log log(m))CC. Note that these two events occur only if CC > 200α|Π|K, and we already
upper bounded the probability of this event with the desired quantity in Lemma B.3. All that
remains is to bound the probability that Err ≤ 200αε|Π| and simultaneously D > ε∗|Π|, which will
establish the desired result.
Finally, we consider any adversary and upper bound the probability that it can cause D > ε∗|Π|,
conditioned on the number of errors being at most 200αε|Π|. This implies that D′ > (19/20)ε∗|Π|,
and so Proposition B.2 implies that the number of hash collisions from h2 is at most 2p2D
′ with
probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(p2ε∗|Π|)) ≥ 1− exp(−Ω(|Π|)).
Then, it remains to show that our nonoblivious adversary cannot cause D to be too large
conditioned on this event, as conditioning on this event can add at most exp(−Ω(|Π|)) to the overall
probability. Similar to the proof of Lemma B.3, we apply Lemma B.5 to get that Pr[D > ε∗|Π|] <
exp(−Ω(ε∗|Π| log(m))) for any additive adversary that is oblivious to collisions in h1 and commits
at most 200αε|Π| errors.
Doing the same union bound over all oblivious, additive adversaries that make at most 200αε|Π|
errors as done in the proof of Lemma B.3 proves that no adversary can cause D > ε∗|Π| with
probability more than exp(−Ω(|Π|)). Formally, there are at most exp(O(ε|Π| · log(m))) adversaries
that commit at most 200αε|Π| errors. Hence, the probability that any nonoblivious adversary that
commits at most 200αε|Π| errors can cause D > ε∗|Π| (conditioned on the number of hash collisions
in h2 being at most 2p2D
′) is at most
200αε|Π|∑
Err=1
exp(O(ε|Π| · log(m))) · exp(−Ω(ε∗|Π| log(m))) = exp(−Ω(|Π| log(m)))
which completes the proof.
Lemma B.5. Suppose that the number of hash collisions in h2 in triples without errors is at most
2p2D
′, where p2 is the hash collision probability of the second hash function. Let p1 = 1mΘ(1) be the
hash collision probability of h1. Then, fix an arbitrary oblivious adversary, and let k be a number
larger than 10C6. Then
Pr[D > k · Err] ≤ exp(−Ω(k · Err · log(m)))
Proof. Fix the errors that the adversary commits, then consider running RobustProtocolV2 (Algo-
rithm 8). Suppose that this run has D > k · Err. Recall that D′ ≤ D be the set of triples (i, u, v)
where ψu,v(i) > 0 and no error occurs between u and v in i. Since the number of errors is Err, we
get that D′ ≥ (k − 1) · Err. Now we argue that the fraction of hash collisions required to be in
D′ must be very large, and that this occurs with very low probability. Denote the set of these D′
triples as D˜∗ for concreteness.
Due to the nonnegativity of
∑
ψu,v, this implies that∑
(i,u,v)∈D˜∗
(5C6 + 5)Xi,u,v + 5C6(Yi,u,v)− 5(1− Yi,u,v) ≥ −6C6Err
Simplifying and using the fact that |D˜∗| = D′ > 6C6Err, we get that∑
(i,u,v)∈D˜∗
(Xi,u,v + Yi,u,v) ≥ 4
5C6 + 5
D′
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Finally, using the assumption that
∑
S′ Yi,u,v ≤ 2p2D′, and by taking p2 to be a sufficiently small
constant such that p2 < 1/(10C6 + 10), this implies that∑
(i,u,v)∈D˜∗
Xi,u,v ≥ 3
5C6 + 5
D′
Finally, using the same Chernoff bound that we used in Claim 4.17, we get that
Pr[(1/D′)
∑
(i,u,v)∈D˜∗
Xi,u,v ≥ p1 + 2
5C6 + 5
] ≤ exp(−Ω(kErr log( 1
p1
)))
By using the fact that log(1/p1) = Θ(log(m)), we conclude the result.
Finally, we can put Lemma B.3 and B.5 together to prove Theorem B.1.
Proof of Theorem B.1. Due to Lemmas B.3 and B.5, with probability 1 − exp(−Ω(|Π|), we can
conclude that CC ≤ 200αK|Π| = O(CC(Π)) and that the number of errors and hash collisions in
the protocol is bounded by EHC ≤ O(ε∗|Π|), where ε∗ > 0 is a constant that is larger than ε but is
sufficiently smaller than C7.
Finally, we recall that the potential φ rises by at least K in each iteration, and there are 100|Π|
iterations (Lemma 4.2). Claim 4.18 yields the final result.
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